FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

SURPLUS
DUPLICATE

JANVARY
1951

VOL·29 NO·2 $1·50 A COPY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

YOUR Foreign Transactions

INVOLVE SPECIAL PROBLEMS

The officers of this bank know that your *business* is *different . . . and that each depositor has individual foreign banking requirements.*

With top-ranking correspondents in every principal free city of the world, The New York Trust Company is equipped to adapt its international banking facilities to the particular needs of each depositor.

THE NEW YORK TRUST COMPANY

100 Broadway

Ten Rockefeller Plaza
Madison Avenue and 40th Street
Madison Avenue and 52nd Street
Seventh Avenue and 39th Street

Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Commercial Banking and Loans

Foreign Banking

Executor and Trustee Services

Investment Review Accounts

Custody Accounts

Corporate Trusteeships and Agencies

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

JANUARY 1951

Japan and the Crisis in Asia	*Shigeru Yoshida*	171
Two Roosevelt Decisions: One Debit, One Credit	*Sumner Welles*	182
Partnership with Asia	*P. C. Spender*	205
Principles of British Military Thought	*Major General Sir Ian Jacob*	219
Needed: A Strategy for Oil	*Halford L. Hoskins*	229
The Eastern Question in Modern Dress	*Fitzroy Maclean*	238
Historians in a Revolutionary Age	*Max Beloff*	248
Europe's Northernmost Frontier	*John J. Teal, Jr.*	263
Rearmament and European Integration	*Donald H. McLachlan*	276
The Buddhism That Was India	*Vincent Sheean*	287
German Reparations in the Soviet Empire	*Peter Nettl*	300
Vargas Returns in Brazil	*C. H. Haring*	308
Recent Books on International Relations	*Henry L. Roberts*	315
Source Material	*Ruth Savord*	336

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
Editor

BYRON DEXTER
Managing Editor

Editorial Advisory Board

GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE
JOHN W. DAVIS
ALLEN W. DULLES
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
GEORGE F. KENNAN
WILLIAM L. LANGER
CHARLES H. McILWAIN
CHARLES SEYMOUR
HENRY M. WRISTON

Published quarterly by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed at 10 McGovern Ave., Lancaster, Pa. Editorial and Business Offices, 58 East 68 Street, New York 21, N. Y. Cable address, Foraffairs, New York. Subscriptions, $6.00 a year, post free to any address. The Editors will consider manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility regarding them.

Vol. 29, No. 2.

Copyright 1950, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed in U. S. A.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

SHIGERU YOSHIDA, Prime Minister of Japan; Foreign Minister in the Shidehara Cabinet, 1945–46; former Ambassador to Italy and Great Britain * * * *SUMNER WELLES*, Under Secretary of State, 1937–43; delegate to many meetings of the American Republics; author of "The Time for Decision" and "Where Are We Heading?" * * * *P. C. SPENDER*, Minister for External Affairs of Australia; Minister for the Army, 1940–41; Opposition Member of the Advisory War Council, 1940–45 * * * *MAJOR GENERAL SIR IAN JACOB*, Military Assistant Secretary to the British War Cabinet, 1939–46; now Director of Overseas Services of the B.B.C. * * * *HALFORD L. HOSKINS*, Senior Specialist in International Relations in the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress; author of various works on the Middle East * * * *FITZROY MACLEAN*, head of the British Military Mission to the Partisans in Jugoslavia, 1943–45; author of "Escape to Adventure" * * * *MAX BELOFF*, Reader in the Comparative Study of Institutions, at Oxford, and Fellow of Corpus Christi College; author of "The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia" * * * *JOHN J. TEAL, JR.*, student of Arctic problems; during the war, Command Pilot in the Eighth Air Force * * * *DONALD H. McLACHLAN*, Assistant Editor of *The Economist*, London * * * *VINCENT SHEEAN*, author of "Personal History," "Lead, Kindly Light" and many other volumes * * * *PETER NETTL*, of St. John's College, Oxford * * * *C. H. HARING*, Professor of Latin American History and Economics in Harvard University; frequent lecturer at various universities in South America; author of "South American Progress," "The Spanish Empire in America" and other works.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, which appears in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.*

The Editors.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 29 JANUARY 1951 No. 2

JAPAN AND THE CRISIS IN ASIA

By Shigeru Yoshida

AFTER more than five years since the termination of hostilities Japan is still technically at war with 49 countries of Asia, Europe and the Western Hemisphere. That she stands ready and qualified for a settlement is admitted on all hands. It was confirmed by President Truman after his historic mid-Pacific conference with General Douglas MacArthur.

Thanks to the guidance and statesmanship of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and thanks to the bounteous aid from the American Government and people, Japan has come a long way on the road of recovery and reconstruction. Economically we have reached a point where further progress toward achieving self-support depends on our participation in world commerce as a free and independent nation. Politically, it seems high time that we were permitted to run the government on our own initiative and responsibility. A protracted occupation, no matter how efficient, wise and benevolent, tends to destroy the people's self-respect and their spirit of self-reliance; it militates against the growth of true democracy in the country. Japan awaits a peace treaty, which is long overdue.

On our Constitution Day, May 3, 1949, General MacArthur issued a message to the Japanese people, in which he took pains to explain the undue delay of a peace settlement. He stated:

> The Allied purposes enunciated at Potsdam in many essential respects have been fulfilled, and you have worked diligently and faithfully to discharge your surrender commitments. . . . That the Allied forces still occupy your native soil is thus by no means due to fault of yours since the inception of the Occupation, but rather to events and circumstances elsewhere beyond your capacity to influence or control.

It is scarcely necessary for me to describe what were those events and circumstances. They may be summarized in a single phrase: the cold war.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It may be recalled that the problem of Japanese peace as an inter-Allied issue was first brought to the fore by General MacArthur, who in 1947, shortly after the Allied Powers had signed their peace treaty with Italy, made public a statement, under the date of March 17, advocating an early conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty and termination of the Allied occupation.

The American Government proposed on July 11 the convening of a preliminary conference on Japanese peace. It stipulated that the conference be composed of the 11 nations then represented on the Far Eastern Commission and that it act by a two-thirds majority vote. Most of the governments to which the American proposal was submitted agreed in principle. The British Commonwealth Foreign Ministers' Conference, which met that summer in Canberra, formally indorsed it. However, the Soviet Union insisted that the Japanese peace treaty must be drafted by a Four Power conference of America, Britain, China and the Soviet Union, each having the right of veto. All efforts through diplomatic channels during the ensuing years to compose the difference of view on procedure bore no fruit.

Voices calling for an early Japanese peace treaty continued to be heard, echoing from continent to continent, but nothing was accomplished by way of drafting one. The difficulty lay deep in the chasm that separates the two worlds. The impasse on procedure is merely an indication of the fundamental and absolutely irreconcilable differences between democracy and totalitarian Communism in the concepts of society and state and in the ideals of human progress and civilization. It is no wonder that the two sides cannot agree on a Japanese peace treaty which is to determine the destiny of a nation of 80,000,000, and which as such will exert a large influence on the course of world history.

We welcome the news that the American Government has decided to take a vigorous step in expediting a peace settlement for Japan, and that Mr. John Foster Dulles, Special Adviser to the State Department and United States delegate to the United Nations, is engaged in preliminary conversations on a Japanese peace treaty with the members of the Far Eastern Commission, including a Soviet delegate.

In face of the treaty of military alliance which the Soviet Union concluded with the Peking Communist régime in February 1950 designating their hypothetical enemy specifically as "Japan or any other State which would unite with it," and now with the cold war

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

turned hot in Korea, it is difficult to see how the two worlds could get together. Any attempt at appeasement or compromise on the part of the free nations is unthinkable. Nor can a change of heart on the part of the Soviet Union be expected. The eventual peace treaty is likely to be a separate peace, omitting the Communist Powers. It would mean peace for Japan with a majority of the nations of the world—perhaps 44 out of the 49 referred to above.

This is opposed by some Japanese—very vehemently and very naturally by all Communists, and quite honestly but unrealistically by some politicians and professors who argue that a separate peace is not a complete peace for which, they insist, we should wait. But I speak for myself, for my Government and for a preponderant majority of the Japanese people in stating that Japan prefers a peace treaty with as many nations as possible to no peace at all.

We can ill afford to sit on the fence, vaguely waiting for something that would not happen in a predictable future. Moreover, we are definitely and irrevocably on the side of the free world. If that does not suit the other side, we can't help it.

II

One of the most important problems involved in the coming peace treaty is the question of security—the security of the Allies and the security of Japan.

I may say that the problem of Allied security has been practically solved through the thorough demilitarization of Japan, mental as well as physical. In the first place, the Japanese Navy was annihilated and most of Japan's war plants were destroyed during the war, while what had remained of her military establishments has been completely dismantled or removed since the war's end. Japan has a new constitution, renouncing war and forswearing all forms of armament. Nevertheless, apprehensions that Japan might again become a menace to world peace seem to linger among some peoples who have suffered so disastrously from Japanese aggression and who have a vivid memory of the resurgence of Germany as a satanic military power under Hitler.

Let me point out that there exists no analogy between Germany after World War I and Japan after World War II. Whereas the Armistice of 1918 found Germany unscathed, Japan in August 1945 was a bombed and battered country of smouldering ruins. Germany possessed vast iron, coal and other natural resources,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but Japan has scarcely any and she would have to import all raw materials needed for the manufacture of munitions. Since battleships and ordnance cannot be built in secret, nor modern armies trained and maintained under cover, the Powers can easily detect any war preparations by Japan and stop them at will by simply cutting off the supply of essential commodities such as iron and steel, coal and petroleum. It is inconceivable that we could ever become, even if we wanted to, a military power capable of attacking our neighbors, to say nothing of carrying war far down beyond the equator. There is no menace from Japan.

But there is a menace *to* Japan that has worried us Japanese right along in the face of the ugly manifestations of the cold war in Europe and Asia, especially the recent rapid advance of Communist forces in the Far East. The Korean war is proof of how real and close that danger is.

American statesmen and military leaders have declared again and again the determination of the United States to hold on to its defense perimeter in the Pacific, a chain of islands running from the Aleutians to the Philippines, of which Japanese islands form the central and vital link. Secretary Acheson stated on January 12, 1950, before the National Press Club: "The defeat and disarmament of Japan have placed upon the United States the necessity of assuming the military defense of Japan so long as that is required, both in the interest of the security of the entire Pacific area and in the interest of Japan's security. I can assure you that there is no intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the defense of Japan." Of course, we are safe so long as the occupation forces remain in the country. But what would happen to unarmed Japan, should the U.S. troops be withdrawn? Would it be possible or desirable for Japan to look to America for protection indefinitely? These are the problems that troubled us.The answer has been given again by the Korean war.

The news of the invasion of South Korea by the Communist forces of the north on June 25 came like a bolt from the blue. But we were happily and infinitely relieved by the alacrity and unanimity with which the free nations of the world rallied under American leadership to repel the aggressor. We have been deeply moved by the way United Nations land, sea and air forces hurried to the rescue of the harassed republic and fought hard battles with grim courage and resolution during these weeks and months. The expeditionary campaign demonstrated beyond a shadow of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a doubt the desire and intention of the United Nations to defend liberty and the rule of law in any quarter of the globe. We know now that defenseless Japan will not be left undefended in her hour of need. It is with an abiding faith in the solidarity of free nations that we shall look to the United Nations for protection of our liberty and independence. I hope the eventual peace treaty will provide for Allied support of Japan's entry into the United Nations, so that we may participate in its efforts to establish conditions of security in the Far East.

III

Communist aggression, which has resorted to war in Korea, more often follows the familiar pattern of infiltration—of fomenting discontent, creating confusion and disorder, overthrowing the legitimate government by force and setting up a puppet régime. Herein lies our problem of internal security, for we have our own share of Communists and a crop of hotheads who will rebel against any established order.

The Japanese Communist Party, long suppressed and practically nonexistent, was revived with the new era of political freedom inaugurated under Allied occupation. The Communists staged a picturesque comeback, parading the Palace Plaza, flaunting red flags and singing the Internationale. Their leaders, fresh from prison or exile, were played up like heroes by newspapers. There was something glamorous about the return of the Reds, which the public seemed well-disposed to celebrate as part of the general jubilation over the nation's deliverance from militaristic dictatorship.

Then, while the old political parties, broken up and leaderless, did nothing, the Communists got busy. They had organization, trained workers, handy formulas and, evidently, money. They set up cells in educational institutions and government offices, infiltrated the ranks of labor and scoured agrarian communities and fishing villages. Very soon they had an elaborate nation-wide network of party organization with numerous publications including a daily called *Akahata* (*Red Flag*). The party boasts 77,000 registered members besides numbers of unregistered members and fellow-travellers. In the Diet there are 24 Communists in the House of Representatives and seven in the House of Councillors.

But here again we are safe so long as the occupation troops remain with us. Any time disorders get out of hand, the G.H.Q.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will step in and clamp down on the troublemakers. The general strike set for February 1, 1947, which would have paralyzed the entire transportation service of the country, was called off by order of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. A riot which broke out among unruly Korean residents in Kobe in April 1948 was quelled by General Robert Eichelberger, then the Commanding General of the U.S. 8th Army, who personally visited the scene of disturbance. Early this year the Japanese Communist Party was rebuked by the Cominform for heresy in soft-pedalling its propaganda machine *vis-à-vis* the Allied occupation, and it instantly published an apology, admitting its error. Soon the party adopted the orthodox Communist tactics vilifying America and occupation policies. But as it grew overbold in its vituperations and destructive manœuvres to incite violence, the members of the Central Executive Committee and the editorial staff of the *Red Flag* were ordered purged. The publication of the daily itself has since been suspended. Thanks to the firm attitude of the Allied Headquarters, Communism in Japan has been effectively contained.

Moreover, the Japanese Communist Party is steadily losing ground owing to the cruelty and crudity of Communist methods, which have been exposed here and abroad, and which have alienated its would-be followers. This growing public antipathy is reflected in the election returns. Whereas in the general election for the House of Representatives the Communist Party captured more than 2,984,000 votes in January 1948, it polled 1,637,000 for district candidates and 1,333,000 for national candidates in the elections for the House of Councillors last June.

Of course, the Japanese Communist Party is not dead. Some of its top leaders on the purge list have gone underground to direct party activities from their hiding place. As soon as the Korean war started the Communists were quick to denounce American "aggression," and they have made a feeble attempt to sabotage the U.N. war effort by disrupting work in Japanese ports and shipyards. They have stirred up student strikes in protest against the proposed purge of the Reds from educational institutions. Their agitations, which have earned only the disgust and contempt of the public, appear to be intended to prove their loyalty to their foreign masters and avoid another "criticism" from the Cominform. The Government is proceeding with its plans to dismiss reprehensible Communists from its service, while coal mines

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and industrial plants have already begun to fire Red agitators and ringleaders in their employ. That these measures can now be taken with safety is an eloquent proof of the retreat of Communism. On the other hand, in order to be prepared against any threat to the country's internal security, the G.H.Q. authorized early in July the creation of a National Police Reserve of 75,000 men, who have already been recruited and are being equipped and trained.

As far as the Japanese skies are concerned, the Red star is receding.

IV

As a result of the Pacific War, Japan was stripped of 44 percent ing all of her huge overseas assets, some 80 percent of her merchant marine, and large portions of her industrial equipment for of her territory; she lost 36 percent of her national wealth, includ- civilian production. That she did not succumb to this appalling disaster of defeat but has achieved a surprising measure of recovery is entirely due to the benevolent occupation policy and the generous American aid.

In January 1948, General MacArthur's headquarters, seeing little hope for an early peace treaty for Japan, embarked upon a policy to put the country on a *de facto* peace footing as far as practicable, by removing or relaxing progressively many restrictions and controls, political as well as economic, so as to hasten Japanese recovery and self-support. It is this American policy, coupled with a comprehensive program for financial aid and technical assistance, which has enabled us to rehabilitate our industries and revive our foreign trade to the present levels.

Under the *de facto* peace the channels for private trade were widened, and Japanese businessmen were permitted to go abroad. The United States established a revolving fund to facilitate Japan's foreign trade in 1948, and a single exchange rate for the yen was set up in April 1949. In December of the same year the nine-point Economic Stabilization Plan was inaugurated. In 1950, through the good offices of the G.H.Q., we have established overseas agencies in five cities of the United States, and more are to be opened soon in Paris, Brussels, Stockholm, New Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and elsewhere. Whereas in 1947 only 50 foreigners entered Japan, the number of visitors to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

our shores in 1949 increased to 15,000, consisting of buyers and tourists, while more and more Japanese are travelling abroad on educational and cultural missions as well as for commercial purposes.

A few figures from the G.H.Q. *Economic Statistics* may suffice to indicate Japan's progress under the Allied Occupation in these past five years.

As compared with the period from 1932 to 1936, the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the China Affair, our industrial production in 1946 registered only 33 percent; but it has moved up to 94 percent as of July this year. The production index rose likewise from 10.2 in 1946 to 41.6 in 1949 for textiles, from 44 to 82.1 for agriculture, from 38 to somewhere near 80 for fisheries. As for the foreign trade, our imports and exports which in 1938 amounted respectively to $750,000,000 and $758,000,000 sank in 1946 to $305,000,000 and $103,000,000 but climbed to $902,000,000 and $510,000,000 in 1949.

These statistics are gratifying. But they fall far below the level for meeting even the immediate needs of the country. Japan must feed a population of 80,000,000, which grows at the rate of 1,500,000 a year; and Japan's domestic food supply, falling short of the demand by 19 percent, necessitates a disproportionately large outlay for the import of foodstuffs.

The figures I have cited on our foreign trade are deceptive in that owing to a drop of some 50 percent in the purchasing power of the dollar our 1949 trade total, though nominally nearing the 1938 mark, is actually less than one-half the prewar volume. Moreover, there is a glaring discrepancy between imports and exports. Our annual excess of imports over exports aggregated 1.366 billion dollars by the end of last year, all of which has been covered by the United States aid fund. In order that we may cease to be a burden to American taxpayers, we must double our foreign trade. In a long-range program for achieving a stable and self-supporting national economy we shall have to triple or even quadruple our export trade, which is, and will be for some time to come, our only means of earning foreign exchange to balance our international payments. That means we have to expand our export industries. That will mean, in turn, that we must build factories, overhaul and replace our outmoded and worn-out tools of production, introduce foreign capital and the advanced technology of the West and develop our hydroelectric resources.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Such are our needs. I hope they will be taken into sympathetic consideration by those nations which are to write the coming Japanese peace treaty. I hope Japan will be permitted to proceed with her economic reconstruction from the point which she has now reached under Allied occupation. I certainly hope the treaty will contain no stipulation that may undo what has been accomplished, or cancel out the past or future aid from the United States.

In some quarters a fear is entertained that a separate peace might permanently sever Japan's trade with Red China. Red or white, China remains our next-door neighbor. Geography and economic laws will, I believe, prevail in the long run over any ideological differences and artificial trade barriers.

However, the importance of our China trade should not be exaggerated. During the period of 1932 to 1936 the ratio of this trade to our total foreign trade did not come up to more than 22 percent in exports and 13 percent in imports (Manchuria, 4 percent and 6 percent; Kwantung leased territory, 12 percent and 2 percent; China proper, 6 percent and 5 percent). Today we have no longer any "special influence" in China. That country itself has lost much of its production and transportation capacities during these long years of warfare. It would be a mistake to expect too much from China trade.

On the other hand, the prospect is bright in the other areas of East Asia. Our trade with India, Ceylon, Indonesia and the Philippines accounted for 20 percent of our foreign trade even in the prewar days. Since the war's end the volume of our trade with these countries as well as Pakistan, Burma and Thailand under bilateral agreements has expanded rapidly, adding up in 1949 to $230,000,000 in exports and $150,000,000 in imports, or 46 percent and 17 percent respectively of our total exports and imports.

Each of these countries is about to embark upon an extensive reconstruction program for the promotion of economic stability and the elevation of living standards. According to the report submitted to the meeting of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East—an area organ under the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations—which was held in Lapstone, Australia, in December 1948, the sums of money needed for the execution of the reconstruction programs formulated by these countries are said to total 13.6 billion dollars. Moreover, the same Commission at its fifth meeting in Singapore in October last

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

adopted a resolution noting that the trade between Japan and these countries of East Asia is complementary and beneficial to the entire area, and recommending investigations with a view to furthering these trade relations. From the above-mentioned facts, it will not be amiss to assume that Japan will be called upon to use a good measure of her industrial power for the rehabilitation of these countries. If America and Britain should, as reported, extend assistance to these countries to speed their political and economic stabilization, the possibility that their potential purchasing power will be translated into an effective demand for the capital goods produced by Japan will be all the more enhanced.

Then there is Korea. The United Nations relief and rehabilitation program will eventually call for quantities of building materials, rolling stock and machinery, besides clothing and all manner of miscellaneous articles. And we are right on the spot to supply them.

But in order that Japan may become a real workshop of East Asia and contribute abundantly to its progress and prosperity she must have a peace treaty. It is essential that we be guaranteed an equitable and equal treatment in international commerce, the rights of travel and residence, and full freedom of trade and shipping in this and other quarters of the globe. Such conditions of commerce and navigation can be realized only after the conclusion of peace and Japan's restoration as a free and independent member to the society of nations. There are inevitable and severe limitations to any *de facto* peace arrangement.

V

Finally, there is a spiritual need for a peace treaty. The munificence of the American Government and people has conferred untold benefits upon Japan. We are deeply grateful to the Allied authorities for guiding and assisting us in the difficult task of national reconstruction. The presence of the Allied forces has been the prime factor for ensuring the country's tranquillity and internal security.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that a military occupation is prejudicial to the fostering of initiative and enterprise, the sense of responsibilty, the spirit of self-reliance and independence, pride and patriotism. These qualities of the spirit cannot be fully developed until our nation is restored to complete sovereignty and reinstated in the community of nations as a free and independent

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

member. Let me, without dwelling on the demoralizing effects of a military occupation, quote from General MacArthur, who views the problem from another angle and perceives that the evils which flow from prolonged occupation affect both sides. In his message of February 20, 1947, to the War Department reiterating his firm purpose to restore peace and normalcy at the very earliest time practicable, and recommending that civilian controls be substituted for the existing military controls, he wrote:

> History points out the unmistakable lesson that military occupations serve their purpose at best only for a limited time, after which a deterioration rapidly sets in—deterioration of the populace in an occupied country which becomes increasingly restive under the deprivation of personal freedom, inherent in such a situation—and deterioration of the occupying forces which in time assume a dominant power complex pointing to the illusion of a master race.

Japan awaits a peace treaty. We do not know what will be the conditions of peace. This is a treaty Japan will conclude as a defeated nation for the first time in her history, and it is likely to prove a bitter pill for us to swallow. But we are prepared to take our punishment. We are resolved to redeem our mistaken past by fulfilling the peace terms whatever they may be with all the sincerity and good faith which we have shown in the discharge of our obligations under the Instrument of Surrender during the past five years.

Meanwhile, I earnestly hope that the coming peace treaty will be such as will give hope for the future and inspire a fresh zeal for national reconstruction; and such as will bring forth a peaceful, hardworking and prosperous Japan—a nation, chastened and free, fit to serve as a bastion of democracy in the Far East. And I repeat my hope that as a result of the treaty Japan may enter the United Nations. We are ready and anxious to join, do our full share and make sacrifices, if necessary, in any arrangement for international coöperation under United Nations auspices to ensure the security of the Pacific as well as of Japan.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TWO ROOSEVELT DECISIONS: ONE DEBIT, ONE CREDIT

By Sumner Welles

WHY did the United States not try to reach agreements with other members of the United Nations on political and territorial problems while the war was still in progress? Perhaps no one question about the conduct of wartime diplomacy is asked more frequently than this, and in no field of policy are critics—writing in the perspective of 1950—more sharp in their comments on the shortsightedness of Allied leaders. It is true that the President and his Secretary of State were officially committed to a policy of no agreements on territorial adjustments or political settlements until the war was over, at which time these could be taken up for consideration and decision at a peace conference of the United Nations. This very definitely was also the policy favored by the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. Perhaps it may be helpful at this crucial juncture of our affairs to review the background of this decision. Another fateful wartime decision, to create the United Nations organization while the war was still in progress, had a happier outcome. How and why that decision was reached I shall also attempt to relate in the pages which follow.

If the great peace conferences of Vienna in 1815 and of Paris in 1919 had taught any one lesson clearly, surely it was that victorious allies invariably quarrel among themselves over the division of the spoils. At Paris in 1919 we saw in particular how appallingly difficult it was to overcome the exaggerated forms of selfish nationalism to which a victorious war gives rise. This was so even though we then were negotiating primarily with Great Britain, France and Italy, Western nations with ideals and practices similar to our own. This time we would be dealing with the Soviet Union. The Stalin-Hitler deal of August 1939 and the Kremlin's subsequent course hardly gave ground for confidence in the inherent altruism of the Bolshevik Politburo's foreign policy. What reason was there to think that, after the defeat of our common enemies, Russia triumphant would be disposed to

Editor's Note: This article will form part of a volume by Mr. Welles, entitled "Seven Decisions That Shaped History," to be published in the spring by Harper and Brothers, New York.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

give the claims of humanity to peace, freedom, happiness and prosperity priority over her own demands for what Stalin would term "security?"

All the "spoils" that the United States wanted for itself at the end of the Second World War were a peace founded on justice and practical common sense so that future wars might be avoided. We would hardly be likely to secure this single end if we postponed taking action until once again the victors were quarreling around the peace conference table. Yet at the very outset the possibility that we would be able to take any steps in that direction seemed to be precluded.

Early in December 1941, Anthony Eden, then British Foreign Secretary, was about to go to Moscow. The United States was not yet at war, but he had let us know that the future status of the Baltic Republics would undoubtedly come up in his talks with Stalin and Molotov. I myself expressed the strong hope in talking with both the President and Secretary Hull that we would urge the British Government not to make any final agreement which would commit Great Britain to support the permanent obliteration of the three states in question—Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. A message in that sense was sent to Foreign Secretary Eden on December 5, 1941, through Ambassador Winant in London.

But the message sent by Secretary Hull went much farther indeed than a mere note of caution on this specific issue. The position he took was that, inasmuch as the Soviet, British and United States Governments were bound by their acceptance of the Atlantic Charter to be guided by its principles in all postwar settlements, no specific terms of settlement should be agreed upon before the final peace conference. The Secretary of State very properly concluded by also urging that in any event no secret commitments should be made. At the moment when the message was sent (only two days before Pearl Harbor) the terms in which it was couched seemed innocuous enough. The principles for postwar policy laid down by the Atlantic Charter provided an altogether desirable pattern.

Yet they constituted a pattern, and nothing more. They gave no slightest indication, for example, as to the justice or injustice of a given settlement covering eastern Poland. The Soviet Government might claim quite plausibly that its retention of eastern Poland would not be territorial aggrandizement of the sort

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prohibited by the first article of the Atlantic Charter, but, on the contrary, a "territorial change" that fully accorded "with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned," as authorized by the second article. Yet the Polish Government-in-Exile would inevitably maintain that such a "territorial change" was aggrandizement at its worst and that the wishes of "the peoples concerned" could not be "freely expressed." Agreement upon the broad principles of the Atlantic Charter would never in itself prevent future bitter controversies over frontiers and zones of influence.

In any event, the message to Anthony Eden created a precedent upon which a policy was soon erected. When the British Foreign Secretary left for Moscow he took instructions from his Cabinet which were similar in intent to the request made by the United States Government. In Moscow, however, he was met with an insistent demand that Great Britain without further ado formally commit herself to the recognition of Russia's 1941 frontiers as they had been established by Stalin's deal with Hitler in 1939. Stalin also proposed the restoration of Austria as an independent state, the detachment of the Rhineland from Prussia as an independent state or protectorate, and possibly the constitution of an independent state of Bavaria. Other suggested territorial changes included the transfer of East Prussia to Poland and of Sudetenland to Czechoslovakia, as well as certain adjustments in the Balkans. "As regards the special interests of the Soviet Union," according to Mr. Eden, "Stalin desired the restoration of the position in 1941, prior to the German attack, in respect of the Baltic States, Finland and Bessarabia. The 'Curzon Line' should form the basis for the future Soviet-Polish frontier, and Rumania should give special facilities for bases, etc., to the Soviet Union, receiving compensation from territory now occupied by Hungary."[1] British recognition of the Soviet demands was to be a preliminary to any Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance.

In accordance with his instructions, Mr. Eden limited himself while in Moscow to the promise that the Russian claims would at some future time be considered by the British Commonwealth as well as by the United States. But upon his return to London he was further pressed by Mr. Molotov, and from Mr. Eden's messages it appeared that he felt the need to comply unless the English-speaking Powers were willing to run the risk of an

[1] Winston S. Churchill, "The Grand Alliance." Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950, p. 628.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

early break with their Soviet ally and of a separate peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Germany.

The issue was, of course, clear-cut. It was evident that even at the climax of the furious German assault upon the Soviet armies Stalin wished to be sure that he would retain the fruits of his earlier collusion with Hitler. The Soviet Government had just subscribed to the United Nations declaration and, consequently, to the provisions of the Atlantic Charter. Yet it was now pressing for a commitment which would violate the spirit as well as the letter of the Charter.

From our standpoint in Washington such an agreement was unthinkable. Our acquiescence in it would have been interpreted in every quarter of the globe as meaning that the Atlantic Charter, in which the British and American Governments had solemnly announced their intention of securing a future peace which would assure "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live," was, in fact, no more than a hollow sham, a collection of high-sounding phrases designed merely to impress the ingenuous. It would have lost the United States that invaluable measure of moral support which was forthcoming in all the countries where people were still able to think and speak freely, and which eventually proved to be of such great avail in the winning of the war.

We found that Mr. Churchill stood four-square with us on this issue. He stated categorically during his first visit to Washington as Prime Minister what he has frequently since reiterated, that "the Baltic States should be sovereign independent peoples." In a message to Mr. Eden of January 8, 1942, he said: "The transfer of the peoples of the Baltic States to Soviet Russia against their will would be contrary to all the principles for which we are fighting this war and would dishonor our cause. This also applies to Bessarabia and to Northern Bukhovina and in a lesser degree to Finland, which I gather it is not intended wholly to subjugate and absorb. . . . In any case there can be no question of settling frontiers until the peace conference. I know President Roosevelt holds this view as strongly as I do, and he has several times expressed his pleasure to me at the firm line we took at Moscow. . . . There must be no mistake about the opinion of any British Government of which I am the head, namely, that it adheres to those principles of freedom and democracy set forth in the Atlantic Charter, and that these principles must become

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

especially active whenever any question of transferring territory is raised."[2]

It was thus, barely a month after the United States entered the war, that a firm agreement was reached between the American and British Governments that no commitments upon postwar political and territorial settlements should be made until the peace conference. For the time being, the Soviet Government acquiesced. When Molotov visited Washington six months later, in June 1942, he proffered no demand for a reconsideration of the American and British refusal to recognize Russia's frontiers prior to June 1941.

Yet it was inconceivable, of course, that the lesser Powers which had territorial or political disputes with the Soviet Union, or with their smaller neighbors, should not seek during the war, while they were bound together in the common cause against Hitler, to get by direct negotiation a settlement that would be confirmed after the victory. If any demonstration of this had been needed, it was soon afforded, first by the several visits to Washington of General Sikorski, the Prime Minister of the Polish Government-in-Exile, and later by the visits of President Beneš of Czechoslovakia.

Sikorski recognized, of course, that no final commitments as to the future status of Poland or the future extension of Polish territory could be made by any Polish Government-in-Exile, but that these matters must await the freely expressed decision of the Polish people themselves. Nevertheless, he told me that it would be criminally short-sighted on his part not to seek an opportunity during the war of reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union and with Czechoslovakia on political and territorial issues, so that the entire problem could be successfuly clarified before any peace conference was held.

He felt—correctly, I think—that there would be no difficulty in finding an agreement with Czechoslovakia. Whether he was equally justified in speaking so confidently, on the basis of his conversations with Stalin in Moscow in 1941, of his ability to negotiate a fair settlement with the Soviet Union is another matter. I remember clearly how he told me that Stalin had quoted to him, with apparent approval, Lenin's remark to the effect that the Soviet Government must realize that the Poles had reason to hate Russia and must treat them in a friendly way and give

[2] Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 695.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Polish nationalism full recognition. In any event, after Sikorski had succeeded with British help in restoring diplomatc relations with Moscow, and had arranged for the formation of a Polish Army to fight against Germany on Russian soil, he felt that he had made concrete progress and that he was not unduly optimistic in believing that fair political and territorial adjustments might be negotiated with Stalin.

President Beneš had had greater experience in the international arena and so was less sanguine. He recognized realistically, as he told me, that the future independence and security of Czechoslovakia lay solely in her ability to walk the tightrope over the abyss between the East and the West. For that reason he undertook his wartime visits to Moscow in the belief that only through understandings reached directly with Stalin could there be any hope that his country would be saved from Russian hegemony in the years to come.

In the same way, the representatives of almost all the smaller European members of the United Nations spoke to me of this, that or the other territorial rectification or reparation which they were determined to seek and which they hoped to consolidate by prior agreement before the end of the war.

In fact, one of the questions uppermost in my mind during the two years after Pearl Harbor was whether the United States Government was not losing an unparalleled opportunity to further the achievement of the kind of peace desired by the American people. By the spring of 1942 we had already commenced within the State Department our intensive study of the kind of world organization and of the kind of political and territorial settlements that we wanted to see made. The work was undertaken by the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy, set up in the State Department under my chairmanship on the authority of President Roosevelt exactly three weeks after Pearl Harbor. The Committee at first was small, consisting of a few Department officials, a handful of private citizens called in because of their special knowledge, and several Congressional leaders of both parties whom the President had authorized me to invite. Later it became unwieldy, and was the subject of endless bickering and internecine feuds.

But even in the period when the Advisory Committee could function effectively the results of its studies necessarily represented merely the formulation of what we Americans believed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to be wise, right and just. We might assume that our views would be found to coincide very largely with those of the British Commonwealth, of our neighbors of the Western Hemisphere and of the lesser Powers of Western Europe. But in the light of our experience to date with the Soviet Union, what possible assurance could we have that when the peace conference arrived Moscow would be willing to accept even a small percentage of our recommendations? Was it not the part of wisdom, as soon as our own views had been formulated, and as soon as we had ascertained what the views of our American neighbors and of some of the smaller countries of Europe might be, to try to do what Mrs. Roosevelt had suggested three years before, namely, set up officially an international group "continuously to plan for future peace?" Should we not create a body, similar in its composition to what later became the Security Council of the United Nations, and representing all of the United Nations, so that this organism might commence without delay to study the future structure of the world, iron out so far as might be possible difficulties among the several members of the United Nations, and be prepared at the end of the war to present for the final approval of the peace conference a series of settlements and of postwar policies already agreed upon in principle? I naturally discussed this possibility with the other members of the Advisory Committee. There the suggestion met with general approval, enthusiastic on the part of some and tepid on the part of others. Yet at the highest level it was summarily turned down.

I think it is wholly accurate to say that, while the President decided to reject the proposal, the intrinsic idea commended itself to him. In judging his decision we must remember the several influences which were being brought to bear upon him and the considerations by which a Commander-in-Chief must necessarily be guided. Winning the war was and had to remain the foremost objective. No step in the political realm, however beneficial it might promise to be later on, could properly be taken if it jeopardized or threatened to postpone the victory.

The first ten months of 1942 were for us the darkest period of the war. We had to face not only the succession of disasters which had struck us in the Pacific but also the series of calamities which had overtaken the British war effort since Pearl Harbor —the setbacks in Libya, the Nazi occupation of Greece, the fall of Crete, and the growing threat to the security of Egypt. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russian armies were resisting the German onslaught magnificently, but how long could they hold?

It was altogether natural that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should constantly warn the President that, whatever advantages might theoretically be gained by trying to settle political and territorial problems during the war, these future assets must be regarded as offset by the immediate dangers of awakening controversies with Russia. If we joined with the British in such an attempt we would at once run headlong into a renewed demand that we recognize the 1941 frontiers of Soviet Russia. How could we do so in view of the position which we had already taken? And would we not inevitably find it impossible to concede other claims that Russia might advance later—for control of the Straits, for a predominant position in Iran, and for strategic and territorial concessions in the Far East—without incurring the legitimate resentment of the peoples of Turkey, the Middle East and China?

On the other hand, suppose we continued firm in rejecting the Russian claims. Would we not, at best, bring about a breakdown in Russian coöperation with us in the war against Germany or, at the worst (and this possibility was in the minds of the Joint Chiefs of Staff throughout the war), encourage the Kremlin to negotiate a separate peace with Hitler? The Joint Chiefs of Staff frequently emphasized the significance of the British Cabinet's belief that a message received from Moscow as early as September 5, 1941, conveyed the impression that Stalin was already then thinking of coming to terms with Germany separately. Representations like these would have been persuasive at any time. During the dark year of 1942 they were necessarily decisive.

There were other considerations as well. The Secretary of State was temperamentally disposed to put off dealing with controversial issues as long as possible. He preferred not to cross the proverbial bridge until he came to it. A remedial policy was to him preferable to a preventive policy. If the discussion of such exceedingly thorny problems as the Baltic States or Poland's eastern frontiers could be postponed until a peace conference, that was infinitely better than grasping the nettle now with decision and dispatch. And this was a moment, it is to be remembered, when as a consequence of the extreme friction that had arisen between President Roosevelt and Mr. Hull in January 1942 the President was making every effort to avoid running counter to Mr. Hull's recommendations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nor must we lose sight of the President's never-failing preoccupation with his rôle as wartime leader of the American people. He was determined to preserve national unity. If it became known that the Government was engaged in discussions about the future frontiers of Poland, the future status of the Baltic States and other East European postwar settlements there could be little doubt that large racial minorities in this country would at once be greatly exercised and become divided into quarreling and antagonistic groups.

Last, but by no means least, was the fact that while the President saw clearly the advantages of going to the peace conference with prior agreements on political and territorial problems he by no means felt that our hope of securing a good peace would necesssarily be prejudiced by postponing the discussion of these issues. For he had—and justly—great confidence in his own ability as a negotiator.

It is perhaps only fair to add that President Roosevelt was apt occasionally to place too much reliance upon a few favorite panaceas in his approach to problems which actually were too basic and far-reaching in their origins and nature to admit of easy solutions. For example, he had a faith in the efficacy of plebiscites as a cure-all for most of Europe's territorial controversies. He was even more wedded than Woodrow Wilson had been to the idea that plebiscites are a universal remedy. It was at about this time that he talked to me one evening for well over an hour about the desirability of employing this method to settle once and for all the friction among the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes which had so beclouded the history of Jugoslavia as an independent state. He apparently did not attribute much importance to the harm that would be done to the national economies of all three peoples should they decide to become independent entities. It was also his original intention to recommend this same plebiscite principle if and when the time came to discuss the future of the Baltic States with Stalin. He said that he was certain that he could get Stalin to agree that a freely-conducted plebiscite should be held in all three of the republics, under international auspices. As is now well known, the President found out at Yalta how vain this illusion had been. Stalin told him that the subject was one which he refused to discuss, inasmuch as the Baltic peoples had already voted to join the Soviet Union.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As the months passed, however, it became plain that while it might be much easier and in some ways perhaps more expedient to postpone discussions of such problems as these until the peace conference, the morale of certain countries—China, for example—would be seriously impaired if their governments could not be given a firm assurance as to their future status. It was also becoming more and more apparent that the appetite of a victorious Soviet Union might well become inordinate if no effort was made to check it before the end of the war. The recognition of these imperious necessities resulted in several purely political actions. Declarations covering the restoration of Austrian independence and the future status of Italy were issued when the Foreign Ministers of the four major allies met in Moscow in October 1943; and a declaration covering Korean independence and the restoration to China of Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores was made when the President met with Chiang Kai-shek and Churchill at Cairo in December of the same year.

At Teheran and at Yalta new and significant political agreements were reached. It was at Teheran that the President first brought up the suggestion that Russia should have access to the Manchurian port of Dairen. At Teheran, too, Stalin temporarily reversed the position which he had taken in his conferences with Eden the year before; he stated that there was no need at that moment for him to speak of Russia's future territorial interests, but added, not without grim significance, that "when the time comes we will speak." It was at Yalta that Roosevelt and Churchill conceded Stalin's demands in the Far East, including the recovery of Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands and the acquisition of a position in Manchuria that was tantamount to full control of that ancient Chinese province. At Yalta, also, Poland's future limits and the political composition of her future government were taken up.

What this brief record shows is that the position so confidently and firmly taken by the British and American Governments in January 1942 was wholly at variance with the course which they later actually pursued, and that this change of policy in a matter of vital significance apparently was not due to a conscious decision by either of them. They seem to have been drifting into a fundamental modification of policy without any realistic apprehension of all its implications.

It must be ruefully admitted, also, that many of the American

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

discussions of postwar territorial and political problems with the Soviet Union were undertaken in a singularly haphazard fashion and without full consideration or preparation. In January 1942 there were two clear-cut alternatives before the United States. One was to create an official international commission, "continuously to plan for future peace." The other was to refuse resolutely to discuss any political or territorial question until a peace conference assembled. Each course had its advantages and disadvantages. My own judgment now, as it was then, is that the advantages of the former far outweighed its disadvantages. By sticking neither to one nor the other we fell between two stools. The immense influence which the United States possessed immediately after Pearl Harbor was not exercised. When the United States did attempt to negotiate political settlements its influence was no longer decisive.

Further, it would be hard to deny that before 1943 the influence of the United States would probably have been conclusive if it had been utilized to support postwar settlements which, although insuring legitimate security to the Russian people, would at the same time have seemed just and wise to the remaining peoples of Europe, the New World and the Far East. At that stage its moral influence was incomparably greater than that of either of its major allies. Mr. Churchill had aroused the hearts and souls of the English-speaking world by his resplendent war leadership. Nevertheless, the part played by his predecessors in European affairs during the decades between the two world wars, his own more recent quarrel with the French, and Britain's rôle as a colonial Power in Asia, Africa and the Near East diminished popular confidence in the British Government. As for the Soviet Government, the suspicion and mistrust aroused by its policy after 1917, and the long war waged by the Kremlin upon organized religion, had deprived Soviet Russia of the moral support of a large part of the world outside of the Communist Party membership. Her struggle against Hitlerism had brought her admiration and a measure of popular backing. Nevertheless, it was to the United States, and in particular to Roosevelt himself, that countless millions of men and women in every part of the globe were turning more and more for leadership in winning freedom and security.

The political influence of the United States was at its peak. Its military strength was already far greater, in proportion to the strength of its allies, than it ever had been during the First World

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

War. The success of the North African operation had revealed its military potentialities. In the production field it was plainly supreme. Two years later, it is true, the Navy, the Army and the Air Force were to be immeasurably greater in striking power. Yet by then the Soviet armies had demonstrably defeated the Nazi invaders.

Stalin himself, at the Teheran Conference at the end of 1942, declared that, except for American production, "the war would have been lost." The armament production which he wrested from the hardly beset Russian people after the German invasion was nothing short of miraculous. But the arms and airplanes which he received from the then limited resources of the United States, in those first dire months when the Russian armies were so sorely pressed that he begged both the British and American Governments to send divisions under their own command to fight on Russian soil, helped greatly to make possible the victory at Moscow.

Should not the United States, at the moment of which I speak, have explored the possibility of reaching a firm agreement with Stalin on postwar political and territorial settlements? Is it not probable that if it had done so its influence would have been sufficiently potent to have kept those settlements within the bounds which a subsequent peace conference of all the United Nations would have been disposed to accept as legitimate and equitable?

To answer these questions we must try to estimate what Stalin would have regarded as the irreducible minimum of his demands. We know what those demands were in December 1941, when he presented them to Mr. Eden. At that very moment the German armies had reached a point only a few miles from Moscow. It would be logical to assume that when Russia's fortunes seemed to be at their lowest ebb Stalin was not resorting to sheer bargaining, and that he was sincere in maintaining that if Russia were victorious she could not accept less than the territorial security that his demands represented.

Of the commitments for which Stalin then asked, one, the Curzon Line, had long been regarded in the West as a legitimate boundary between Poland and Russia, for ethnic as well as strategic reasons. It was in fact accepted by Churchill and Roosevelt at the Teheran Conference later that year. The adjustments involving Bessarabia and Bukovina were not a major difficulty. From the American standpoint, the only one of the commitments

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sought by Stalin that could not have been accepted was that for the permanent incorporation of the three Baltic Republics into the Soviet Union.

Yet even here it is doubtful whether Stalin in the winter of 1943 would have proved altogether obdurate. Up to the time of the deal with Hitler his own record had been one of consistent opposition to all projects for the increase of Russian territory. It is not often remarked nowadays that it was Stalin himself who went to Helsinki in 1917 to declare the independence of Finland from Russia. Time and again he had announced as his immutable policy, "Not one foot of foreign soil." In this he was, of course, repeating one of Lenin's most cherished tenets. And we find him in 1925 announcing that any effort on the part of the Soviet Union to acquire spheres of influence abroad would be "the road to nationalism and degeneration, the road of full liquidation of the international policy of the proletariat." Until the eve of the Second World War, so far as we can tell from the documents so far made public, as well as by Stalin's support of Litvinov's efforts on behalf of collective security, he had never wavered from that position. It seems by no means unreasonable to assume that some fair solution of this one basic difficulty might have been found if the matter had been broached in the early days of the joint war effort. Such a settlement would of course have had to include an assurance to Stalin that the solution would provide security against a new attack from a rearmed Germany in the years to come. This danger was an obsession with him which governed all his thinking in his dealings with his major allies.

But if Stalin had proved impervious to all American suggestions, what course could he have pursued in the winter of 1943? He could not have risked a withdrawal of lend-lease assistance or a diminution of Anglo-American coöperation without inviting a Russian defeat. The consensus of opinion in Washington and London was that he might sue for a separate peace with Germany. We now know that he was equally fearful that his Western allies might make such a peace. Yet Stalin at that time had by no means attained the measure of popularity that was to be his during the last years of the war; and to sue for a separate peace would have been most unpopular with the Russian people, then in a state of savage fury over the devastation of their homeland and the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis. Finally, what prospect was there at that moment that he could secure even as good peace terms from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an enraged Hitler as had been granted to Russia in the shameful Brest-Litovsk Treaty 25 years before?

From that time on the situation altered rapidly. The victory at Stalingrad was followed by the ultimate German retreat. The Red armies occupied the territory to which Stalin had laid claim. The moment for negotiation was gone. Simultaneously, as Russia's military strength increased, the leverage which American political, military and industrial strength could exert upon the Kremlin correspondingly diminished. Soviet Russia had become the principal Power in Europe and in Asia, and her ambitions grew proportionately.

As I see it, the critics of the agreements reached at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam confuse cause and effect. The agreements so bitterly assailed would have been far different in their nature had the President decided in 1942 to insist upon the creation of a United Nations Council charged with the duty of finding solutions for political and territorial problems before the end of the war. His refusal to do so was in accord with the advice given him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by his Secretary of State, and by most of his White House advisors, as well as with the views then held by the Prime Minister of Great Britain. He made his decision in the conviction that as Commander-in-Chief he possessed the paramount obligation to permit nothing to jeopardize the winning of the war. Yet with the advantage that hindsight gives us, is it not fair to say that it was that decision which was largely responsible for the division of the world today into two hostile camps?

II

In another field where the Advisory Committee on Post-War Problems did long and careful work the accomplishment was more satisfactory. The planning for future international organization which was undertaken in the Department of State during the war did not at first appeal to the President. But in 1942, counter to his early inclinations, he approved it as the basis for the Moscow Declaration which opened the way for the subsequent Dumbarton Oaks Conference. In the early stages of the war he had not believed that the time was propitious to create a world organization. Yet at Teheran in 1943 he initiated the discussions with Churchill and Stalin which later made possible the negotiation of the U.N. Charter at San Francisco. To him, indeed, and to him alone, we owe the fact that a preliminary United Nations organization

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

came into existence before the end of the war; and without that there would have been no United Nations today.

Why did Roosevelt believe, as late as 1941, that the United States should make no commitment to help rebuild an "effective international organization?" As a Vice-Presidential nominee in the campaign of 1920 he had made more than 800 speeches in support of the League of Nations. Yet all of his intimates knew that during the following two decades his enthusiasm for the League had cooled to a point where it might fairly be described as glacial.

This was due in part, I think, to his disgust, after the first few years of the League's existence, with the way the British and the French, particularly the former, so frequently prevented the League from facing any major issue squarely. He said to me once, in 1935: "The League of Nations has become nothing more than a debating society, and a poor one at that!"

But it must also be remembered that the President himself, consummate politician that he was, was never blind to what was politically inexpedient. In the early thirties he felt that the American people were firmly wedded to a policy of isolation, and that the question of American participation in the League—as distinguished from the World Court—had become altogether academic. Had he raised the League issue in the campaigns of 1932 or 1936 he knew his Republican opponents would have secured great political advantage from playing again on all of those jealousies, fears and suspicions that had so fatally confused the voters in the 1920 campaign.

It is also, perhaps, a characteristic of many of the members of the Roosevelt clan to overestimate the value of success in itself and to appraise unsuccessful causes and endeavors too cheaply merely because of their failure. And no one could deny that the League of Nations had been an abject failure.

Another compelling motive for the President's failure to devote much thought to the details of international organization immediately before and after Pearl Harbor was his preoccupation with his rôle as Commander-in-Chief of America's armed forces. He felt that his first obligation was to persuade the American people to subordinate every other consideration to winning the war. As early as September 11, 1939, Mrs. Roosevelt had publicly stated: "Let us pray that this time we will have strength and foresight enough to plan a more permanent way of peace. . . . I should like to see an international group meeting now continuously to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plan for future peace." But I know that her view was not shared by most of the President's White House advisors. Some of them, like Harry Hopkins, were inclined toward isolationism because of early environment and individual preference. Others whose duties were largely confined to the field of practical politics strongly felt that anything resembling an appeal for American participation in a postwar international organization would resurrect the old League of Nations controversy and would be filled with political dynamite. They insisted that it was a dangerous and unnecessary risk.

These influences were all the stronger because they coincided with certain of the President's own inclinations and prejudices. Yet the factors which brought about a complete change in his viewpoint proved in the long run more powerful still.

There were, first of all, the spectacular results of his own initiative in summoning the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace at Buenos Aires in 1936. During the next five years the President had seen the rapid and steady growth of a regional organization composed of the 21 American republics. He had seen this organization bring hemispheric solidarity against the Axis Powers. He had also been profoundly impressed, and somewhat surprised, by the enthusiastic reception which American public opinion had given the Atlantic Charter. The Charter represented a total break with the narrowly isolationist policies of the Harding, Coolidge and Hoover Administrations. It declared that the United States, a nation still nominally neutral, would coöperate after the war in laying the foundations for a decent and peaceful world. He had seen the American people respond with almost universal approval.

The mounting list of casualties within the family of nations also affected his thinking. He had been revolted to the very depths of his soul in 1939 and 1940 by the prospect of the kind of world that Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin were so rapidly creating. His original reaction had been the concept of an Anglo-American policing job. But as time went on he saw that, appealing as the idea might be, it could not work. Britain, even though victorious, would be ruined at the end of the war. New and mighty revolutionary forces were arising throughout the world, and even the unparalleled power and resources of the United States could not successfully cope with them alone. Some other answer had to be found.

But I am convinced that the determining factor was the im-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mense impact of Pearl Harbor itself. The disaster brought home to him the full realization that today Great Power aggression can be forestalled only by effective collective security. In any event, the definitive change in Roosevelt's beliefs took place between the Atlantic Charter meeting and the spring of 1942.

The reason I feel that I can speak with authority on this is that in the very many talks which I had with the President between 1936 and the summer of 1941 on the subject of international organization, he never once was willing to agree that an organization composed of all non-totalitarian countries was as yet feasible. Much less did he agree that the United States should attempt to participate in the construction of a new international organization. After Pearl Harbor, however, he not only became steadily more engrossed in the possibility of international organization; he made plain that I might take it for granted that, when and if, in his judgment, the moment became ripe, he would assert American leadership in an attempt to create the kind of new world envisaged in the Atlantic Charter.

During the first part of 1942 it is quite true the President frequently used to say that he did not want to become drawn into the intensive studies of postwar settlements already under way in the Department of State. This was primarily because he feared that if he did really get into them he would become so interested that he might be tempted to devote less of his time and thought to the war effort itself. It was also probably due to his wish to keep an open mind regarding frontiers and other postwar problems, knowing that some compromises would be inevitable and that it would be inexpedient for him to become too fixed in advance in his own convictions about particular solutions.

At the beginning of 1943, after I had been urging him to let me have the needed time, the President finally gave me an uninterrupted two hours at the White House in which I might show him in written form the tentative conclusions reached by our Advisory Committee regarding a future international organization. He saw me in his office late one afternoon after the day's appointments were finished and after he had signed the urgent papers in the wire baskets which flowed so endlessly across his desk. For once he was not in a digressive mood. He read very carefully the memoranda and charts that I placed before him.

At that stage the members of the Departmental committee were almost unanimously of the opinion that any new world struc-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ture should be built upon regional organizations similar to the Organization of American States. Each of these regional organizations would periodically elect representatives to sit in a superior executive council to which supreme authority would be delegated by all of the members of the United Nations. This executive council was to be composed of 11 members, seven of them to be elected by the regional organizations and the remaining four to be delegates of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China. These four were to have permanent seats, with a veto to the extent that the employment of military force could be ordered by the supreme executive council only if nine of its members voted affirmatively. However, if any one of the major Powers was found guilty of aggression, that country should not be permitted to veto the use of military sanctions upon it.

In general, the President thought well of the project. He expressed considerable doubt, however, whether regional organizations of the Near East and, for that matter, of Asia, could be expected to function efficiently in view of the lack of experience in self-government of most of the peoples in those areas.

The President held some exceedingly decided views as to the nations that should be given the ultimate authority to run the world during the first years after the war. There was naturally no question about the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States. But he could not persuade himself that France was entitled at that juncture to be regarded as a major Power. He felt that her recovery would be impossible if she continued to spend the major part of her national revenues upon armaments and a standing army, and that, since Germany must be dismembered, disarmed and placed under international control, there was no reason why France should continue to maintain a great military establishment.

On the other hand, he was equally positive that China from the outset should be regarded as a major Power, with a permanent seat on the supreme executive committee of the United Nations. He felt, he said, that recognition of China's status as one of the four major Powers would prevent any charge that the white races were undertaking to dominate the world; that it would do much to stimulate patriotism and national pride in China, and to pull the various contending factions together; and that a stable China, recognized as one of the Great Powers, would be a barrier to Soviet ambitions in the Far East and serve as a centripetal force in Asia.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This would be of the utmost value in limiting the effects of the revolutionary tidal wave already looming in the Far East.

I fully agreed with the President's conclusions concerning China. But I believed that only harm would result if he persisted in his views about France. In fact, I argued with him for some time, pointing out that, if, as I hoped, Germany was going to be disarmed and divided into a number of autonomous sovereign states, Great Britain alone could not be expected—especially in view of her losses during the Second World War—to balance in Western Europe the weight of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. I doubt that my arguments had much effect at that time. Two years later, however, the President himself was to urge the Soviet Union to agree to French participation in the military control of Germany. He also subsequently dropped all ideas of French disarmament, probably as a result of the representation made to him by Mr. Churchill. At all events I never heard him refer to it again.

The State Department's projects had been thoroughly digested by the President and were very much in his mind when Anthony Eden, then British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, came to Washington in March 1943 to canvass our Government's views on postwar problems. Shortly before his arrival, Mr. Churchill had delivered a speech on postwar problems which gave the impression that he was interested solely in the creation after the war of a regional European organization which the United States should be invited to join, and that he had abandoned his earlier support for a more general international organization. Mr. Eden made it plain that he himself staunchly favored the construction of a new, universal, international organization, though he deprecated the idea that the Prime Minister really differed with him in that regard.

Mr. Eden came to the White House one day late in March for a full discussion with the President, the British Ambassador, Secretary Hull and myself. The President outlined the kind of international organization which he had been thinking over since my talk with him in January. He emphasized, rather more strongly than I hoped he would, his belief that Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States, together with China, must for a long time to come assert the right to make all the basic decisions affecting the maintenance of world order. As I remember the conversation—which was comprehensive, although at times it ran off on side issues—there was already a very remarkable meeting of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

minds between the British and ourselves, even on the subject of trusteeships.

In June of that year I gave the President the final blueprint of the United Nations as we had formulated it in the Department, and when I went to see him the day before he left for the Teheran Conference this draft with his own notes and suggested amendments was lying on his bed. The sketch drawn by the President at the Teheran meeting, reproduced in Sherwood's "Roosevelt and Hopkins,"[3] conveys simply but graphically all of the essential features of the project we had so often discussed. In the meantime the major members of the United Nations, including China and so far excluding France, had issued at Moscow the joint declaration announcing their intention of establishing a universal organization. But it was at Teheran that Roosevelt and Stalin first discussed, around the table, the form which that organization should assume.

In view of Russian policy since the war, it is worth noting that at Teheran Stalin opposed the inclusion of China as a major Power. China would never have been so accepted had not Roosevelt overridden the joint British and Russian objections. Moreover, by then Stalin had come to favor the creation of regional councils entrusted with responsibility for maintaining peace, and he advocated that the United States be included in such a regional council for Europe. What is equally worthy of note is the President's blunt statement at the conference that the chief threat to the future peace of the world would be aggression on the part of a major Power. He insisted that in this case such a Power must automatically be subject to bombardment, or invasion, or both, by the police force of the world organization.

During the months between the Teheran Conference and the meeting of the four major Powers at Dumbarton Oaks in the late summer of 1944 much was accomplished in ironing out the differences regarding world organization which had begun to show at Teheran. The President had long since reached the conclusion that these differences must be solved before the end of the war if there was to be an international organization in which all the major Allies could take part. He had not failed to recognize the sinister significance of the insulting message sent by Stalin to Churchill in the spring of 1944, containing the threat that unless the Soviet Union could have her own way with regard to the Pol-

[3] Robert E. Sherwood, "Roosevelt and Hopkins." New York: Harper, 1948, p. 789.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ish settlement, Russian "coöperation in other spheres" would not be forthcoming. President Roosevelt's final correspondence with Stalin shows plainly how well he realized not only that the Kremlin's suspicions of United States motives had by no means been dispelled, but also that the Soviet Union would probably refuse to live up to the spirit of her political agreements with the West if her strategic position enabled her to evade them with impunity. He was not blind to the signs that the Russian defeat of Hitler's armies had rapidly stimulated the Russian ego, nor to the fact that after Germany's defeat the Soviet state would be by far the most powerful entity in Europe and in Asia.

Yet for these very reasons he was more than ever convinced that the only form of insurance which could be devised at that stage was to secure the active participation of the Soviet Union in the United Nations organization, with all of the restrictions and limitations upon her that this would provide. What is surprising is that at this very juncture the President succeeded so well in dealing with Stalin that there was little difficulty at Dumbarton Oaks in securing a joint agreement upon most of the principles which we regarded as basic in any new international organization.

The serious difficulties, in fact, were only two. One was whether the Soviet Union should be given what amounted to three votes in the Assembly instead of the one vote to which it was legitimately entitled. The other, far more important, was whether the right of the veto granted the permanent members of the Security Council should be unlimited or whether, as the British and Americans desired, the veto should be restricted to proposals to use sanctions in disputes in which the major Powers were not themselves participants.

The Soviet Union was adamant at Dumbarton Oaks that every Great Power should have not only the right to veto the imposition of sanctions by the Security Council against itself but also to veto the mere consideration by the Security Council of any international dispute in which that Great Power might claim it was a participant. The Soviet Government at first threatened that it would never join an international organization which did not guarantee it an unlimited veto power. Yet here again by direct negotiations with Moscow—undertaken, it may be remembered, during an exhausting Presidential campaign—the President secured agreement on a compromise formula which was later officially approved at the Yalta Conference.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This compromise admitted the Soviet contention that the veto might legitimately be employed by a major Power to prevent sanctions against itself. But the Soviet Union conceded the American contention that the veto should not include the right to prevent consideration of any dispute by the Security Council, even if a major Power was a participant in the dispute. The compromise formula, therefore, made it possible for the Security Council to ventilate publicly all controversies in which Russia or any other Great Power was involved.

From our standpoint the formula is, of course, imperfect, since it admits the right of the Soviet Union to prevent the Security Council from imposing sanctions upon her if she commits an act of aggression. Resort to collective action to check the aggression must, therefore, be undertaken by recourse to other instrumentalities. Yet after all, the fact is that the world organization does exist and action has been possible. As we saw when Russia threatened aggression against Iran in 1946, the ventilation of such a dispute by the Security Council and the consequent impact on public opinion throughout the world can be extremely effective. And in the recent case of aggression against South Korea, 53 members of the United Nations were able to join in armed resistance to the aggression, notwithstanding the Soviet resort to blackmail, intimidation and parliamentary filibuster.

In the light of conditions as they existed in 1945, could any objective observer who believed in a universal international organization as the only efficient means of securing peace have seriously maintained that it was not far better to obtain a United Nations of which Russia would be a member from the outset than to risk having no United Nations at all by refusing to compromise? It is possible to amend the Charter, moreover, whenever world experience shows such amendment to be necessary.

The President's concession that the Soviet republics of the Ukraine and Byelorussia should be invited to become members of the Assembly, whereby the Soviet Union secured three votes in that body, was made reluctantly. At the outset he was determined to refuse. He felt that he could persuade Stalin not to press this demand by telling him that he would agree provided Stalin also agreed that the United States should be given 48 votes in the General Assembly, one for each of the sovereign states in the American Union. I can only assume that the President finally gave in because he believed that the question was not in itself of prac-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tical importance—as, in fact, it was not—and because the British felt strongly that the concession might prevent Soviet opposition to the voting rights of the members of the British Commonwealth —as, in fact, it did.

I have known no man in American public life who believed more implicitly than President Roosevelt that the hope of the world lay in the renewal of the people's faith in democracy. He saw more clearly than most of his contemporaries that the power and menace of Communism lay in the fanatical faith of its prophets and of its addicts, even more than in the military force and vast potential resources of the Soviet Union. To him, Communism was bloody, stifling and intolerable. It was revolting to the passion for individual freedom which he had inherited from his Dutch and New England forebears. He frankly recognized the appeal which Communism's promise of economic security held for millions of starving and down-trodden men and women in many parts of the world. But he believed Communism would never prevail provided democracy became a living reality here in the United States and in the other free nations, and provided those who cherished democracy were willing to strive for its fulfillment and eventual supremacy with the same self-sacrificing fervor shown by the Marxists in fighting for their ideology.

Beyond and above all else, he had reached the conclusion that Communism's stoutest ally was war, and that only in a world at peace could the basic tenets of democracy ultimately triumph. He was one of that rare and select number who "see visions and dream dreams."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PARTNERSHIP WITH ASIA

By P. C. Spender

IN THE course of less than ten years, 550,000,000 people in six countries of South and Southeast Asia have passed through the crisis of Japanese aggression, and later the complete eradication of Western political control, and have assumed the full responsibility for their own political future. Of the other countries of Asia which possessed national sovereignty before 1941, China has since undergone Communist revolution and Japan has yet to be readmitted to the community of nations. Only Thailand has emerged from the past ten years with her political and social system virtually unaltered, although she must necessarily be affected by the profound changes that have taken place around her.

In all, more than one billion people have been caught up in political and social transformation in Asia. The processes of change have no doubt reached a more advanced stage in some Asian countries than in others. But everywhere the dynamic growth of new political and economic policies, and new institutions, will continue under the impulse of the nationalist idea and the demand for economic and social reform. Moreover, all Asian countries will continue to be sensitive to the progress of events in Korea, Japan, China and Indo-China where the process of governmental stabilization is incomplete and important political decisions have yet to be taken. To a growing extent the new national governments of Asia, through the United Nations, through regional meetings, through the British Commonwealth, and through the channels of diplomacy, are influencing the course of events throughout the region. Through these channels also the non-Asian world is learning to understand Asia, and the outlook of Asian countries upon the rest of the world.

There is no more important task of international relations than the development of mutual trust and confidence between Asia and the countries of the Pacific, particularly the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, and between Asia and Western Europe. The non-Asian Powers are united in their determination to protect their own security against imperialist Communism. In Korea the United Nations has taken swift and decisive military action against aggression from North Korea in defiance of international law. In Malaya the United Kingdom authorities

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have been obliged to use force against the banditry of Communist guerrillas. These policies are consistent with relations of mutual confidence and good neighborliness between Asian and non-Asian countries. But it would be complacency to suppose that all Asian people necessarily accept the point of view of the non-Asian countries in these matters. The use of armed force to restrain aggression in Asia combines with the constant pressure of Communist propaganda to create strains in relations between Asia and the non-Asian world. If we believe, as we must, that there may be further occasions for the democracies to stand out against Communist intervention and obstruction in the peaceful adjustment of situations in Asia, and even the possibility of United Nations forces again taking up arms against aggression in the area, it is of paramount importance that we eliminate the fictitious or superficial issues which confuse relations. To do so will call for special efforts of tolerance and patience on both sides, in order to eradicate misunderstandings which arise directly out of the history of Asian-Western relations and out of the different processes by which Asian countries achieved their national independence.

The objective of the non-Communist world goes beyond passive adaptation to the changes that are taking place in Asia. International Communism is not passive: its agents move among the Asian people preaching doctrines of national independence, of reform, of social equality, of economic development, and the elimination of the evils of landlord-tenant relations and the other material burdens that weigh upon the people. These are objectives that the Asian people want. They are objectives which only the non-Communist world can help the Asian people to gain. Yet exposure of the falsity of Communist propaganda, the sterility of its promises and the ruthless acquisitiveness of Soviet international policies will not of itself divert Asian people from Communism. The non-Communist world must take unto itself the constructive reformist ideals of Asia. It must associate itself with the dynamics of Asia. It will not be enough for Western countries to approach Asia merely with the liberalism of Western democracy, emphasizing democratic institutions, individual liberty and private initiative as the mainspring of economic life. It would be imprudent to underestimate either the difficulties for the West or the advantages that aggressive Communism possesses in Asia. Communism is an instrument of internal intervention. It works with and among the people. It exerts its influence on the minds

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and political life of the community by methods which the non-Communist world must avoid at peril of arousing the resistance of governments and people determined to reject all forms of "Western imperialism."

II

Most of the handicaps under which the Western democracies labor spring directly from the nature and history of the nationalist revolution in Asia. Some examination of the main ingredients in Asian nationalism will suggest how readily a Communist minority can win support and eventual power when it is organized internally and is prepared to use force in pursuit of its aims, and is also subtle in its appeal to the desires and fears of the masses. The same examination will show how difficult it is for the democratic governments to offer to Asia the practical support which their preponderant resources, and their experience in technology and in government, would otherwise permit.

Nationalism in Asia was not solely a revolution against the West, and, indeed, discrimination and restrictions are still applied as between many Asian countries. But it was predominantly a movement against colonial imperial power, and against the status of colonialism. The strength of political groupings and the popular support they received from the people tended to be in direct proportion to the fervor of their demands for independence. Nationalism was at the same time a revolt against what was alleged to be foreign economic privilege or domination. As a result, the legacy of resistance to new forms of "imperialism" has not been directed solely to the Powers which are identified with political colonialism.

A no less significant feature of the nationalist movements has been the objective of social reform. In this may perhaps be found one reason why Communism has gained ground so swiftly in Asia, but has failed to gain control in other countries which have developed economically in the era of liberal democracy over the past 150 years. In Europe and North America social reform has progressed more or less steadily against a background of political liberty and economic individualism nourished by the immense spurt of productive power released by the industrial revolution and, in the new world of America and the British Dominions, by access to abundant land. In these countries Communism is rejected not merely for its enslavement of the individual but be-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cause as an economic system it has proved so grossly inefficient.

In Asia, on the other hand, social reform has involved a much more explosive change in the social structure than Europe experienced over a comparable period of time. In Asia the speed with which change is sought, and the political environment in which it is taking place, greatly strengthen the false appeal of Communism. Change means to its people protection from the recurring disasters of flood and famine and alleviation of the poverty which afflicts the peasant, the landless and in some areas the urban workers. It means curtailment of the power of the landlord, better distribution of land and reduction of the disparities of wealth. Change was sought not merely because the existing social order perpetuated what was called "foreign domination" but because, in many cases, it appeared to offer inadequate remedies for the problem of poverty and inequality of wealth. Among those members of the community who have limited education, are without adequate standards by which to judge the successes and failures of the administering powers in introducing economic improvement, and are unable to appreciate the basic limitations in their own technological backwardness, any change might appear to be for the better. At the same time Communism pretends to make political and economic independence and economic reform the main objects of its platform in Asia.

There is no widespread acceptance in Asia of the superiority of free enterprise over alternative economic systems. Socialist organization of the means of production is not a matter of controversy as it is in many non-Asian countries. Under colonial administration, government direction and management of economic resources were widely practised throughout the area. It cannot be expected therefore that Asians will necessarily consider Communist doctrines of economic organization repugnant, particularly where those doctrines are cunningly adjusted to avoid any admission of intended attack upon the private ownership of land by the peasants themselves.

The immense vigor of democracy as we know it lies in a passionate devotion to individual liberty, expressed in political and economic freedoms. It must be admitted that these liberal conceptions find limited acceptance among Asian peoples, used to a social system centering in most cases upon the family unit within the larger organism of a paternalistic government which, historically, has taken a variety of forms of absolutism. Communism

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thus has certain direct affinities with traditional Asian belief in the authoritarian state as the embodiment of absolute law.

Whether, in the realm of abstract values, the great religions of the East must necessarily oppose Communism is a more complex question. It might be argued that the Asian mind will tolerate Communism so long as it accepts specious promises of relief of human suffering; and that the inconsistency of its atheistic materialism with Asian religions will be of no political significance so long as Communism successfully disavows any intended attack upon religious beliefs.

Examination of the recent history of the nationalist movement leads to the further conclusion that Japanese aggression, and the ruthlessness of the occupation, did little to divert the intensity of Asian opposition to Western influence. Indeed at times the Japanese military successes were exploited as a vindication of Asian denunciation of non-Asian rulers. Moreover, during the period of occupation the Japanese, not without success, used their own propaganda techniques to assuage local discontent with the emotional appeal of pan-Asianism. The Japanese cunningly fostered and at the same time controlled the anti-Western movements, and deliberately set out to persuade Asians that any concept of non-Asian superiority in political, military or economic fields was false.

Stimulated by the rapidity of changes in Asia, the decline in the authority and confidence reposed in the West by Asian people, and the menace of imperialist Communism, Western thinking has in recent years made a tremendous effort to analyze the Asian revolutionary movements. Much has already been written about the purpose which inspires them and the extent to which Communism is likely to succeed in capturing the political allegiance of the people. The friendship of Asia is of supreme importance to the non-Communist Western world. Nevertheless, the West has failed in the main to find the key which will open the confidence of Asia and hasten the assimilation by Asia of the best in Western democracy—liberal institutions, efficient government, principles of economic equality and techniques of social welfare and the technology of production. However much her leaders may deny it, these ideas are foreign to the present Asia. It is also true that the Western countries have so far had limited success in directing to the area, with the willing acceptance of independent Asia, a stream of ideas and material aid, which will compete with the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

highly organized appeal of international Communism. The success of Communism, but its point of greatest weakness, lies in its ability to disguise its imperialist qualities which, when exposed, will come into direct clash with the idea of national independence. The practical task of the West in exposing the Communist imperialist motive is to avoid all suspicion that the West is competing with the Soviet Union to restore imperialist fetters upon Asia.

III

Western policy everywhere has been influenced by the ominous character of Soviet expansionism. So long as aggressive Communism, fortified by the existence of the armed might of the Soviet Union, and supported by acts of sabotage as part of an integrated pattern, threatens national independence everywhere, Western countries will be deeply preoccupied with measures for their own security. Out of sheer necessity strategic considerations are of major importance for the West. But the Western world has demonstrated in its association between Western European and North American Powers how military strategy can be blended in a comprehensive structure of political unity, economic progress and military security. This organism, still in evolution, draws its strength collectively from the Atlantic Treaty, the political solidarity of the Council of Europe, and from the Organization for European Economic Coöperation, which is the instrument of United States assistance and of mutual economic aid within Europe itself.

Western thinking toward Asia has undoubtedly been colored by the victories of Communism and by a legitimate anxiety as to the ability of new régimes, deliberately turning away from all forms of "dependence" upon the West, to maintain orderly government and to resist aggression. Western appraisal of the likely course of events tends to waver between extreme attitudes, and it is not surprising that there is some uncertainty in policy. Some Asian leaders hold to the view that the removal of all vestiges of colonialism, and the unequivocal establishment of complete national independence, will of themselves destroy the attractions of the Communist ideology. Communism, they contend, will then have nothing to offer. In what might perhaps be called a middle view it is agreed that indigenous reformist Communism may gain political power; but it will be essentially

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Asian Communism, devoted to raising the welfare of Asian people and strong in its resistance to domination by Soviet foreign policy.

On the other hand there is a belief that the new nations of Asia stand exposed to the continuous pressure of Soviet Communist intervention, and that their prospects of withstanding it are not encouraging so long as they resist coöperation with the non-Communist world, particularly since an agency of Communist penetration lies ready at hand in the Chinese minorities throughout Southeast Asia. According to this view, political neutrality in the global conflict, which many Asians see as the only condition under which they can apply themselves to the immense task of improving economic welfare, is a dangerous deception. Communist imperialism will not accept a power vacuum in Asia.

Differences certainly exist between some Asians and some non-Asians in their attitude toward these matters and in their respective judgment of the likely course of events in Asia. They may differ also in their judgment of the relative importance to be attached to the various consequences of international action in the area. For example, in Asian eyes the United Nations action in Korea can be judged primarily by whether it achieves a unified Korea, independent and capable of restoring and developing her economic life. All members of the United Nations—Asians and non-Asians—are pledged to that. But not all Asian leaders feel that an important aspect of the events of recent months is the manifestation of a wider principle—that the nations of the free world will oppose Communist aggression by force of arms.

There will be differences of view, as there have been in Korea, over the methods to be employed to deal with aggression and to preserve the independence and right of peaceful self-determination of peoples. There will be differences of view as to the possibilities of conciliation as distinct from the final exercise of restraining force.

These differences are important and sometimes disturbing. But they can be narrowed if the Asian countries and the Western countries together seek consciously to do so, standing on common ground in the form of basic international principles. Within basic principles it should be possible to reconcile conflicts of judgment and less important principles that are bound to develop from time to time. Herein lies one of the great potentialities of the United Nations. The United Nations and its Charter to-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gether provide the principles and the instrument with which to begin in the building of the partnership with Asia. The Western countries should constantly reaffirm their intention that, in accordance with United Nations principles, they will unwaveringly support national independence in the countries that have it. The West should constantly reaffirm its encouragement and support for both the people and the administering governments in the territories which are seeking to attain independence. The West will not, however, defer to armed banditry and foreign Communist revolution or any method contrary to the Charter as legitimate means of conferring full nationhood on these territories. Nor does support for national independence necessarily involve support for all policies that are conducted in the name of "nationalism." But the United Nations, and great associations like the British Commonwealth of Nations, are powerful instruments for promoting political understanding on matters where there is real controversy, and for finding an identity of political purpose.

No less important, however, is the necessity for the West to convince Asia that coöperation between them does not threaten Asia's economic independence. This should be a major objective for the West, for economic assistance is an essential element in the relationship yet to be built. It is difficult to state the objective of economic aid, and to implement it, without entanglement in false controversies arising from the emotions associated with newly-won independence and the deceptions of Communist propaganda.

Economic assistance to underdeveloped countries can be so organized as to be mutually beneficial to contributors and recipients alike, in a world that needs greater production to raise the living standards of all countries. It is false to say that economic aid is inevitably accompanied by the surrender of special privileges to the public or private interests of the country affording it.

The Western countries can, moreover, show concrete evidence of the great humanitarianism that prevails in their outlook upon malnutrition, disease and poverty throughout the world. This humanitarianism has been already reflected in the sums contributed by the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and many others to the work of the International Children's Fund, in the support given to the International Refugee Organi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

zation by all the non-Communist countries, and in the work of many other international organizations. Deep-rooted humanitarianism is reflected in the vast overseas activities of private charitable organizations in the United States and other countries. It can be demonstrated afresh in the great work of rehabilitation which the United Nations is about to commence in Korea. This spirit of human solidarity should continue to underlie our attitudes toward the people of Asia, and its presence should be demonstrated to them by all practicable techniques of communication and publicity.

Let it be plainly stated, however, that the West is also entering the struggle for the purpose of winning the mind of Asia. The democratic countries should deliberately aim to change the negative attitudes of many Asians toward the non-Communist world, to persuade Asian countries to see the enormous potentialities for the welfare of their peoples that lie in coöperation with the great democratic community of the British Commonwealth, the United States and Western Europe. Wisdom in the use of methods, and an effort of mutual understanding, will eventually bring both Asia and the West to recognize that Asian economic and social development is a common objective for East and West.

IV

The most constructive approach to the problem is for the West to participate, with the consent and encouragement of the governments of Asia, in the process of economic and social development which is part of the nationalist movement. Attitudes on the part of the West which stand in the way of economic reform will be unlikely, in the long run, to lead to any useful purpose in Asia. Sooner or later discontent will burst forth. Constructive policy will offer ready assistance to governments to carry out economic and social programs in ways of their own choice. President Truman made this a feature of his speech of October 17 at San Francisco. After describing the similarity of social objectives that exists between American and Asian people he went on to say: "We are not trying to push blueprints upon them as ready-made answers for all their complicated problems. Every people must develop according to its own particular genius, and must express its own moral and cultural values in its own way."

In deciding the mechanics of economic coöperation this simple

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

statement of objectives needs to be held continually in mind. What is required is a flow of capital to Asia to supplement the deficiencies in internal savings and to provide its governments with the means of financing new projects of development. Private capital can play its part. The foreign capital will be spent on imports of all kinds both to sustain consumption and to provide the equipment needed for a rapid growth in productive output. Asia is rich in manpower, but poor in the capacity of its manpower to produce what it needs for a better life. Asia also needs technology from the Western world, and techniques of economic organization and government administration. But the flow of aid of this kind must be adapted to the tempo of social change which is wanted by the countries themselves and which can be absorbed in their own cultural and political systems. The yardsticks of success will not be the extent to which production of the few major export industries is raised, but the extent to which economic resources are used and bring a general sharing of increased wealth and widened opportunities for employment. Merely to pour into Asia quantities of advisers, for example on the techniques of social welfare as developed in the advanced capitalist countries, will not necessarily lead to successful results. The problem of social reform requires a real pooling of ideas. The pooling can fruitfully take place in Asia itself, the more advanced assisting the less advanced within social systems that are generally similar to each other. In addition the partnership between Asian countries and the more developed countries of the West needs a two-way traffic of ideas which will dissipate our mutual ignorance of each others' philosophies, religions, social ideals and political objectives. In current planning of "assistance" programs perhaps overmuch attention is being given to the one-way traffic in technical and financial assistance, while the advantages of an intake of ideas from Asia are being neglected. This is an area of coöperation where governments have a part to play by stimulation and exhortation. But the channels will be non-governmental—through universities, employer and trade union associations, international machinery like the International Labor Organization, conferences of newspaper editors, scientists and intellectuals in all walks of life. In this way the non-Communist world can present to Asian people the best in its liberal democratic traditions and its sciences.

As between governments, functional coöperation has developed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to some extent in the past two years. Technical assistance is being organized and should soon begin to flow at an impressive rate. The United States in particular has provided financial aid to many countries in Asia to help restore the damage done by the war and to begin the long task of raising standards of living. It is evident, however, that financial assistance to Asia has to be multiplied many times before there will be a perceptible improvement in the living standards of an ever-increasing population. The problem is an international one because the rest of the free world needs to be in partnership with Asia, although the material capacity to help in its solution will necessarily be limited to relatively few countries.

From the Asian point of view financial aid must be "without strings." From the point of view of the West this condition must be respected; yet the purpose of aid is to bring lasting benefits to the Asian people, and there will undoubtedly be occasions when disinterested advice to some governments concerning the use of aid would be justified. The problem is to reconcile these two objectives.

Under bilateral arrangements between contributors and recipient governments, aid can often be provided more quickly than under other international arrangements where the administrative processes involve a number of governments and are therefore slower. Yet in many cases bilateralism is not the best procedure in Asia. It is notoriously susceptible to current political excitements in the countries providing the aid. It is the medium under which the contributing government has liberty to lay down whatever conditions it thinks fit. It is therefore subject to a greater or less degree of suspicion. Bilateral arrangements have been made successfully in the past and there will be scope for them in the future. Except in unusual circumstances the bilateral method in Asia is not likely to make it easy, however, for governments to offer guidance, where guidance is needed, as to its most effective use. There is always a risk of incurring misunderstanding and sensitivity against external interference.

For this reason there are substantial advantages in using international organizations—the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and special organizations such as the International Children's Emergency Fund and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency—for providing some kind of assistance. Within the framework of international machinery, recipients meet

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with contributors as full equals. They share full responsibility for the laying down of principles and conditions, which are not directed against any particular country because they are drawn up for universal application. Principles are no longer the creation of a single power. Moreover, their implementation is supervised by international rather than by national representatives.

At the same time it is doubtful whether international organizations can be used exclusively as the channel for economic aid of all kinds. The mobilization of large-scale aid for economic development raises, in international organizations, the problem of agreeing upon priorities when probably more than 40 countries would claim the need, in greater or less degree, for external financial assistance. In the present fields of activity of international organization, such as care of the welfare of children, relief and rehabilitation in defined areas such as Korea, and the provision of technical assistance, there are criteria which facilitate the sharing of the aid available. Moreover, the financial burden upon contributing countries has not so far been a particularly heavy one. In large-scale economic development programs, on the other hand, there is an understandable reluctance on the part of taxpayers in the contributing countries to accept a system in which the vote of their government on the disposition of assistance as between recipients carries no more weight than that of any one of 50 or 60 other governments. Furthermore, until the Soviet Union demonstrates an interest in helping organize aid programs for the benefit of the countries involved, it must be assumed that dispassionate discussion of the needs of recipient governments will be subjected to obstruction, manœuvre and misrepresentation of motives similar to those which have become so damaging in the political work of the United Nations.

So far as Asia is concerned, an experiment has been undertaken which seeks to combine the most beneficial features of the bilateral and international method of organizing assistance. The initiative was taken by Australia at the Colombo Conference on Foreign Affairs of the British Commonwealth in January 1950. A Commonwealth Consultative Committee, consisting of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, has since established a Technical Assistance Bureau in Colombo and has prepared a comprehensive report on the development of India, Pakistan, Ceylon and the British Territories in and around the Malayan Peninsula. Careful and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

detailed surveys and programs for each country were prepared by the respective governments. A program of economic development for each country over six years beginning in 1951 was presented to the Commonwealth Committee for discussion. The programs were realistically directed to bringing about the minimum rate of development which each government considered to be essential if an increasing population was to be offered real hope of an improvement in its living conditions.

In this coöperative work, designed to bring help to more than 400,000,000 people in Asia, will be found an effective partnership between Asian and non-Asian governments. In full equality the Ministers of three Asian sovereign countries and the Asian representatives of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore discussed with Ministers of the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand practical ways of organizing programs for economic and social improvement in these Asian countries. All these countries of the Commonwealth have a profound concern in the future of Asia, whether as members of the Asian community itself or as close and friendly neighbors. For the Commonwealth, orientation toward the affairs of Asia is a further link in the chain of events which included the historic transfer of sovereignty by the United Kingdom to India, Pakistan and Ceylon. The tolerance which is an attribute of relations among members of the Commonwealth, their traditional allegiance to common principles of government, and the vital spirit of pragmatism in the British tradition of government and inter-governmental relations, together provide the ingredients of a successful Asian partnership of much wider scope. Already the Commonwealth governments have suggested to other governments in the area that they join in the coöperative enterprise, and preliminary discussions have been held. It is evident that no program of regional assistance in Asia as a whole could succeed without coöperation and material support from the United States and other countries outside the area. These governments are already providing assistance. Thus a successful attack upon the problem would involve a regional inter-governmental arrangement, including governments outside the area which have special interests in it. It would necessarily follow that if governments which have not so far been associated with the planning for the needs of Commonwealth countries decided to participate in a wider venture embracing other countries, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

organization would be transformed and would no longer be identified as a Commonwealth enterprise as such.

V

The struggle for an independent Asia in which the reformist movements are expected to bring about relief from poverty and to advance stable government and democracy will make demands upon the economic resources of the non-Asian countries. Nevertheless, the amount of external assistance required would be considerably less than that which was made available for European economic recovery. Moreover, the rest of the world would receive substantial economic benefits. Europe's commerce with Asia has always been a fundamental link in the pattern of world trade. Growth of a more abundant trade built upon the use of the wasted resources of Asia would contribute a great deal to solving the dollar problem of the world. There is real hope that decisions will be made to throw a share of the resources of the more developed and economically prosperous countries into the struggle. The democracies have the advantages of vast resources, a genuine humanitarianism, and the desire to work for the full sovereign independence of Asian people. International Communism has none of these objectives. The attraction which it exerts for many Asian people can be explained by its successful exploitation of the nationalist idea, coupled with the limited success of Western democracies in reaching the minds of Asians. Through the United Nations the democracies of the world have been able to act against aggression in Asia. The value of this demonstration will be dissipated unless we recognize that, in the long view, the victory to be sought lies in the realms both of material welfare and abstract ideas. In many parts of Asia living standards, already appallingly low, are falling even lower. New governments committed to preserve independence and maintain internal order and security find that per capita standards of their people are lower in some cases than before the war. Because capital resources are limited and productive power is low, the rate of improvement that it will be possible to achieve even with the aid of the resources of the West will be slow. For all these reasons, the development of a full partnership for the economic development of Asia should be a first concern of the governments of Asia and of the world.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PRINCIPLES OF BRITISH MILITARY THOUGHT

By Major General Sir Ian Jacob

THERE have been so many bewildering developments in the world in the last few years that settled ideas about national strength and national security seem to have been overturned. But although many things have changed, the geographical position of the British Isles in relation to Europe has not. It has been a powerful factor throughout Britain's history. Another prime factor has been the growth of the Empire overseas; but the relation of Britain to the other parts of the Empire has undergone various changes since before the First World War.

Until 1914 Britain acted as the center of a large, widely-dispersed empire, on whose behalf defense questions were settled in London. There were already four self-governing Dominions within the Empire, but the Committee of Imperial Defense in London was recognized as chief organ for the formation of defense policy for the whole—a practical arrangement that had not yet given way before the constitutional developments that were taking place.

There were very good reasons for this. In the first place there was no potentially hostile first-class Power outside Europe. Any danger to Britain and the Empire was bound to come from Europe, and thus the United Kingdom would receive the first impact. Secondly, the Empire depended for its safety on the British fleet, which held command of the seas throughout the world, and could thus prevent danger from Europe spreading to the overseas territories of the Empire. Britain's defense problem therefore consisted in maintaining the security of the United Kingdom and the command of the sea. Help for the center could thus flow inwards without interruption, and expeditions could move with certainty to any desired point. The local defense of all British overseas territories other than the Dominions and India was framed on the idea that local forces could withstand the comparatively minor attacks that might develop during a "period before relief," while sea-borne reinforcements were on the way from the nearest military center.

The forces required to maintain the security of the Empire in these circumstances were not large. There were garrisons at the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

key points on the lines of communication; there was a standing army, partly held at home and partly in India, which was not large in comparison with the world-wide extent of the territories of the Empire; and there was a fleet which had to be sufficiently strong in relation to possible rivals to ensure the command of the sea. The burden of security was not heavy, and could easily be carried.

It is important to note that throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Great Britain and the Empire simply never included in their strategic planning the thought of fighting a war single-handed against a first-class European Power, or of undertaking large land campaigns on the Continent. The very nature of the strength which Britain could deploy precluded this idea. Britain's strength resided in her navy, in her economic resources, and in her ability to take as much or as little of a war as she chose. She was thus ideally placed to endure a long struggle and to animate a coalition of land Powers whose strength could complement her own.

These were the conditions that ruled up till 1914. But in the First World War there came a great change. Great Britain, the Dominions and the Colonies mobilized among them 9,000,000 men, most of whom were engaged in great land campaigns. Behind and supporting these were further millions producing munitions. Gone were the days of limited land expeditions and of the steady maintenance of sea power. In this war, too, appeared the airplane and the submarine, forerunners of the modern menace to the United Kingdom.

There was no going back after World War I. Britain's horizon in major matters of defense was forcibly widened beyond Europe by the rise of Japan and by the ending of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. No longer would it be enough for the Empire to send help to the United Kingdom in a European war. Danger could now fall directly on other parts of the Empire. This development was naturally foreseen in the strategic thinking in London between the wars. It was realized then that Britain might be faced with three enemies simultaneously, at least two of whom were in the front rank, and one of whom was outside Europe and could thus directly threaten the South Pacific or Indian Ocean. We would have allies in Europe, but none elsewhere. No reliance could be placed on the type of collective security possible within the League of Nations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

True, there was British sea power resting on three secure bases —the United Kingdom, the Middle East and Singapore. But the Government was warned by its military advisers that a combination of the three naval Powers—Germany, Italy and Japan—would probably prove too much for us even in alliance with France, unless the United States could be called in to redress the balance; and aid from the United States was a doubtful quantity. The main reason for this weakness was that the industrial strength, the skilled manpower and the naval force which the Empire could deploy was so largely located in the British Isles. The Dominions, though developing rapidly, were still small in manpower and resources. India, though a great source of manpower, had little of the technical skill and independent enterprise required by principals in a world-wide struggle. The Colonies were of insignificant military potential, and were being slowly developed politically and economically under the shelter of British sea power.

When war came in 1939 the unwelcome combination duly materialized, and though the entry of Japan into the field brought the United States in too, American strength could not be made effective quickly enough to prevent the collapse of sea power in the Far East. For two and a half years forces of the British Commonwealth were stretched to the limit attempting to carry on the fight nearly single-handed in so many theaters of war. Indeed, this dispersion of effort persisted to a great extent throughout the later campaigns, so that although in sum the forces maintained by the Commonwealth were very large and absorbed a total of 8,000,000 men, the strength that could be concentrated in any one area seemed small by comparison with that of nations whose efforts could be concentrated.

To sum up the position as it appeared in the course of the war, the strength of the British Commonwealth could be stated in the following terms:

1. A center in the United Kingdom possessing 20,000,000 men and women of working age and experience, homogeneous and of first-class quality for fighting or for industrial production.

2. Subsidiary centers in the Dominions and India, of varying industrial and military strength but animated by a strong common purpose.

3. Raw materials of comprehensive range and quantity to sustain a considerable war effort.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

4. Possession of intermediate territories to provide the bases for a system of control of sea communications.

5. Naval power based on the largest merchant fleet in the world.

6. Skill, experience and knowledge of the conduct of world-wide affairs and of organization on the largest scale.

On the other side of the balance sheet there were certain weaknesses:

1. The undue dispersion of centers of effort and of resources with consequent vulnerability to separate attack.

2. The unwelcome dependence of the main center on imports both to sustain life and to keep industry active. This is clearly a grave economic weakness in wartime when industry must concentrate on armaments and cannot produce the exports with which to pay for the needed imports.

3. The proximity of the main center to the European mainland and thus its vulnerability to severe bombardment.

4. The difficulty of concentrating potential strength at a distance from the main center.

From these factors there emerges a picture of a loosely-knit organism, entirely dependent upon free communication for survival, but, given a reasonable freedom of communication, possessing great strength in terms of manpower, industry, raw materials and experience. The more the burden of the maintenance of free communications could be lightened the greater the strength that could be developed. (An example was the reopening of the Mediterranean to traffic in 1943; the saving of effort previously absorbed in sending everything round the Cape of Good Hope was most beneficial.) An instance of a different order was the system of lend-lease, which enabled the supply of goods for each theater and for each country to be organized largely from the nearest source irrespective of payment difficulties.

II

We must now concentrate our attention on the present and the future. How has British strategic thinking developed since the war?

When complete victory is achieved in war the victors are rather apt to imagine that their problems have been solved, and that they can return home and resume their interrupted normal life. They do not at first realize that war, in a few years

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of stress, brings about changes that might otherwise have taken a long time to mature. There can be no going back to prewar life. With nations, as with individuals, the life to which we return is different. So it is that Great Britain's strategic picture has considerably altered since the war, not perhaps in any unexpected manner, but rapidly and decisively.

The first change is a constitutional one. India, Pakistan and Ceylon have become Dominions, and Burma has left the Commonwealth. In the process, most regrettable tensions have developed between India and Pakistan. These tensions, added to the difficulties caused by the policy of the South African Government, have shaken the previously secure position of the Commonwealth on the shores of the Indian Ocean. The great reserves of manpower and the bases that were provided within the Indian sub-continent may or may not now be available to the British Commonwealth. They may be otherwise engaged, particularly as the policy of the Indian Government on the world stage seems to have diverged considerably from that followed by the other members of the Commonwealth.

The next great change in the situation is the consolidation of Russian power and its extension through the satellite states and Eastern Germany deep into Europe. Opposite this must be put a factor of equal importance—the emergence of the United States as a World Power permanently interested in European affairs.

The United Kingdom, from its geographical position, has a vital interest in ensuring that no one nation shall dominate the whole of Europe. Britain has fought several great wars to defend that interest, and would have to fight again in the same cause. We have always been successful in the past because there were other powerful states in Europe with which we could combine against the aggressor. A quite new situation for us has been created by the elimination of all Powers of the first rank in Europe, other than Russia, and the substitution for them of a weak coalition supported by the United States, a non-European Power. This new situation in Europe is of such importance that I shall have to return to it again later on.

The third great new factor in the situation is the advance of Asia to a position of primary importance on the world stage. Before the war, the whole of Asia except Japan was of secondary influence in strategic thinking. China was torn by internal dis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sensions. Southeast Asia was quiet, and was regarded merely as a source of economic wealth. The Indian Ocean was a British lake. Now all that has changed, and the whole continent is in a ferment, with China emerging as a real Power after a revolutionary unification, and with the clash of races and of political aspirations disrupting the life of the southeast Asian states and colonies. This would perhaps not be so serious for the British Commonwealth if it were not for the opportunity that is offered throughout Asia for Russian Communism to keep the ferment going and to hinder the processes of recovery and settlement.

The attitude of the British Commonwealth in the face of these great new factors requires some explanation. Ever since the First World War the Dominions have declined to play their part in the peacetime military responsibilities that have fallen on the United Kingdom. They have always been more ready to collaborate in a world organization than to commit themselves to joint action within the Commonwealth in support of a policy that they have felt would be largely formulated in London. This aloofness on the part of the Dominions, the product of a desire to establish their real independence as sovereign states, persisted until after the end of World War II. The Committee of Imperial Defense was abolished, and for it was substituted bilateral machinery between the United Kingdom and the Dominions severally. The degree to which this machinery developed depended upon the extent of the defense problems that affected the two parties jointly. For example, the United Kingdom and Canada collaborate closely in all matters affecting the security of the North Atlantic, whereas Canada takes no part (except in a general sense as a member of the United Nations) in the discussion of events in Southeast Asia or of defense measures required there. These are left for discussions among the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.

This is not necessarily a source of weakness, as willing collaboration among free partners is better than a closer form of coordination having in it an element of coercion. But it does to some extent prevent the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth and Empire from exerting their full influence in parts of the world when strength in peacetime is an important factor. Nevertheless, the situation is changing gradually under the impact of events. Australians are operating in Malaya and in the occupation of Japan, and Canadians, New Zealanders and Australians

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are taking part in the Korean campaign. But there is still no unified policy within the Commonwealth, and its members act as individual states and not as a unit.

I have dealt at some length with this aspect of Commonwealth relations because it affects materially the thinking which has to be done in London, and also the actual disposability of British strength. In the present situation of the Commonwealth and Empire—with self-governing Dominions and Colonies in various stages of progress—it would obviously be much more economical if the peacetime military burden so largely borne by the United Kingdom could be decentralized. For example, suppose Australia and New Zealand could provide all the force required to fight Communism in Southeast Asia; suppose Canada could take over military responsibility for Hong Kong; and suppose India, Pakistan and South Africa could provide the military strength required in Africa and the Middle East. In those circumstances it would be possible for the greater part of the military forces of the United Kingdom to be concentrated for action in Europe. There seems little prospect that such a division of duties and responsibilities will be accepted. As a result, a great part of the disposable United Kingdom strength has to be spread around the world—in Gibraltar, in Malta, in the Middle East, in Africa, in Malaya and in Hong Kong. It was this dispersion that led to the difficulties in the early part of World War II, to which I have already referred; but these difficulties may be even greater in future if the reservoir of army formations in India, both British and Indian, is no longer available.

The question naturally arises whether there could not be some contraction in the many overseas commitments for which British troops have to be provided in peacetime. If all British troops could be withdrawn from the Middle East, for example, there would be a great easement in men, money and transport. But it is hard to see how this could be done. The Middle East is not only a most important link with the communications among the different parts of the Commonwealth, but it contains vital oil supplies. It is also the connecting link between Asia and Africa, and contains the gateway to the Indian Ocean. The states of the Middle East are weak and poorly developed. They could do little to guard themselves against infiltration or open conquest from the north. Unless Britain provides the stiffening, and holds the base from which large forces could operate in an emergency, some

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other Power would have to do it. The United States is the only one which could relieve Britain of the burden. Similar considerations prevent the withdrawal of other garrisons.

The truth is that under the constant menace of Russian Communism, the various military commitments which each of the Western Powers undertakes are in the interests of all. The French in Indo-China, the British in Malaya, and the forces of the United Nations in Korea are all engaged in the essential task of stemming the Communist tide in vital areas. It is the duty of the nations of the free world to review the whole position and, recognizing their mutual interest in maintaining free territories intact and sound, to allocate forces to the best advantage. The problems and burdens of one are the problems and burdens of all. This notion does not absolve each of us from making a full contribution to the united effort, and in this wider conception the British Dominions would be ready to play their part. It does mean that as far as possible force should be economized by using it where it can be most easily deployed.

III

What part can the United Kingdom itself play? Her power in peace or cold war, and her potential power in full war, have been largely obscured in the last five years because of her economic difficulties. Many people jump to the conclusion that because Britain has had to be supported, first by an American loan and then by Marshall aid, her military capabilities have gravely deteriorated. This is not so, and in fact all through this period Britain has maintained forces far in excess of any that have previously been maintained in peacetime. Since the war Britain has never had less than 700,000 men under arms, and recent measures are once more raising the total figure. Conscription has been in continuous operation since 1939. The population of military age has not declined, and industry is producing considerably more than before the war. British jet aircraft lead the world, and there is no slackening of naval preparedness.

Only two factors cast doubt upon the power of Britain to exert a war effort equal to, if not greater than, she did in the last war. These factors are economic and geographical, and can most easily be exposed by asking two questions. How can Britain keep a great war effort going if she cannot pay for the large imports of food and raw materials that would be required? And could Britain

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

survive the bombardment that seems likely to fall upon her, including, as it well may, atomic bombs and long-range rockets?

The first question can be easily answered. Lend-lease or its equivalent would be essential, otherwise most of Britain's industry would have to continue making goods for export to pay for imports. If payment difficulties can be solved, then British industry will be able to concentrate on war production. The second question is more debatable, and no one can be certain of the answer. The only opinion that can be given with confidence is that Britain will be quite ready to put things to the test if the need arises. Nevertheless, the question has a considerable effect on British strategic thinking. First, it points to the absolute necessity of keeping any potential enemy as far away as possible. Russia must not be allowed to come nearer than the Elbe, and if possible must be thrust further back. Secondly, the air defense of Western Europe, and of the British Isles, must at all times be efficient and complete. The supreme significance of the European theater for Britain, to which I have referred above, is thus clear. More than at any time in our history is there the need to gather all available resources to meet the main danger.

I hope I have succeeded in showing how profoundly different the defense problems of a widely dispersed and loosely organized empire are from those of a highly concentrated continental nation such as the United States. The United Kingdom is still carrying by far the largest share of the defense responsibilities of the Empire, and its peacetime strength is so dispersed that Britain finds difficulty in furnishing two regimental combat teams for Korea over and above the forces deployed in Germany, the Middle East, Malaya and Hong Kong. This stretching of British resources arises from the nature and location of the danger. Russia, her satellites and China occupy an immense, continuous block of territory. The periphery of this block comes close to many areas where British interests lie—in Europe, the Middle East, South Asia and the Far East. But it is not only British interests that are thus threatened. Many other free nations find themselves in jeopardy. But despite the danger, at least we know clearly who our enemy is. What is unusual for us in Britain is that we know who are the friends and allies that we can count on to be with us at the start should war come. British strategic requirements are clear, and our strategic objectives are based on our reading of the danger.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We believe that the men in the Kremlin are out for world domination. They do not differentiate between peace and war; they seek to attain their end by whatever method is appropriate at any given moment. All free nations are their prey. This being so, all free nations must unite for mutual self-defense. It is just as important for Britain to help save the next selected Communist victim as it is for other nations to help the United Kingdom maintain her vigor and potential power. No further members of the free world must be allowed to succumb, and in due course the tide of Communism must be pressed back. Hence we in Britain believe that the Atlantic Treaty must be the forerunner of analogous organisms in other areas, all falling within the general scope of the United Nations. In the face of the overriding menace, lesser differences of opinion must yield. There can be no place for neutrality.

Holding these views, the United Kingdom, the Dominions and the Colonies are all capable of great contributions. The contributions of each independent member of the Commonwealth will vary, and there is no central authority which can direct them all. Speaking only for the United Kingdom, one is safe in saying that our military policy will aim at securing the following principal ends: first, the utmost security for the United Kingdom itself. This requires the creation of sufficient land and air strength in Western Europe to ensure the inviolability of everything now outside the iron curtain, and the preservation of the British Isles from crippling air attack—our first priority. Second, the maintenance of free communication by sea throughout the world. Third, the preservation of the Middle East and thus of Africa. Fourth, the destruction of Communist influence in Southeast Asia. And fifth, the contribution of force to secure respect for the decisions of the United Nations.

None of these ends can be achieved by Britain's unaided efforts. The United Kingdom must therefore work through the United Nations, and in direct collaboration with friends and allies, toward the assembly of sufficient force. It is no longer enough for us to think in terms of the defense of the British Empire. It is the British Empire, and the free world of which it forms a part, that must be defended by our efforts linked with those of other like-minded states.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NEEDED: A STRATEGY FOR OIL

By Halford L. Hoskins

IN THE contemporary world oil is power. It is power in time of peace to develop great industrial establishments, and to transport goods and passengers on land, at sea and in the air. Its value as an item of trade exceeds that of any other commodity. In time of war, oil is power to expand industry and to exert strength at great distances. Atomic energy may partially supersede oil some day as a driving force in the modern state, but not in the visible future. Since oil is a prime essential for American security, our policy in regard to the supply and use of oil must be in harmony with other elements of national policy in United States strategic planning. In important respects it is not in harmony today.

The primary fact of the problem is that our requirements cannot be measured in commercial terms. If war could be dismissed as a possibility, the amount of oil that the United States will need at any given time could be fairly well calculated in advance. But the amount of oil we would need in an emergency in which the survival of the nation was at stake can hardly be reckoned. The only certainty is that in such an emergency the demand for oil would rise according to the degree of danger. Thus the imponderables of war enter into everything touching the discovery, production, refining and use of oil. Even in "normal" times the commodity value of oil is affected by political considerations.

In 1948, the former Petroleum Administrator for War, Mr. Ickes, stated that, except for a few local rules and regulations, "we have never had a national policy on oil and we have never had an international policy on oil."[1] It appears doubtful that the omission has been repaired in the interval. Of course, there are practices amounting to segments of policy relating to particular features of oil production, transportation and marketing, both at home and abroad—some of them the work of the oil industry, others the fruit of administrative decisions by government agencies. But there is no policy embracing both short-term and long-term programs.

To point this out is not to underestimate the complexity of

[1] Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Petroleum of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, March 11, 1948.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the problem, subject as it is to physical, economic, political and military factors. Conditions which obtain with reference to world oil in one year seldom obtain in the next; dearth and plentitude of oil seem to follow each other as do the seasons, against a shifting background of international relations. Almost the only constant elements in this ebb and flow are a progressively increasing demand for oil products, both in this country and abroad, and an eventually diminishing world supply of raw petroleum. But some of the factors affecting decisions which must be taken without loss of time can briefly be described.

II

The supplies of petroleum available to the United States from Western Hemisphere sources, notwithstanding a temporary shortage of gasoline for military purposes, were ample for 1950. For the time being, the world supply also appears to be adequate. If the international political outlook were favorable, there would be no occasion for great concern regarding oil supplies for a number of years. But since the prospect for peace is dubious, to say the least, three basic questions must be raised. The first is: To what extent should the oil reserves of the United States be conserved by being supplemented by imports while the international situation permits? The second is: What are the oil needs of the countries of Western Europe? The third is: Where can the needed oil be obtained and what shall we do to safeguard the supply? The answers to all three questions point to the Middle East; but the problems they raise have many ramifications.

There was a widespread belief at the close of World War II that the United States would soon be compelled to lean heavily on oil imports or on a large-scale synthetic oil industry, or both, to supplement our domestic production. Some leaders of the oil industry now believe that United States oil resources within the Western Hemisphere can meet all demands for a number of years, and that even in war they would satisfy domestic needs. This conclusion reflects several recent developments: the discovery of new and potentially rich oil deposits, especially in Canada; new techniques in deep drilling and in the secondary recovery of oil; improvements in refining; promising progress in the production of oil by synthetic processes; more economical types of oil-burning engines; and the rapidity with which the serious oil shortages of 1946, 1947 and early 1948 were overcome.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For the short run such optimism may be justified. Within the oil fields of the United States alone are at least 26 billion barrels of petroleum, perhaps a third of the oil reserves of the world. It is possible that other deposits are as yet undiscovered. To such resources can be added the reserves of Canada, potentially large. Venezuela, lying within the area of political influence of the United States and much the richest in oil of other parts of the Western Hemisphere, possesses about 9.5 billion barrels of untouched oil, more than 12 percent of the world total. Some would add to these resources the proved reserves of Mexico, Colombia and Trinidad. Together the countries of Latin America possess nearly 11 billion barrels of oil reserves, about 14 percent of the world total; and, in all, the deposits in the Western Hemisphere represent roughly half of the world's known oil reserves. At the current rate of usage (without taking into consideration the likelihood that other deposits will be proved) they should satisfy peacetime requirements in the producing states for perhaps 20 years.

But even in the short run there are several reasons for caution about the situation. Oil fields do not produce at a uniform rate up to the point of exhaustion. Figures of proved oil reserves do not always convey a good idea of the future volume of production. The United States domestic oil production in 1949 amounted to the impressive total of 1,840,307,000 barrels. This was the combined flow, however, of 449,545 wells: an average production of only 11 barrels daily per well. In Venezuela the production of 457,176,000 barrels in the same period came from 6,236 wells: an average flow of 201 barrels daily per well. Quite in contrast, the Middle East production in 1949 of 512,275,000 barrels came from only 208 wells, the flow averaging about 5,500 barrels daily per well. This means simply that many United States fields are old, over-exploited and declining in production. It suggests that even intensive exploring and wildcatting cannot be expected long to maintain the present rate of production. Except for the promise of young Canadian fields, the outlook for long-continued production in the fields certain to be available in time of emergency would be dim. The astonishing output in the Middle East reflects the characteristics of young fields likely to be productive for a good many years.

Meanwhile, there is no apparent likelihood that the consumption of oil products in the United States will be stabilized at the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1949 or 1950 levels. During World War II, as industries expanded and needs of the armed services grew, consumption increased at the rate of about 100,000,000 barrels annually. But instead of tapering off at the close of the war as expected, civilian demand continued to grow almost at the wartime rate. Consumption of oil products in 1950 amounted to approximately 6,500,000 barrels a day. This is a phenomenal rate of usage, amounting to two-thirds of the oil consumption of the world. Such a pace cannot long be maintained at the present rate of oil discoveries within the "safe" zone of the Western Hemisphere. In order to sustain maximum efficient rates of production and to provide a backlog of producing capacity so that the country will not be too largely dependent on the vagaries of new discovery, there must be proved reserves in the ground of something like 12 or 13 times the annual consumption. Proved reserves must rise with current requirements, if production is not to be wasteful and if there is to be a substantial surplus for a time of emergency. To satisfy United States demands on a peacetime basis and to maintain reserves in the same ratio to production as in 1950, more than 34 billion barrels of new oil reserves would have to be provided in the United States (and Canada) within the next ten years. Not even the most optimistic estimate can count on such discoveries.

Above all other reasons, complacency about our oil supply is dangerous because we must have a reserve supply for emergency. What wartime demands could do to the 20-year supply sketched above can readily be imagined. Moreover, is it wise to assume that in a third world war the United States would have uninterrupted access by sea to the oil ports of the Caribbean? Our experience with German submarines in World War II is eloquent on that point. And can we be perfectly sure that if the United States had her back to the wall, all of the oil states of Latin America would strain every nerve to make sure of the oil flow to this country? In short, since it is necessary to assume that the oil production of the United States, plus that of Canada and even the Caribbean, will not be equal to wartime demands, national safety demands that we protect ourselves either by importing and stockpiling oil, or by developing sources of oil fuels other than crude petroleum.

III

The most essential derivatives of petroleum for a highly indus-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trialized country are fuels and lubricants. The present emphasis is on high-octane gasoline, though this may possibly be lessened. By various forms of synthesis and refining these fuels and lubricants can be obtained from natural gas or from coal or oil shales. The United States is unique among nations in having almost inexhaustible deposits of bituminous coal, lignite and oil shales. Whether synthetic products can compete in quality and price with petroleum fuel is still questionable, but there can be little doubt as to the advisability of continuing experiments in the synthetic processes. Doubtless, too, one or more plants for the production of oil fuels in significant quantities should be constructed. But despite the great need of national self-sufficiency in oil, present evidence points plainly to the wisdom of planning to satisfy the major portion of both normal and emergency needs for fuel and lubricants by means of petroleum products, for a number of years to come.

The certainty that the need for oil fuels of all types would vastly increase with the advent of another major war has prompted studies of the feasibility of importing and storing oil in quantities great enough to tide the country over another war effort. During World War II, with the demand for petroleum products nearly twice that of the prewar decade, the daily rate of domestic oil production was stepped up until in 1945 it reached a point approximately 1,000,000 barrels above that of 1941. During four years of war, between 1941 and 1945, the United States oil requirements for all purposes were 1.25 billion barrels in excess of those of the years 1938 to 1941. In another war requirements would mount far higher. To provide a fair margin of safety against the possibility that supplies from the Middle East would be cut off, and the possibility that those from the Caribbean might be temporarily interrupted, an oil stockpile of the order of a billion barrels of crude would not be over-large. The fields of the Middle East are quite capable of producing that amount within five years at most, over and above the amounts expected at present rates of production.

Could such a quantity be transported from the Middle East and stored in semi-permanent fashion in the United States? A new tanker fleet of about 150 vessels of the latest type would be needed to import 200,000,000 barrels of oil a year. The cost both in steel and in dollars would be burdensome, since this tanker fleet would have to be added to the existing one. It is also prob-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lematical, at the present time, to what extent the new and prospective pipelines from Middle East oil fields to the shores of the Mediterranean would prove equal to the task of supplying the additional billion-barrel total.

The storage of such an amount of oil in the United States would also offer problems. The building of "tank farms" above ground to accommodate oil in billion-barrel lots is open to very serious question, for such concentrations would be extremely vulnerable to sabotage or enemy bombing, and the construction of enough tanks to hold an extra billion barrels of oil would place a strain on steel production. Moreover, oil so stored for considerable periods is likely to suffer from deterioration. Although in 1950 more than 560,000,000 barrels of crude oil and refined products were stored temporarily above ground in the United States, and perhaps 50,000,000 barrels more in other parts of the world for the use of the U. S. armed services, large-quantity, long-term oil stockpiling in metal tanks for strategic purposes is not generally regarded with favor by competent authorities.

At one time or another the practicability of storing crude oil in large amounts underground has been considered. Abandoned mines have been studied with this end in view, but expert opinion has been almost uniformly unfavorable. Proposals for pumping crude oil into depleted natural underground oil and gas reservoirs also is open to serious objections. In fine, the disadvantages of bringing oil from considerable distances and storing it in the United States appear definitely to outweigh the advantages, even if the monetary cost is disregarded.

There is another form of stockpiling for an emergency, however, which is more practicable, namely, the segregation of proved domestic oil fields. The problems involved here are of an entirely different nature. They include the necessity for careful measurement of production potentialities, the drilling and closing in of the requisite number of wells for production when needed, precautions against drainage from the shut-in fields, and suitable arrangements between the government and the oil industry for ownership or leasing, drilling, testing and emergency operating. Such a plan implies, of course, that we shall import sufficient oil for current use to make up for the supply taken out of use. This type of stockpiling is exemplified by the field at Elk Hills, California, which, although established as a federal reserve in 1912, has been developed largely since 1942 as Naval Petroleum Re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

serve No. 1. Other naval oil reserves also have been set aside in the United States and Alaska, but their combined full production is but a tithe of what may be needed to supplement regular production.

IV

In the present state of world affairs, the oil problems of the United States cannot be considered apart from those of the Marshall Plan nations of Europe. The defense of free Europe is vital to the defense of the United States in the event of another world conflict, and the evolution of the "cold" war into a "smolder" war gives a strong practical impulse to what might otherwise appear to be a moral duty. Oil supplies for the rehabilitation and rearmament of free Europe are hardly less important for our security than oil for the armed services of the United States.

The oil production of Europe outside of the Soviet orbit is small and far below current needs. At the close of World War II the European area was not able to supply more than 20 percent of its requirements from its own sources of crude oil and liquid hydrocarbons. The remainder was obtained from the United States, the Caribbean and the Middle East. The withdrawal of some oil-producing areas behind the iron curtain and the steadily increasing requirements of Western Europe under the Marshall Plan have worsened these proportions. During the years 1948–1950, Western European oil production shrank to about 5 percent of current needs, necessitating the importation of substantially all of the oil products required for the resumption of normal economic life and a modest degree of rearmament. Hence, while oil shipments from the Western Hemisphere to Europe continued throughout the period of oil deficiency in 1947 and early 1948, United States Government agencies naturally gave every encouragement to the substitution of Middle Eastern for American oil for Europe.

For Europe to draw on the Middle East for its requirements in oil is generally advantageous. It relieves pressures on Western Hemisphere reserves. Economic factors recommend it. Transportation distances from Mediterranean terminals are shorter than from those in the Americas; and although the price of Middle East oil since 1948 has shown a tendency to rise, the costs of crude oil and refined products delivered at European ports favor Middle East sources. The fact that much of this oil can be pur-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

chased with sterling and, to a modest extent, with francs, makes possible the husbanding of Europe's dollar resources, though at some disadvantage to the American oil companies engaged in Middle East operations. It is now expected that by 1952 almost all of the oil imports of the Marshall Plan countries will be supplied from the Middle East.

The logic of all of this is inescapable. A prime requisite of any United States plan of strategy for world security is to make certain, at all hazards, that the oil fields of the Middle East do not fall into totalitarian hands. In the event of major hostilities and the sudden upsurge of demand for oil products, sources of production in the Western Hemisphere might not supply our needs for long, and probably would not meet them even briefly without permanent damage to the producing fields. Circumstances can arise in which our need for Middle East oil is scarcely less than that of Europe's—and Europe's needs and our own are hardly separable.

It would be a mistake to overlook the fact that Middle East oil fields are strategically vulnerable. They lie at long distances from United States and Allied bases, and even if the sea lanes remain consistently in Allied hands, virtually all of the oil fields and refineries in the Middle East area lie within Soviet bombing range. They also lie within reach of hostile ground forces. The natural distaste of the Middle East peoples for Communist ideology, coupled with the fact that oil production in the area is wholly in Allied hands, might suggest the likelihood of strong local resistance to aggression from the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, such a response is not to be depended on. The Arab states in particular entertain far from cordial feelings toward Great Britain, France or the United States. Their willingness to deny themselves considerable income in royalties for the sake of denying oil to Israel is a clue to the political situation there.

Turkey, however, is a staunch friend of the United States. It is here that the oil regions of the Middle East can best be defended. The Turks are stout fighters on their own soil, and, operating with relatively small but mobile Allied forces, with strong air support, and exploiting fully the rugged terrain, could be expected to offer real opposition to an invader.

Even so, we must be prepared for interruptions, at least, in the all-important supply of Middle East oil. Supplies necessary to keep free Europe at war strength, and to drive the armed forces

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the United States without hampering industry, can be accumulated only if action is taken well in advance of a crisis. Until synthetic processes can compete with petroleum products in quantity, quality and cost, therefore, security must be sought in some form of oil stockpiling. This must be done on a scale commensurate with the extraordinary requirements that would be likely to accompany an all-out military effort. The only method of oil stockpiling which now appears to be practicable takes the form of oil reserves fully developed in time of peace but unutilized except as necessary to keep individual wells ready for prompt use in time of emergency. This means the substitution of government for private control of shut-in reserves, and for the investment of public funds on a large scale. It may mean also the withdrawing from private enterprise of unit fields whose production would be used to maintain the usual level of domestic oil supply. It involves replacing the oil thus impounded with imports from the Middle East.

The independent oil companies would suffer some hardships from the limitations placed on their exploitation of domestic oil resources, and from imports of oil—even though American-owned —from abroad. The furor caused by importations of Middle East oil during the months of stringency in 1947 and 1948 would make governmental agencies reluctant again to issue licenses for oil imports which might be thought to affect either the quantity or the price of domestic production. And the necessity of a conservation policy of this nature—though it would become obvious enough if war came—no doubt would be challenged. It is never easy to balance private interests, which are specific and immediate, against national security, which is likely to be relative and more or less remote, in a country whose economic life rests primarily on private enterprise. Nevertheless, it is proper to ask all Americans to remember that if the nation is insecure, the outlook for private economic interests is exceedingly poor. Security for the United States rests to an uncomfortably large extent on ready supplies of oil.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE EASTERN QUESTION IN MODERN DRESS

By Fitzroy Maclean

FOR many years preceding 1914 the international scene was dominated by the so-called Eastern Question—the question of what should be done to reform the Ottoman Empire, or (the real rub) to distribute its possessions when it fell apart. The Ottoman Empire fell apart in due course, and what remained of Turkey became a small Republic of some 14,000,000 souls, located in Asia Minor and concerned exclusively with its own affairs. Of the two major contenders for the prize, the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires, the former disappeared totally and the latter was changed into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, by definition and by proclamation immune to the imperialist sin of grabbing territory. The Eastern Question ceased to exist. And for a quarter of a century Turkey played but a secondary rôle in international affairs.

After the First World War relations between Russia and Turkey, based on the Russo-Turkish Treaty of 1921, were friendly. Both countries found themselves to some extent isolated and were able to render each other useful services. But Turkey made no concessions to the Soviet Union in regard to her internal politics; the friendship rested on the understanding that the Turkish Communist Party would be rigorously suppressed. Nor did these good relations prove an obstacle to the eventual rapprochement between Turkey and the West; as things turned out, the Soviet Union found herself in a position where assistance from the despised bourgeois nations was decidedly useful.

With the end of the Second World War, however, all this changed. The victorious alliance in its turn dissolved. The Soviet Union abruptly ceased to be an ally of Turkey's Western associates and became their enemy. And the heirs of Lenin began to fold foreign lands to the bosom of Mother Russia with a length of arm that Alexander III or Nicholas II never knew.

Turkey had to make a choice and she made it without hesitation. She did not for a moment seek to attenuate the bonds linking her to the West, but on the contrary took steps to strengthen them. She thus placed herself squarely in the opposite camp to that of her great neighbor and automatically constituted her-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

self an outpost of the democratic world against advancing Soviet imperialism. Politically and strategically, Turkey holds a key position in the great conflict of democracy and dictatorship in our time—and the Eastern Question reëmerges in modern dress.

II

Driving down through the Balkans to Istanbul and on into Asia Minor, one passes from Europe to Asia, though one notices no sudden change. But Istanbul is today a Western town and so in the main is Ankara, with its fine new official quarter and wide streets and modern buildings. Except in the remoter provinces, Eastern dress has disappeared almost completely and has been replaced by a stereotyped Western garb, noticeable mainly by its drabness. Indeed, approaching Turkey by way of Greece and Jugoslavia, I found far more reminders of the old Turkey in Thrace or Bosnia or Macedonia with their mosques and minarets, their veiled women and turbaned men, than I did once I had crossed the present Turkish border.

Though it is perhaps less apparent now than it was ten or twenty years ago, there exists in Turkey an almost pathological horror of anything oriental. The Turks have made a clean sweep of the past. The old palaces of the Sultans are falling into disrepair; the mosques have the air of museums, and until recently permission to build new ones was not granted. But the chief targets of this passion for Westernization have been the veil and the fez. Except in the country, Turkish women now seldom wear the veil, contenting themselves with pulling one end of a shawl or kerchief across part of their countenance when in the presence of strangers. As to the fez, I did not see one during the whole of the time I spent in Turkey, though the horror which its memory still inspires in official circles is shown by a recent announcement in the press that certain reactionaries had been found wearing berets which approximated the fez in shape and that arrests had been made accordingly. Only here and there does one catch a glimpse of the old Turkey—in the provinces, or, glancing through a porthole on board ship, chancing to see an aged pilgrim from Mecca wearing his turban at his devotions in the privacy of his cabin.

Turkey has one feature in common with other dictatorships. Everywhere there are portraits, statues, photographs of the Dictator, the Liberator, in military uniform or, more often, in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

white tie and tails which symbolize the essentially Western character of the régime which he founded. Everywhere, too, are to be found reminders of the War of Liberation, the only war now accorded official recognition. But Turkey's War of Liberation was fought more than a quarter of a century ago and Mustafa Kemal has been dead 12 years. Since his death the régime has been a dictatorship without a dictator, and today it is fast losing the last vestiges of its dictatorial character.

When Mustafa Kemal first seized power in 1923, after he had driven the Greeks out of Asia Minor and given Turkey her self-respect again after the defeat of 1918, he let it be known that his intention was to set up an authoritarian régime only for so long as was necessary to achieve the objects which he had in view. Once these had been attained, he said, he would again permit an opposition and the other machinery of parliamentary democracy. Likewise, it was not for ideological reasons that Kemal decreed the centralization of economic enterprises in the hands of the state. Determined to promote industrial development, he saw no way of doing so without endangering national independence except by making the state the prime mover. And here again it was his declared intention to restore private enterprise once the situation permitted.

The Kemalist régime had yet another feature which distinguished it from Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy and Stalin's Russia: it was non-expansionist. After 1918, the Turks had fallen back on their homeland, the Anatolian peninsula, and there they gathered themselves together, a homogeneous people, determined to yield no more ground, but equally without desire for foreign conquest. Perhaps it is in this absence of imperialist designs that lies the reason for the success of the Kemalist régime, for its moderation and, above all, for its survival.

During the 15 years of Kemal's personal rule, the situation did not in his judgment ever become ripe for democratization. It was only after his death in 1938 that his successor, Ismet Inonu, felt able to take the first cautious steps. But by then the storm clouds were already gathering fast and it was not until after the war that the process could be continued. In preparation for the elections of 1946, two properly constituted opposition parties were for the first time allowed: the Democratic Party of Celal Bayar and the more reactionary Nationalist Party of Marshal Cakmak. Both were offshoots of the People's Republican Party

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which had been founded by Kemal himself in 1923, and both Marshal Cakmak and Celal Bayar had been closely associated with Ataturk during his lifetime. Both parties prided themselves on their Kemalist origins, and loyalty to the memory of Ataturk and to Kemalist traditions was an essential article of their creed. Nor was there any very marked divergency between their programs and that of the People's Party. At the same time they provided a genuine rallying point for any opposition to the government that there might be in the country, and the mere fact of their creation marked a notable departure from the one-party system.

At the 1946 elections the two opposition parties together obtained only 50 or 60 seats to the 400 or so held by the Populists. But even this result was striking, coming after 23 years of one-party rule and under an electoral system that was heavily weighted in favor of the government party. In the eyes of many Populists it represented a danger to the régime. The President, Ismet Inonu, was strongly urged to meet the danger by dictatorial methods. It is to his credit that he declined to yield to this pressure and continued along the path of gradual democratization.

There were some complaints by the opposition parties that the elections of 1946 were not fairly conducted. In order to meet this criticism, Inonu in due course passed a new electoral law which provided for the secrecy of the ballot, the public counting of votes in the presence of representatives of all political parties, and the supervision by the judiciary of all electoral procedures. This law, which was brought into force in time for the general election of May 1950, appeared to give reasonable guarantees of fair play. But it was clear that much would depend on the way in which it was implemented, especially as practically all Mayors and *Muhtars* (parish headmen), who play a prominent part at elections, were members of the government party. Another unprecedented feature of the 1950 elections was that the two main parties, the People's Party and the Democratic Party, allowed their local organizations to nominate the greater part of the parliamentary candidates. Hitherto candidates had been chosen by the central party organizations from distinguished national figures who as often as not had no connection with their constituencies.

In spite of these reforms, however, no one was prepared for the overwhelming victory of the Democrats, who won 408 seats to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Populists' 69. And indeed the result of the election amounted in effect to a bloodless revolution. After 27 years of continuous power, the People's Party, founded by Ataturk himself, was swept out of office by a free vote of the people and reduced to the rôle of a virtually powerless opposition.

The probable explanation of this development seems to be that the People's Party had been in office too long and had grown complacent and self-satisfied. The heroic age of the Revolution and the War of Liberation had receded into the dim past. A generation had grown up that knew Kemal only from his portraits and effigies. The tension had relaxed. The spell had been lifted. And in its place had come disillusionment: distaste for the old familiar figures, a tendency to hold them responsible for everything that had ever gone wrong, a tendency, too, to lend heed to the stories of nepotism and corruption. In short, as is so often the case in elections, a great many voters voted against something rather than for something.

Most of all, perhaps, the middle classes had grown dissatisfied with a party blamed for continual state interference in the economic life of the country and the high cost of living. But although the strength of the Democratic Party lies mainly in the middle classes, it did not owe its victory entirely to them. One of the relatively few important differences between the party program of the Populists and Democrats was that the latter had announced their readiness to grant industrial workers the right to strike. Thus the working-class vote went almost entirely to the Democrats. The peasants, too, had come to resent the highhanded behavior of the provincial bosses of the People's Party. Finally, there was the younger generation, which characteristically voted for a change and for what seemed to be the more progressive of the two main parties.

III

The outcome of the 1950 elections appears to be the final justification of the policy which Ataturk initiated. Certainly it has been so regarded by the principal protagonists. The very result of the elections provides striking proof of the fairness with which they were conducted by the party in power; and the orderly transfer of power testifies to the good sense and political maturity of the country as a whole.

Credit for this must go first and foremost to the leaders of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

two major parties, Ismet Inonu and Celal Bayar. These two men have confronted each other at almost every turning point in recent Turkish history. It was Celal Bayar who succeeded Inonu as Prime Minister in 1937, the year before Ataturk's death. When, a year later, Inonu succeeded Ataturk as President of the Republic, it was Celal Bayar who, as Prime Minister, arranged the transfer of power. Again, after the 1950 elections, Inonu carried out his duties as retiring President with quiet dignity, while Celal Bayar, who had resigned from the Democratic Party in order to assume the office of President, played his part with equally laudable moderation. Credit too must go to the Turkish press. When the change took place, *Zafer,* the organ of the Democratic Party, paid tribute to Inonu as the retiring President, while on the same day a leading article in the Republican organ, *Ulus,* wished the new government success and undertook on behalf of the opposition to be moderate and constructive in criticism.

On the whole, these portents have not been belied by subsequent events. As was to be expected, numerous changes in the civil service have followed the election, but it cannot be said that there has been a wholesale purge of the administration. Though some Democrats are excessively enthusiastic about their victory, the new rule cannot by any stretch of imagination be described as repressive. The ease with which the transfer of power has taken place is no doubt largely due to the absence of any really fundamental divergency of principle between the Democrats and the People's Party. Another reason for Turkey's political stability is the absence of any glaring social inequalities, attributable to the levelling influence of Islam and the action of the Sultans centuries ago in destroying the power of the feudal lords of Anatolia. Yet another safeguard against political excess was the suppression by the Kemalist régime at a much earlier stage of extremists of both the Right and the Left, of both Monarchists and Communists.

Like the People's Party, the Democrats still stand in the main by the anticlerical principles inaugurated by Ataturk. They have, however, shown themselves slightly more lenient on various minor issues and have granted permission for the building of new mosques. They are likely to move toward less state control in industry, though again the fact is that both the two principal parties have for some time past been moving gradually toward the conclusion that the time had arrived to allow greater scope to private enterprise. One of the main difficulties in the way of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"denationalizing" commercial enterprises in Turkey is the difficulty of finding anyone with the necessary capital to take them over; ever since the Kemalist Revolution the amount of private capital available in the country has been extremely limited. But a great many of the state-owned industries are running at a loss and the resulting deficit represents a not inconsiderable burden on the national economy. It seems likely that the government will try to bring foreign capital into the country. Nor is foreign capital the only thing that Turkey needs from abroad. Like almost every other people in the Middle East, the Turks lack skilled workers. They are making strenuous efforts to train technicians themselves, but it seems likely that for some time to come they will also need the services of foreign experts.

Despite the degree of industrialization which has been achieved, Turkey still remains first and foremost an agrarian community. At the present time 50 percent of the national income is derived from agriculture and 90 percent of Turkey's exports are agricultural products. More than 80 percent of the present population of almost 19,000,000 relies on agriculture for a living. Moreover, agricultural resources might be used much more fully. In the words of an American expert, "Turkey, properly developed, might become another California." With American help good progress is already being made. During the past two years $36,000,000 has been spent on agricultural development under the European Recovery Program, with high priority given to road building, and before long Turkey will have a network of adequate roads ensuring communication between all parts of the country.

Steps are also being taken to improve crop rotation and to mechanize Turkish agriculture. Here the main difficulty lies in the fact that 70 percent of Turkish farmers own 25 acres or less each, and cannot therefore afford to discard their wooden ploughs and oxen in favor of expensive new machinery. Only the big landowners can pay for these, and thus for the government the choice lies between big properties efficiently exploited and a large number of small-holders who, while offering greater social stability, are proportionately less productive. A solution would seem to lie in the creation of farmers' coöperatives, but so far little has been done in this direction.

In general, the whole country is engaged in a large-scale program of national development, and the budget sets aside funds for considerable expenditure on industrial equipment from abroad

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and on irrigation and power schemes. The immense cost of maintaining the Turkish Army at its present level hinders this program seriously. But this is clearly unavoidable in view of the international situation and of Turkey's geographical position.

IV

We return therefore to the paradox with which we began—the astonishing reëmergence of the "Eastern Question," not this time as a problem of reforming Turkey, but as a problem of protecting a progressive, self-restrained and self-governed Turkey from foreign reaction. In the sphere of foreign affairs and defense the present government has made it clear that it intends to follow the same policy as its predecessor. Indeed, if anything it has gone even further in support of the Western democracies. One of the first acts of policy was the dispatch of a substantial Turkish force to Korea in response to the call of the United Nations—a bold move in view of Turkey's proximity to the Soviet Union. There can be no doubt that the Turkish people stand behind the government and would fight steadfastly in the defense of their country should the need arise. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that in Turkey today there is no trace of a fifth column. After a quarter of a century of rigorous suppression there are, practically speaking, no Communists in the country. The mere fact of the Communist connection with Russia, the hereditary enemy, is sufficient guarantee against any revival of the Party.

Nor is there any real danger from disaffected national minorities, as in Iran. Since the Revolution, political equality is guaranteed to all citizens of the Republic and to all races and creeds; but no "national minorities" are recognized. Before the war the refusal of some local Kurdish chiefs to accept these conditions led to trouble in eastern Turkey, in the neighborhood of Mount Ararat. But the rebellion was rigorously suppressed by Ataturk, the chiefs exiled and many Kurds settled in other parts of Turkey. Since then, the Turkish Government has persisted in its refusal to recognize the Kurds as such, referring to them simply as "mountain Turks." This somewhat drastic policy of national assimilation, coupled with political freedom, seems to have answered very well. Travelling about eastern Anatolia, I came across many communities whose members were identifiable as Kurds by their distinctive costume, but nowhere did I find any signs of discontent or subversion.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Of recent years the Russians have sought to make trouble with the Kurdish tribesmen of Turkey, Iran and Iraq, using as a nucleus a puppet "Kurdish Republic" which they have set up on Soviet territory at the foot of Mount Ararat. But, whatever effect this may have had on the Kurds of Iran or Iraq, it seems to have left the "mountain Turks" of Anatolia unmoved. All Soviet radio propaganda beamed on Turkey has been unsuccessful. The Turks are a steadfast race, with strong nerves, and the flood of threats and abuse that comes pouring across their frontiers from Russia leaves them cold. Notably they have paid little heed to Soviet demands for the return of the frontier provinces of Kars and Ardahan and the revision of the Straits régime, put forward officially soon after the end of the war and several times repeated. Turkey cannot be pulled down from within. If the Russians wish to impose their will on the Turks, they will have to use force—that is to say, they will have to march in.

But what if the Russians do march in? Much of Turkey is mountainous and the lines of approach to eastern Turkey are limited and difficult. The Turks are by nature a warlike race and would fight stubbornly. But even so, under conditions of modern warfare, they could not hope to stand up to the Russians unaided for long. Strategically, Turkey's position, nipped between the Balkan and Caucasian claws of a potential Soviet pincer movement and with her Black Sea coast exposed, is far from reassuring. Moreover, while the Turks are natural fighters, they have no real experience of modern warfare. Nor has the average Turkish peasant as yet the technical and mechanical aptitude to handle the modern instruments of war. Much, it is true, is being done by the American and British military advisers at present in Turkey and good progress has been made during the past two or three years in equipping the Turkish army on modern lines. But the Western Powers would be blinking the facts if they were to persuade themselves that either the military or economic help which they are giving Turkey is sufficient to enable her to hold off the overwhelming military might of the Soviet Union for more than a few weeks. Their salvation must, to a great extent, come from the West. And it is to the West that they are looking for help in case of a Soviet attack.

Events in Korea have been closely followed in Turkey. They have been followed with relief, first of all that the armed forces of the West have indeed taken the field on behalf of the victim of ag-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gression; then with dismay at the early reverses of the U.N. forces; then with satisfaction at their subsequent victories. In case of an attack by Russia on a third Power, Western intervention is now assumed to be certain. To this extent Korea has served to reassure the Turks; but only to this extent.

Though the old dread that the Western Powers might stand by inactive and let one small country after another be bludgeoned into submission has disappeared, it has been replaced by the fear that, in the event of war, Western help, when it comes, will be too little and too late. The Turks still fear that the most to be hoped for would be occupation by the Red Army, followed at some later date by liberation at the hands of the Western Powers—if by then there was anything left to liberate.

Even in Korea help barely arrived in time. Looking around the Middle East, the Turks find little to comfort them: a handful of British troops in Egypt; a sadly depleted Mediterranean Fleet; no aircraft to speak of; no indication, above all, of how help would be given or whence it would come. "We do not even know," a high officer of the Turkish General Staff said to me, "what the Western Powers would do to help us to defend the Straits, if they were attacked, or even if they would help us to defend them at all."

It was this anxiety, this uncertainty as to Western intentions, that found expression in the Turkish Government's renewed application for admission to the Atlantic Pact last August, and there can be no doubt that its rejection was a serious disappointment. This disappointment was to some extent dispelled, it is true, by the Atlantic Powers' counter-proposal that Turkey should join in the military planning of the Atlantic Pact countries, and there seems indeed no reason why this should not serve as a first step toward the creation of a wider Middle Eastern defense system. But this should not distract the Western Powers from the basic issue. If the security of the Middle East is to be effectively safeguarded, two things are needed. First, a suitably trained, suitably equipped Western striking force, able to give immediate and effective help to any country in this vital strategical area that is attacked by Russia; and, secondly, machinery which would enable the general staffs of the countries concerned to coördinate their plans for combined action in case of attack. So long as neither of these exists, the resulting gap in our defenses will continue to tempt Providence—and the Kremlin.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HISTORIANS IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE

By Max Beloff

THERE would probably have been a reaction against the Versailles settlement in any event. The hopes placed upon it were too high. But this reaction was converted into doubts about the justice of the war itself and the value of the victory, and by a radical revision of the views held about its causes. This revision was largely assisted by the more or less fortuitous fact that the Germans were first in the field with their diplomatic documents of the period, and that the first diplomatic histories of the years in question were perforce written on the basis of these documents and by more or less Germanophile historians. Repudiating the view in the Peace Treaty that the war was one "imposed upon the Allied and Associated Governments by the aggression of Germany and her allies," these historians, even when they kept clear of the German version of "Allied encirclement," presented the period in terms of an international anarchy: all nations sought selfish ends—Germany no more than others and less than some—and having no means of settling such disputes except by force or the threat of force, they were bound sooner or later to end in general war.

This is not the occasion to reopen that debate except for one observation which has a wider relevance. It is that the theory of equal responsibility is one which is rendered highly plausible by any technique of historical writing that confines itself to diplomatic documents and ignores the internal life and politics of the countries concerned. So long as one talks in the favorite abstractions and personifications of the diplomatic historian about "the Wilhelmstrasse," "the Quai d'Orsay" and so on, it is not difficult to regard all the countries concerned as following policies of the same kind and hence as bearing an equal responsibility for the outcome. It is only when one looks at the internal structure and ethos of the societies concerned that one can differentiate between them, and see the gulf which in fact separated Asquith's England or Wilson's America from the Kaiser's Germany.

This doctrine of equal responsibility which contributed so much (along with some of its offshoots like the alleged wickedness of armament manufacturers and bankers) to the moral and material disarmament of both Britain and the United States in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

face of the revival of German aggressiveness was, of course, largely unable to hold its own when aggressiveness merged into overt aggression. As soon as it became evident that the object of the Germans was to reverse not the Versailles settlement but the victory which gave it birth, it became possible to review the pre-history of the First World War and to make use at the same time of a wider range of historical materials than had at first been available. If full use is made of the German archives now in Allied hands for the earlier period as well as for the inter-war years, a further revision in the picture may be required.

Now, after the Second World War, we talk very often as though the causes of that conflict were already patent and as though we had only to avoid our previous errors in order to avoid renewed disaster. Just as the choice of "unconditional surrender" as the leitmotif of our peacemaking projects was based on our determination to prevent a new German "stab-in-the-back legend," so a great deal of the current political argument turns on the belief that the fundamental cause of the Second World War was "appeasement" and that the avoidance of "appeasement" is the sum of true statesmanship. It should be clear that on logical grounds alone "appeasement" can never be a prime cause, for before there can be "appeasement" there must be threat of aggression, if not aggression itself to appease. But historians have actually helped the growth of these and other facile stereotypes, for reasons which have again been partly outside their own control.

For the vast bulk of the material available to the historian has come from the Western European countries and in particular from France. And the apologias of Western statesmen, particularly French statesmen, are necessarily concerned primarily with their own share in the events they record, even though from a wider point of view that share was a relatively minor one. The correction of such stereotypes, such automatic reactions to the mention of particular events in the recent past, is an essential but neglected task of the academic student of politics.

The professional historian of the inter-war years as of the previous period still falls too easily into the routine of treating the Great Powers as so many roughly similar units whose fundamental interests and policies are of the same family. The pieces in the great game of international relations are not like the pieces in draughts or checkers; they are not identical and interchangeable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

They are like the pieces in chess with individual habits of their own. Some can travel one way along the board and some another; and the limitations are real and constitute the essence of the game. But unlike even chess, international relations has the awkward characteristic that the values and dispositions of the pieces are not permanent, but changeable. Soviet Russia did not just begin where Tsarist Russia left off. The America of Roosevelt was not the America of Wilson. Hitler was not the Kaiser.

There is, of course, the contrary and equally oversimplified view of the Marxists, who regard the world of the inter-war period as sharply divided between the peace-loving Soviet Union on the one hand and the warring imperialist states on the other—the latter prevented only by their internecine rivalries from joining together to crush the Soviet Union and the hope of emancipation which it presented to their own and the colonial proletariats. But the patent inadequacy of the Marxist analysis should not blind us to the inadequacy of the viewpoint which holds that everything has all been done wrong up till now, but this time we shall show the world how it is to be done. Many of us may have felt like that in 1944–45, and already we see how wrong we were. Human affairs being the tangled mess of rationality and irrationality that they are, it is unlikely that in these great matters any generation should be wholly right. What history seems to reveal is not a succession of errors followed by a flash of final and total illumination, but rather a succession of partial insights and partial blindnesses, leaving us something to learn from both. In our present mood it has become fashionable to contrast the relative solidity of the Vienna settlement with the rapid collapse of the Versailles order. And no doubt there were aspects of politics into which Metternich saw more deeply than Wilson; there were also aspects of politics into which Wilson saw more deeply than Metternich, and more deeply, too, than some of his successors and critics. The contempt for Wilsonian principles that seems to be one of the few meeting-places for right and left has yet to be proved a productive form of reaction.

II

What, then, are the particular lessons to be drawn for a study of the history of the inter-war period?

In the first place, it seems that sufficient allowance must be made for two facts which distinguish that period from preceding

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ones. The first of them is one that has been gaining ground as a result of recent events but is still not altogether accepted as applied to historiography. It is the simple fact of change of scale. After 1917—the crucial year of America's entry into the war and Russia's withdrawal—the European framework of modern history finally collapsed. It was possible to write the history of modern times up to that date around Europe as a nucleus, with the other continents coming into the main story only when, and in as far as, they were affected by European events.

The illusion was not merely an example of European egocentricity. Indeed it would not be too much to say that it has died harder in the United States than in some parts of Europe itself. The whole rationale of American isolation—in so far as it had a rationale—was based on the idea that a European equilibrium could be restored and preserved by the efforts of European nations themselves. Even today the same fundamental illusion underlies the unthinking support given in the United States to the totally unreal notion of West European federation. The British resistance to this idea is not (as some people appear to think) the product of a simple desire to retain certain special benefits of the Commonwealth relationship, but rather of an awareness which the Commonwealth relationship fosters—an awareness of the total unsuitability of a West European unit (or even of a wider European framework) as an instrument for providing a solution for any of the problems, political, economic or even cultural, that such a federation would be supposed to solve.

Any study of the inter-war years which does not give major attention to the changes in the status and outlook of non-European Powers, American and Asian alike, is a parish-pump affair, and predestined to superficiality. But the historian clinging to his documents which tell him a lot about the Rhine and the Danube, but little about the Ganges or the Yellow River, who finds a comforting familiarity in the interchanges between European diplomats and a discomforting unfamiliarity about the names and aims of Asian statesmen and movements, is normally content to leave these questions as sideshows for specialists.

Important as this question of scale undoubtedly is, it is both easier to understand and simpler to grapple with than the other major particulars in which the years after the First World War differ from the years before it. For we are here dealing with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a change of spirit and temper reflected in changing institutions; and such immaterial changes present much harder problems to the historian, particularly the contemporary historian, than do changes in the relative weight and importance of different areas or states. It is indeed precisely the difficulty which those who still took for granted the temper of the preceding age had in understanding the age into which they had now come that explains the extent of their failure. Neville Chamberlain's failure to understand Hitler (dare one add Franklin Roosevelt's failure to understand Stalin?) was not the failure of individuals but of a civilization. And we are still far perhaps from having plumbed the full depths of this gulf. Indeed it is too early to be sure that we shall not be swallowed up by it in our turn.

The gulf is symbolized most obviously and dramatically by what can best be described as a growth in callousness in the Western world—a growth in indifference to murder. In the late nineteenth century or the early years of the present one, public opinion could be moved, and political action to some extent swayed, by revulsion against Turkish ill-treatment of Bulgar or Armenian minorities, or by Russian pogroms against the Jews. Yet the victims of these world-shaking horrors as they were then regarded could have been numbered easily in thousands. In the course of the Second World War, the Germans as a matter of public policy put to death some 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 Jews and further millions of Poles, Jugoslavs, Russians and others. Yet within five years of the overthrow of the régime that ordered murder on a scale unknown since the times of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, the revulsion against it seems almost to have vanished. Of course the inhumanities of the Soviet rulers have absorbed our attention, yet in discussions about policy with regard to various degrees of partnership with Germany in America, in Britain and even in France, should not the memory that we are dealing with a nation that has recently practised genocide as an instrument of its political program continue to be a factor in reaching decisions?

It is no doubt true, as Socialists will remind us, that we are more sensitive than our grandparents to some evils, that we accept social responsibility for individual welfare to a greater extent than any previous society. But a public conscience that demands free spectacles all round (in both senses) but is indifferent to the gas-chamber and the incinerator seems oddly proportioned to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

anyone inheriting the simple standards of religion and ethics as the Western world has known them.

Yet this blunting of the public conscience—a theme that could be pursued—is only a reflection in a partly nonpolitical sphere of the impact of the major political event of the period we are considering: the twentieth century revolution. The word revolution is used in the singular of set purpose. It helps to emphasize the necessity of clearing our minds of yet another all-pervasive stereotype that makes a proper understanding of the immediate past (and of the present) quite unattainable. It is the stereotype of political division into right and left. This bore some relation to the political circumstances of an earlier age when it could plausibly be argued that the semicircular arrangement of European legislatures corresponded to some real divergence of fundamental views, so that on the extreme right one would have adherents of the traditional legitimist order, on the extreme left those of pure democracy, with various gradations in between. But since 1917—again the crucial year—all this has been quite irrelevant, and has been kept alive by certain elements who have thought to make political capital out of the resultant confusion.

It has been useful for Communists in their "popular front" periods—and such periods are recurrent features of Communist tactics—to pretend that as the "extreme left" of the political amphitheater they are suitable partners for "democratic" Socialists and even liberals on the benches next to them. At other periods, it has suited Fascists or National Socialists to claim that they are "the extreme right," and can thus be regarded as defenders of tradition and legitimacy against the extreme left. Both these claims have paid handsome dividends from time to time. But both are obviously spurious. In everything that matters, Fascism and Communism are far more alike than either is like liberalism or conservatism. In other words, the whole of this right-left dichotomy is now a dangerous irrelevance. Any test one applies will demonstrate the truth of this conclusion. In the days when the right-left division had meaning, it was generally agreed, for instance, that a sympathy for Socialism (in some form) and with internationalism (in some form) was a characteristic of the "left" as contrasted with the devotion of the "right" to property and patriotism. Today it is clear enough, at least in Britain, that Socialism can be combined with the very extremes of nationalist insularity. There is thus no logical link whatever between Socialism

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and internationalism; and the right-left division obviously breaks down.

Presented in a highly abstract and schematic form, what has in fact happened appears to be more like this. In the century of the Vienna settlement, the European states-system, then the core of world politics, was run on the assumption, generally if not consciously held, that liberalism was making its way under the shadow of the old legal order. This liberalism had as its expression in the field of international relations a respect for the sovereignty of individual states, and a growing tendency to regard as the proper foundation of such states the principle of national self-determination. Although over much of Central and Eastern Europe this principle was violated in fact, it generally commended itself to what were regarded as forward-looking minds. It was held, too, that nations based upon this principle would be able to compose their differences without the resort to war which was still accepted as the ultimate sanction of national sovereignty. Meanwhile, however, peace was actually preserved by the self-restraint imposed upon the Great Powers by the balance of forces between them, and by a certain realization, perhaps, that under modern conditions a major clash between them might lead to far-reaching and undesirable consequences for their internal structures. For structures of government and society were in many parts of Europe proving less and less capable of giving a proper place to the demands of new classes for political self-expression. Yet there were even in darkest Russia some stirrings of reform; and nowhere in Europe was it possible to take the same gloomy view of the future that the present generation has come to regard as almost normal. It might perhaps be added that the fact that overseas emigration, particularly to the United States, still held out opportunities to vast numbers of those who by reason of political, religious or economic discrimination had least to look forward to in Europe, and was a safety valve of inestimable importance.

Above all, however, the characteristic of this last period of the old Europe was something which can best be described as the rule of law. It was the feeling that people were living within a social and economic order which, whatever its injustices and pressures, could at least be trusted to endure, in which, to take the most telling symbol, the value of money could be expected to remain stable and in which in consequence planning for oneself and one's family was still possible. Under such an order, personal re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sponsibility and personal initiative made up in part at least for obvious social defects. And something in the field of international relations corresponded to this feeling about the internal order. There might be wars as there had been in the past, and some people would suffer; but the basic pattern of civilian life would go on. Statesmen might regard each other with suspicions that were justified, but on the whole they were men in whom a certain degree of self-control, in whose ambitions a certain measure, might be presumed.

This is the order that was destroyed by the First World War, and by the European revolution of which the 1917 revolution in Russia was the first step. In retrospect we can measure its magnitude better. For we have seen in more recent years how the Japanese conquest of Southeastern Asia and its aftermath have ended the domination of the Western Powers in those lands, and have broken up a great deal of the apparatus of law and order upon which any kind of productive and civilized life must depend. Americans who have been prone to applaud the weakening of "imperialism" and "colonialism" can now see in Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and Indo-China how hard it is to supply the place of the everyday machinery of government when it is withdrawn, along with the habits of obedience upon which it rests; how easy it is for anarchy to rear its head, and how much may have to be suffered by the peoples of these areas before a substitute is found for the British, French and Dutch rule that would-be "progressives" have bespattered with so much unjustified contempt.

The difference is, however, that whereas we have so far discovered no clear formula for the current problems of Asia, the problem of the collapse of the old European order seemed in 1919 to have a solution ready-made for it in the principles of Wilsonian liberalism. This solution rested on the belief that what had happened could be regarded as the speeding-up of a natural historical process that had been going on over a long period. Europe was being remapped at last, in terms of national self-determination; those countries which did not already enjoy liberal-democratic institutions were being endowed with them (that "liberal" and "democratic" were possibly antipathetic was normally overlooked); and finally an organization was to be set up in order to assure respect in the international order for the rule of law. To replace the balance of power and the self-restraint of autocrats that had failed the world, Wilsonian liberalism provided a new

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

machinery of international coöperation and conciliation, and the hoped-for impact of world opinion mobilized in defense of peace.

With all allowances made for national selfishness and the still greater force of national fears based upon historic experience, the statesmen of Western Europe, of Western-minded Central European nations like the Czechs, and of the Americas (where these participated at all) were for the next two decades governed by the Wilsonian complex of ideas. The new Wilsonian order failed, and with that failure, contempt for these principles grew. But the point here is, surely, that for the most part the wrong reasons were given, and still are given, for their failure.

It is of course true that in action the confinement of statesmanship to Europe proper had the same deleterious effect as the confinement to the European framework has had upon historical thought. But the other reasons were for the most part very wide of the mark. Ignoring the fact that politics nearly always has a primacy over economics, the argument was that the greatest flaw was the multiplication of economic barriers that the practice of self-determination was shown to entail, and the creation of a multitude of warring and autarchic little states. But it was not the little states that went to war; and the whole of this argument seems to rest rather on some intellectuals' love of bigness and power for their own sake than on any reasoned analysis of the course of events.

It was argued, too, that the weakness was that the principle of national self-determination itself was not carried out to its logical conclusion, that its teachings were overtly disregarded in some areas. This of course is not altogether consistent with the first argument, though it was quite often advanced by the same people. But the real point is again that war did not come over an attempt forcibly to rectify an injustice of this kind. The dispute over Danzig and the "Corridor" was the occasion rather than the cause of the final breakdown. What had made it inevitable was the German march into Czechoslovakia. Wilsonian principles did not demand that Nazis should rule in Prague; and once they were there, there was no reason not to regard the demand for the "Corridor" (so-called and of set purpose) as more than a stepping-stone to German rule in Warsaw, and beyond.

At any rate, criticism of the Versailles settlement for paying too little attention to the principle of self-determination is hardly compatible with the approval of the principles of Potsdam. Self-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

determination has never until the last decade been held to mean the tidying-up of the map of Europe by mass-murder—or by mass-expulsions. The Russians and their satellites (not without some early connivance in other quarters) have been almost as adept at the latter as were the Germans at mass murder.

The real point is surely that the Versailles settlement was destroyed not by events or causes in the field of international relations proper, but by the advent of the European revolution. In Russia, and then in Italy and Germany, régimes came into power which did not simply demand a revision of the existing structure, but repudiated it altogether. These régimes seeking their support from the lower depths of society, and from the lower depths of human nature, could not be fitted into any system based upon respect for law and upon self-restraint because they recognized no law and no limitations. This was clearer at first internally than externally; it was not at first seen that to deny human rights to "bourgeois" or to "kulaks," to Socialists or to Jews, to treat individuals as merely units in the balance-sheet of national power, can never have a purely internal significance. States which repudiated all law in favor of mere will could not form part of any international order. They were as out of place in the new Europe as they would have been in the old.

It is not surprising that this was not at first realized. As far as Russia was concerned, there was the feeling that it was a government of the "left" and therefore deserved the support of "progressives." Forgetting the circumstances that had led to Allied intervention against a régime that was making peace with the German enemy, and simultaneously stimulating the forces of revolution everywhere, people rapidly developed a guilt complex over the whole episode and this helped to blur the picture still further. But the fundamental point was that certain spurious historical analogies tempted people to believe, after the earlier years were over, that the régime would settle down, that in Russia too, after a fashion, normalcy would return. The complete misconception (that still bobs up here and there) about the meaning of Stalin's famous, or infamous, "Socialism in one country" provided an intellectual excuse for ignoring the fact that "permanent revolution" was not simply the heretical doctrine of an outlawed sect, but something inherent in the Soviet régime by its very nature. Violence breeds violence; and a régime which is ready to sacrifice its own people for the sake of its blueprints of future happiness

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the more concrete temptations of present power will hardly hesitate to repeat the process at the expense of foreigners when opportunity affords.

And all this of course was equally true of Germany, and to a lesser extent of Italy. It was somewhat concealed from the outside world by the fact that instead of coming into power as a result of a violent revolution against the old order, Fascism and National Socialism each came into power with the connivance of part of the old ruling elements. In Germany particularly, where the existing settlement had never seriously been accepted, soldiers, civil servants and industrialists saw no reason why they should not exploit the dynamic of the revolution for their own purposes. But in a contest as to who should exploit whom, a revolutionary movement with its fewer scruples is almost certainly bound to win against its more traditionalist and intellectual opponents. And so one had in Germany the series of pathetic and foolish manœuvres which ended in the plot of July 20, 1944.

In Italy, the dynamic of Fascism was more artificial and much weaker, the old order, strengthened by the survival of the monarchy, correspondingly stronger. Fascism's malignant hatred for it is shown in Mussolini's "Memoirs." His final endeavor to build himself up as a revolutionary hero (even if it owed something to the example of Napoleon as the myth-maker of St. Helena) was in essence a shrewd appraisal of the reason for his failure.

Only in Russia, where the crust of civilization was thinner and the pent-up dark energies of the people more fully exploitable for the evil purposes of Lenin and his successors, has a twentieth-century revolution really fulfilled itself. There, almost every barrier against naked politics has been swept away—and the prospect is the more grim. In Russia the creation of a people acknowledging no limitations upon human action other than technical ones, and certain of its ultimate mastery over the latter, has gone further than anywhere else. To read the Soviet press is to be reminded that the visions of an Aldous Huxley or a George Orwell about conditioned minds are not pure fantasy. The real problem of our times may prove to be not how to get rid of the Soviet régime (for such a régime is bound to carry within it the seeds of its own destruction) but how to find anything to put in its place. Are there any healthy shoots in the Russian soil ready to sprout up when this vast jungle-growth of Communist bureaucracy no longer shuts out the light of the sun?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

III

But this is to anticipate events. Our immediate purpose is with the past and particularly with the 1920's and 1930's when the Communist menace was rightly regarded as secondary to the menace of National Socialism and its allied Fascisms. Rightly, because although the universality of Communism makes it in the long run a more dangerous creed than the parochial frenzies of the German master race, it did not seem as though its adherents could rebuild the Russian state and advance its strength to the point at which its military might could seriously weigh in the world, or even the European, balance of power.

Some of the neglect of Russia's possibilities as an ally against the Nazis had nothing to do with any ideological prejudice but was the result of a purely technical appraisal of Russia's weakness. And this weakness was of course realized by the Russians themselves and acted on accordingly. Indeed if the term "appeasement" is to be applied in its contemporary meaning to the foreign policy of any country in the 1930's, it would seem best of all to fit the policy of the Soviet Union toward Fascism. The whole series of events from the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria to the nonaggression pacts with Germany in 1939, and Japan in 1941, carries the story of Russian appeasement of the "aggressor states" well past the point at which Great Britain and France, and in a different way the United States, had abandoned the effort.

If the Russian appeasement was more wholehearted than that of the Western Powers, it was because it was the conscious policy of a government that knew what its object was, that had not renounced the belief in force as the universal arbiter but was concerned to see that no arbitrament was resorted to at a time unfavorable to itself. It did not spring, as did Western appeasement in large part, from the pressure of populations wedded to the ideology of peace as never before in history, and between governments who were caught without a valid doctrine of international relations for the revolutionary world in which they had to function.

In as far as the Governments of Great Britain, the United States and France had a doctrine, it was surely essentially Wilsonian. On the whole, and with the deviations in favor of specific national interests of a traditional kind which were to be expected

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

only in a human and hence imperfect world, they still adhered to the ideas of national self-determination as the proper foundation of a world order. The remodelling of the internal relationships of the British Commonwealth to which the Second World War gave an added impetus rather than a new direction was testimony enough in one sphere, as was the revision of the policies of the United States in Latin America in another. And even more important was the belief that such changes in the political order of the world that had to be made should be made by consent and not by force.

The problem was how to apply principles of this kind and to operate the type of international machinery that they demanded in a world in which were at work revolutionary forces that denied the principles themselves. The statesmen of the Western Powers—encouraged as they were by the support of the majority, indeed the vast majority of their fellow-citizens—were bound to assume that time was on their side, that if they could only delay the catastrophe by timely concessions, the revolutionary movements (where they recognized them as such) would undergo a process of stabilization, and gradually fit themselves into the existing framework of world politics. On at least three occasions in the history of the Soviet Union—the last being in the early years of its participation in the Second World War—it has been widely argued in Western countries that the régime was settling down, that its revolutionary impetus was slackening, and that it could henceforth be treated along the lines of the traditional diplomacy. In a similar way in the 1930's, people were prone to clutch at every suggestion that Hitler or Mussolini, as the case might be, were acting as a check upon their "extremists" and were ready to come in to an all-round peaceful settlement.

All these were illusions—but illusions honorable to the heart if not to the head. Is it healthy to treat the heads of great states, the accepted rulers of great nations, as perjured criminals until proof positive and incontrovertible has been obtained? Would any country having reached the level of humanitarian and pacific feeling of the Western democracies and after the experiences of World War I have agreed to what would have been in effect a preventive war?

And there was in the 1930's a further dilemma of a perfectly genuine kind. The balance of military strength—actual rather than potential—so favored the revolutionary Powers at the time

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

when the far-reaching nature of the threat they presented became apparent that it was hardly possible to resist one without the help of the others. And it was not obvious in such a case what action would in the long run be most desirable. The British and French Governments have been blamed rightly or wrongly for not doing as much as they could to bring the Soviet Union into a common front against German aggression. But if they are to be blamed for this, should they not also be praised for refusing to have any truck with the idea of joining the Axis Powers in an anti-Bolshevik crusade against the Soviet Union? For despite all Communist propaganda to the contrary, there is not a shred of evidence that this was a part of the policy of the Western Powers, not even to the extent of passive connivance in German designs—though a certain number of individuals may well have felt that the best thing that could happen would be for the different revolutionary régimes to destroy themselves in internecine strife, just as the Communists on their side hoped to see the capitalist world destroy itself in warfare for their own ultimate benefit. One could say that the Anglo-French guarantees to Poland and other countries after the occupation of Czechoslovakia had precisely the contrary effect, providing as they did a cover for the Soviet frontiers.

Indeed one could say that both the negative policy toward the idea of close association with the Soviet Union and the hostile attitude toward the idea of a limitless eastward expansion of Nazi Germany sprang from the same fundamental concept of what was proper to the foreign policy of twentieth-century democracies. In the end, the decision was made for them by the pressure of events; and for a period the Atlantic democracies became the allies of the Soviet Union. It may well be that this alone made the defeat of Germany possible; it can scarcely be said in the light of subsequent events that the forebodings of those who would have preferred if possible to do without it have not in part been justified.

In this perspective, it might well be argued that the statesmen of the Western world in the inter-war period were faced with a dilemma that had all the elements of classical tragedy, since it was ultimately insoluble. There was perhaps no path that could have combined adherence to principle with practical achievement. It is easy to see how in fact the actions of such statesmen con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tributed to the circumstances in which war came; it is much harder to see how a situation could have been created in which the war might have been avoided.

This does not mean that the historian of the inter-war period should now embark upon a defense of those reputations—Mr. Chamberlain's, Monsieur Daladier's and so on—that have suffered most heavily at the hands of recent writers. There is plenty of evidence that such men lacked even the limited insights of some of their wiser contemporaries—though not all those who criticize them today, such as Socialist opponents of British rearmament, were among these wiser contemporaries. There is plenty of evidence that even their own principles were not always adhered to fully, that they were weak, vacillating and above all unimaginative. Rather it should be realized that these facts and the abundant documentation that increasingly serves to illustrate them are of very secondary importance, that the traditional interests and techniques of the diplomatic historian have little relevance to a revolutionary age.

It may be, of course, that even this level of the argument is not the final one, that if it be true that the historian for the next few generations will see our age in terms of conflicting ideologies and of the movements generated by them, a still more long-range judgment will regard all this activity as superficial compared with underlying changes in technology, in population and in the major question of the relation of the human race as a whole to the resources of the planet it inhabits.

No one can tell. But to those who argue this way, it is possible to answer that such questions lie outside the province of the historian in the accepted sense. His business is with those parts of the historical process that take their form from the conscious activity of the individual or the planned activity of the group. His efforts must be to comprehend so as to narrate the story of each generation within the terms of the problem it set itself at the time. To judge by such historical works as the inter-war period has so far called forth, that is enough and more than enough for most people. It is, as has been here suggested, a problem that is far from having been solved. It is perhaps presumptuous to say that it can be. There may be human tragedies that the human mind is too small to grasp.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EUROPE'S NORTHERNMOST FRONTIER

By John J. Teal, Jr.

THE Spitsbergen archipelago—the northernmost frontier of Europe—was proclaimed an integral part of the Kingdom of Norway on August 14, 1925. This was in accord with the Paris Treaty of 1920. The nations which signed the Treaty, among them the United States, hoped that by awarding the area to Norway they would put an end to ancient conflicts, and that its future would be secure in the hands of a peaceful country. They made but two major stipulations: that the signing nations should have continued access to their economic interests there, and that the archipelago, to which the Norwegians gave its Norse name Svalbard, was not to be fortified.

For a quarter century Norway has scrupulously honored the treaty. No fortifications have been built in Svalbard. But today the Norwegians there are outnumbered three to one by Russians who have been sent into the region, ostensibly as coal miners, since 1947. Secrecy surrounds the Russian activities. However, coal mining is obviously not the only activity of the Soviet settlers; although there are three times as many Russians as Norwegians, they succeed in producing only a third as much coal—about 100,000 tons a year. The Russians are established about Isfiord, the main settlement area, in such a fashion that they could take over Svalbard "any morning before breakfast." These developments have been little remarked upon, but they are noteworthy, for an attack on unfortified Svalbard would directly involve the United States under the terms of the Atlantic Pact.

Svalbard, which in old Norse means "land with the cold coasts," comprises a number of islands roughly 39,000 square miles in area, or one-fifth the size of Norway, lying 360 nautical miles off the north coast of Scandinavia and within 600 miles of the North Pole. It straddles a branch of the Gulf Stream, and as a result for six months of the year West Spitsbergen, the main island, is in contact with the rest of the world by open water—a unique attribute among Arctic areas. Svalbard is less than an hour by air from northeast Greenland and within three hours by plane of more than half the north Asiatic coast. It is thus of commanding importance to Russia's northern sea route, which ex-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tends from Archangel to the Bering Straits. German efforts to establish a naval base in the islands in the Second World War attest to their importance in relation to Atlantic Ocean and Norwegian sea routes. And Svalbard's strategic importance for European air routes is readily disclosed by the fact that London, Berlin, Moscow and the industrial heart of the Soviet Union are all nearly equidistant from it.

II

West Spitsbergen, largest and most settled of the islands, and most accessible by water, is a place of jagged mountains, inundated by fiords which lead either to broad valley river systems or glaciers. However, there are many flat or rolling regions, totally ice free, especially on the western and northern coasts. The many streams fed by melting snow run shallow because just under the earth's surface there is a layer of permanently frozen ground 300 to 900 feet deep. Northeastland, 15,000 square kilometers in area, is roughly three-quarters covered by glaciers which on the south and east form an almost unbroken stretch of ice along the seacoast. White Island, the easternmost section of Svalbard and but 100 miles from Franz Josef Land, now held by the U.S.S.R., is a huge glacial dome with but two small points which are ice free. (It was on one of these points that the remains of the balloonist, André, and his companions were found 30 years after their mysterious disappearance in an attempt to reach the North Pole.) Access to both White Island and Northeastland is made very difficult by pack ice in all seasons of the year. Other islands, such as Barents Island, Edge Island, King Karl Land (the breeding place of polar bears and their only sanctuary in the world), are ice free but of only passing importance. Bear Island, lying half way between Spitsbergen and Norway, is chiefly a flat plateau surrounded by cliffs which make its approach hazardous and spelled the doom of the coal company operating there.

The climate of Spitsbergen is not more severe than that of many north temperate areas, and compares directly with that of the Varanger Peninsula in northeastern Norway. As in the rest of the Arctic there has been a general warming of the climate during the past 50 years, resulting in a retreat of the glaciers and the spread of vegetation. There were times in the distant past when Svalbard was a temperate, almost a tropical place. Occasionally the fossil skeleton of a saurian lizard may be found.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As one walks along the glacial moraines or the beaches it is possible to pick up fossil leaves and large pieces of fern. These plants are responsible for the wealth of Svalbard, for they have created the seams of coal, estimated as enough to supply Norway (which has no other coal) for 4,000 years at the present rate of consumption. Other minerals, such as gypsum, asbestos, zinc and iron have also been located. The coal is most abundant in the areas about Isfiord, and can be seen blackening the sides of mountains up every valley in the central part of the island. Although the individual seams are usually quite thin, the mining conditions are ideal since the temperature inside the mines is a uniform 24.8 degrees F. throughout the year, cold enough to keep the loose rock frozen and obviating the need for extensive wooden supports. It also does away with the need for artificial ventilation and prevents flooding. The coal is a fine steam coal with a relatively low ash content.

In summer, even on the northern coasts and islets, there are carpets of yellow poppies, purple saxifrage, Arctic cotton and other flowers. In Isfiord and King's Bay the inhabitants turn out their cows and horses to graze in the valleys. Musk-ox and hares were introduced from Greenland by the Norwegian Government in the 1920's and the former seem to be thriving. Though land mammals are scarce on Svalbard, the eroded cliffs are rookeries for a sea-bird population estimated at upward of 100,000,000. The coasts are dense with plankton. Auks, dovekies, guillemots, fulmars, puffins and gulls fill the air, and there are eider ducks, geese loons and phalaropes. Of the 54 species found, two, the ptarmigan and the snow sparrow, stay throughout the year. The rich bird life has for centuries supplied a readily available food supply, and eiderdown has been a source of income.

The early Vikings, who purposely sailed to certain northern lands and were blown ashore on others by chance, probably knew of Svalbard, and the busy sealers of the north surely came upon it. These Arctic lands were claimed by name by early Norwegian and Danish kings. Recently discovered records show that Svalbard was known and visited by a number of Norse voyagers in the sixteenth century, but its "official" discovery is credited to William Barents, in 1596. Henry Hudson also came across Svalbard, in 1607, while searching for a northern passage to the Orient. He wrote of the great number of whales which abounded in its fiords. Almost immediately the Dutch and English whalers,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and to a lesser extent the Basque and Danish, swarmed to Svalbard to take advantage of the incredibly rich and easy catches, and to engage in bitter rivalries over whaling rights. In some years the Dutch cities sent more than 300 ships, and the Dutch whaling town of Smeerenburg, on the northwestern corner of Spitsbergen, was said to have had a population of 10,000. Busy streets, rows of frame houses, smoking vats of boiling blubber, a bakery with a bell to announce new batches of bread, a fiord cluttered with hunting boats killing and dragging the whales ashore characterized the summer scene. After a century of such hunting the whales thinned out and avoided the closed waters of the fiords, and today only an immense graveyard and grass mounds remain to remind one of the frenzied industry.

Before fiord whaling was abandoned, however, Russian hunters began to arrive in large parties which stayed the year round to collect reindeer hides, foxes, seals and polar bears. They called the country Grumant, thought to be a colloquialism for Greenland. Quite often they were sent out by Russian monasteries and lived in large communities. Sturdy, ingenious and superstitious men, they knew how to adapt themselves and worked a rich trade in furs. These men were virtually the only inhabitants of Svalbard for more than a century, and the remains of their hunting stations, their tools and their crosses may still be found. In the nineteenth century they were gradually supplanted by Norwegian hunters who very often murdered them and stole their year's catch.

III

For three centuries, in spite of various claims, Svalbard had remained a *Terra Nullius,* outside the web of sovereignty. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, two new factors, coal and strategy, set the scholars of all the interested nations to digging up records of discovery and advancing proofs of rights. John M. Longyear, head of a Boston engineering firm, purchased lands in Svalbard in 1907 and made the first serious effort to mine coal. He was soon sending coal shipments to Norway from his camp, Longyear City, now called Longyearbyen—the capital of Svalbard. The success of his mine stimulated companies from Norway, England, Holland, Sweden and Russia to stake out claims, and the "Spitsbergen boom" was on. Some of these companies settled down to serious production, but the majority pro-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

duced mainly wild reports of discoveries and unfulfilled promises to stockholders. Since there was no protecting government and Svalbard knew little or no law, claim-jumping and gun battles were the rule, to an accompaniment of diplomatic notes among the foreign offices.

The Germans were the first to perceive the strategic importance of the islands. They had been the first to exploit the tourist possibilities of Spitsbergen and for years had sent luxury liners north on summer cruises, often loaded with rather ludicrous tourists who dined on caviar and champagne while clad in furs and armed with daggers. Not all of the tourists were ludicrous, however. Naval and military men from the Kaiser's services made the trip, noting with interest the many fine fiords so suitable for submarines and other naval units, and so commandingly placed in regard to the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic. Their reports captured the imagination of authorities at home, and soon weather stations staffed by military personnel sprouted, and Zeppelin and others conducted detailed scientific observations. Fortunately, when the First World War broke out air warfare was undeveloped and steps were taken to forestall German use of Spitsbergen as a naval base.

Meanwhile the Norwegians had determined to bind Spitsbergen to their kingdom. They offered the earliest reasonable claims of discovery, their hunters were there in force, their sealers and whalers used the islands as stations, they had done considerable mapping and scientific work, and geographically they were closer than any other nation. During the war the American coal company, crippled by strikes of Norwegian workers, had been forced to sell out to the *Store Norsk Spitsbergen Kulkompani.* As final arguments the Norwegians had installed sailing markers and beacons, a postal service and a powerful radio station. They claimed preëminent interest.

The English, who had persisted in erroneously referring to Spitsbergen as Greenland until a very late date, based their case upon royal declarations made during the height of the early whaling period but later abrogated, and upon extensive mining claims, mostly staked out by questionable stock companies. The Swedes based their claim upon several operating mines and the unchallenged fact that they had done the greatest part of the scientific investigation. Russian claims, never formally advanced and often officially denied, became muffled in revolution.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

After the First World War the Norwegians, now almost alone in the field, redoubled their efforts, always in their statements referring to the archipelago by its ancient Norse name. Their merchant marine had performed valuable service in the war, and they asked the sovereignty of Svalbard as a reward. The treaty Powers at Versailles, realizing the need to extend law and order to the Arctic land, and at the same time wishing to neutralize it, agreed to Norway's request. On February 9, 1920, the Svalbard Treaty was signed by Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Great Britain and her Dominions, France, Italy, Holland, Japan and the United States. A waiting period of five years was prescribed to allow for the adjustment of claims and for the only other interested party, Russia, then unable to sign because of civil war, to give her approval. In 1924 Russia gave her full approval, though she had not been consulted during the drafting of the treaty, and the next year King Haakon proclaimed Svalbard an integral part of the Kingdom of Norway. But in awarding Svalbard to Norway, this treaty had invoked the debatable principle that a nation does not have the right to take steps for the defense of its territory. No doubt the Powers thought that they were thus dedicating the islands to perpetual peace; actually this provision of the treaty produced a soft spot in an immensely important strategic area and invited the critical situation which exists on Svalbard today.

IV

The Norwegians assumed their duties with enthusiasm and carefully kept their pledges. The Norwegian Polar Institute sent expeditions north annually. The Norwegian mine at Longyearbyen steadily expanded and the Government bought up the claims of defunct companies from other nations. The big Swedish coal mine in Braganza Bay sold out to the *Store Norsk Spitsbergen Kulkompani.* The English companies, after a postwar flurry, backed out of the field. Then the Dutch mine in Green Harbor was offered for sale. There were no buyers, not even the Norwegian Government. Only Norwegians remained on the islands; and then suddenly the Russians came back.

The original motives for Russia's decisions to reopen her old mines were logical and valid. Her historic effort to gain an ice-free outlet to the seas had failed, and the application of national self-determination had separated her from all her Baltic ports except Leningrad through the creation of the independent

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nations of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Her only recourse was the development of a shipping route along the Arctic coast of Asia, the Northeast Passage. Five of the world's largest rivers flow from her interior into the Arctic Ocean and are natural highways for the development of vast new territories. Along these rivers and at their mouths timber and mining cities mushroomed, largely due to an easily procured and inexpensive supply of labor. Some have reached a population of 100,000. A railroad was built to Archangel on the White Sea, forming a connection in the west with a comparatively ice-free port.

To bind all these Arctic rivers and resources together a concerted attack was made upon the problem of ice navigation from Archangel to the Bering Straits. The Northern Sea-Route Administration was formed and given unlimited backing; and with courage and scientific skill it broke a workable trail and kept it open with massive icebreakers. The Soviet Union takes great pride in the expansion of this route and the volume of traffic which it carries, and the pressure for improvement has never been relaxed.

Among the first major problems of this route was fuel for the ships. Russia then had no northern coal supplies and she hoped that her mines on Svalbard would help meet the demand. Large numbers of men and women miners were sent to Barentsburg; other Isfiord mines were opened at Coles Bay, Grumantbyen and Pyramiden. Barentsburg was a fine town with cattle, warm houses, schools and pictures of Lenin and Stalin which could be seen for miles off shore. A moderate amount of coal was mined, but it never was sufficient for the needs of the fast-growing Northeast Passage. Soon, however, the Soviet Union opened mines with unlimited reserves on the Arctic mainland and there was no longer an economic purpose for operation of the Svalbard mines.

After the German invasion of Norway in the Second World War, the Norwegian mines served as a staging route for escaped Norwegians bound for England. The Germans, with an eye to the potentialities of Svalbard as a submarine base athwart the shipping route to Murmansk and Archangel, sent a fleet of warships consisting of the *Tirpitz,* the *Scharnhorst,* nine destroyers and some submarines into Isfiord and King's Bay, and shelled and burned all of the mining communities. At the same time they established meteorological stations at various hidden points

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

throughout the islands which sent back daily weather reports.

The Norwegians who were on Svalbard when this attack occurred had been rendered defenseless by the 1920 treaty and were unable to return more than small arms fire, although guns emplaced along the mountain walls of the fiords might have replied effectively to the attack. Heroic efforts were made to evacuate the population on the *Empress of Canada* and various colliers. But a number of the men stayed behind to form the nucleus of a Norwegian garrison, and, operating from mountain huts and on skis, eventually sought out and destroyed most of the German positions in a series of bloody battles in the Arctic winter. Relief from German pressure came to Svalbard only with the development of full-scale Allied invasions further south. The experience impressed upon the Norwegians the strategic importance of the islands and the dangers of their defenselessness.

In the autumn of 1944 the Soviet Government, demonstrating considerable opportunism, addressed a note to the Norwegian Government in London requesting treaty revisions to correct Soviet dissatisfaction with the 1920 agreement, which it insisted, did not properly safeguard its economic interests. More significantly, the note requested a discussion of common measures for the defense of the island group. Fortunately, the Norwegians were not duped. Though it was true that the Russians had not been consulted about the treaty in 1920, the fact remained that the Soviet Union had ratified it in 1924 and had again affirmed it without reservations in 1935. Secondly, it was obvious that, at the end of 1944, the Germans were no longer a threat to Svalbard and that the Russian desire to introduce military equipment there had some other end in view. There were then no Russians on Svalbard, and Russians had played no part in the Svalbard fighting against the Germans.

The Norwegian Government reminded the Soviet Union of its unqualified agreements to the 1920 Treaty, and said that it would be impossible to hold unilateral discussions or to make unilateral revisions of a treaty to which many parties were members. Since Japan and Italy were signatories, discussions of any type were patently impossible at the time. If such discussions were ever to take place they could in no way touch upon the matter of Norway's absolute sovereignty over Svalbard.

Again in 1946 the Soviet Government requested discussion and revision of the treaty, and Norway informed the other signa-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tory nations. In January 1947 word of this request spread about, and the London *Times* published an account of Soviet plans to fortify Svalbard. The effect was immediate, and the press and public opinion, particularly in Norway, registered a resounding protest. *Pravda* replied that the Soviet Government sought no favored position but was concerned with the best interests of all the signatories. The Norwegian Government replied in forthright terms that common defensive measures had been made unnecessary by the end of the war, and further that consideration of such a topic would violate the Government's traditional policy of not discussing questions of a military nature concerning territory under Norwegian sovereignty with any single state. However, the Government would be quite willing to discuss economic readjustments, *i. e.* such matters as taxes and improvement of facilities, with those most interested.

The Russians have never requested such readjustments, but in 1947 they sent their miners back to Svalbard and began an intensified development of their properties. Extreme secrecy prevails in their operations, but two salient facts are obvious: that the mines are unproductive; and that the amount of construction in which the Russians are engaged, and the number of Russians in the archipelago, are out of proportion to the possible requirements of coal mining.

Had the Norwegians acceded to Soviet demands for unilateral treaty revision and joint defense, the 1920 Treaty which gave sovereignty to Norway would thereby have been abrogated. The Soviets might then have declared Svalbard once more *Terra Nullius,* have arranged and claimed paramount interest, pronounced the islands within the Russian sphere of interest, and in due course incorporated them in the Soviet Union. Or the U.S.S.R. might simply have assumed the legality of fortifying her settlement in Svalbard, confident that once that had been accomplished, control of the island group would in practice have been achieved. However that may be, she has now ceased to talk about the matter.

There are only a handful of Communists among the Norwegian miners and they are the butt of ridicule because the Russian authorities will not permit them to enter the Soviet mines. The Norwegians speak often of such things as that several of the Russian mine directors are military pilots; that Russian ships, presumably sent to carry away coal, arrive fully laden; that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

abandoned mine-shafts, inaccessible to the Norwegian inspector, make excellent arsenals; that the Russians drive away all visitors and keep to themselves, though indulging in a good deal of night travel. Most interesting of all, perhaps, they remark that the Russian miners are chiefly young men of military age, not at all typical of a mining community. In a way such intelligence is superfluous, however, because it is obvious that the Russians could seize the unfortified Norwegian community, outnumbered as it is three to one, at any time. It may be that the Soviets hope to provoke the Norwegians to some fortification which will automatically break the 1920 Treaty. But the Norwegians will not fortify, or break the treaty.

V

After the postwar Russian complaints had died down, but were still fresh in mind, the Norwegians entered into preliminary discussions for the formation of a Scandinavian defense union. Among the primary reasons why these negotiations broke down was the refusal of the Swedes to include Svalbard in any such arrangement. Recourse was later had to the larger and more effective Atlantic Pact, by the terms of which Svalbard, as a part of Norway, is included. But until recent developments in Korea, most small nations were still uncertain about the willingness of the United States to act in the event of aggression. The Norwegian Government was wary of the situation on Svalbard and strove to divert attention from the archipelago. It lost an opportunity to publicize to all the world that Svalbard was part of Norway when it shelved the plan to have the King attend the 25th anniversary celebration there. The anniversary was barely mentioned by the Norwegian press.

The situation at Svalbard is further complicated by the implications of the so-called "sector principle" for the parcelling out of the polar regions, a compound of shortsightedness and folly inspired by a fifteenth century Papal Bull and seized upon as a means of slicing up the polar regions like pies among various nations. The entire theory is the very negation of the idea of a boundary—which as Isaiah Bowman once said "has to be here, not hereabouts"—but a number of nations have convinced themselves that they can acquire polar territory by the easy device of an agreement to distribute slices rather than by the accepted procedures of discovery and effective occupation. By such means

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they can reserve to themselves unused lands which might otherwise be occupied and made productive by the nationals of other countries. Fortunately, the United States has wisely and vigorously opposed this scheme, although it has been offered slices in both polar regions.

The "sector principle" applies in different manners at each Pole. The Antarctic is divided into arbitrary slices roughly paying homage to discovery and the amount of attendant publicity. The absurdity is heightened by the facts that many slices overlap, some are too thin to hold a road, and virtually nothing is known about the commercial or strategic value of any of them.

In the Arctic, where the possibilities of commerce and settlement and the strategic significance of the area are known, the principle offers even more invitations to trouble. Here the slices are determined by lines running north to the Pole from the eastern and western boundaries of the nations surrounding the Arctic Ocean, and include the whole area between. The Soviet Government has endorsed the principle enthusiastically, and laid claim to an enormous area which embraces sea and lands which other nations had discovered, scientifically investigated and utilized. For examples, the U.S.S.R. took Franz Josef Land, discovered by Austrians, explored by nationals of many countries (not including Russia) and used commercially by Norwegians. In driving out the Norwegian sealers and hunters the Soviet Union refused even the protection of acquired economic interests that it demands from the Norwegians on Svalbard. The story of Wrangel Island to the east is largely the same. The Russians have closed the high seas to sealers, fishermen and all traffic, and have frequently arrested strayed foreign crews and confiscated their ships.

The last war moved the Russian land boundary many miles to the west in northern Europe. As a result a direct line from the Russian-Norwegian border north to the Pole cuts off a good section of Svalbard. The Russians assert that they divert the line so as to exclude Svalbard, but not its surrounding waters. Thus, encouraged by the fatuous "sector principle," they are able to lodge another threat to the security of Svalbard.

VI

There is an unhealthy fatalism today in Finnmark, the northern province of Norway. Every building there was burned to the ground by the retreating German Army. The Russians came no

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

further west than the Tana River, and behaved well, but in eastern Finnmark they claimed that the Norwegian territory they occupied was rightfully Russian since it was bartered away by the former Archduchy of Finland without Russian consent. Having lodged their claim they withdrew to the Norwegian boundary, but not from northern Finland which they took by conquest. Here they drove out the Finnish population, took over the big Finnish nickel mines and other industries, maintained a large army, and converted a wilderness border into a heavily manned military position. Where once the good neighborliness and cooperation of the Arctic ruled between Norwegian and Finn there has been a steady succession of border incidents. In Sr Varanger and the Pasvik Valley the Russians have organized Norway's largest concentration of Communists. The people of Finnmark, who have been busily engaged in reconstruction since the war, point to the East and shrug their shoulders. They know that if war comes they will be overrun virtually without opposition. The importance of Svalbard in relationship to the defense of Finnmark need hardly be emphasized. The part that it might play in the Russian submarine program which, under the guidance of captured German experts, includes experiments in northern waters from Europe to the Bering Straits is also apparent.

One final aspect of the situation in Svalbard should also be noted, namely, the possibility that the Soviets might gain possession of Svalbard simply by economic means. Norway has no coal of her own other than that brought from Svalbard, and is forced to rely heavily upon the import of Polish coal. Recently that Polish coal has been made so cheap that the Norwegian coal company on Svalbard, faced with high labor and transportation costs, cannot compete with it. Should the Norwegian Government fail to give the company economic support it will collapse. Then almost automatically the Russians would be in sole occupation of Svalbard. Norwegians point out that the islands would be a much less tempting target if other governments which are signatories to the 1920 Treaty were to encourage the establishment of commercial enterprises there. Its diverse resources offer a number of fields which might reasonably and profitably be developed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REARMAMENT AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

By Donald H. McLachlan

IN THE last three months of 1950 a new chapter has been opening in the story of American economic policy towards free Europe and Great Britain. Not, be it noted, a new story —in spite of Korea, rearmament, the imminent end of Marshall aid and the Gray Report[1]—but a new chapter in the story that has been running since Secretary Marshall's Harvard speech of 1947. In a very real sense Marshall aid and the European Recovery Program were functions of a foreign policy that set out to build up convalescent Europe to the point where it could master the Communist virus with its own strength. The United States saw in rising productivity, higher and better-spread prosperity, social improvement and confidence in the future precious allies against the Cominform's cold war. But between the Atlantic Pact meetings of September and the appearance of the Gray Report in the middle of November the emphasis in America's plans for aiding her allies has been moving from economic strength for its own sake to economic strength for the sake of rearmament. To use the crude formula of the Nazis and Communists, the old problem of butter versus guns has forced itself to the front of statesmen's minds; and the decision has reluctantly been made that the desire for butter has now to give way to the need for guns.

Before the execution of that decision is planned in detail and carried out with the zeal and thoroughness that the military situation demands, the allies of the United States on the European side of the Atlantic have to estimate two things: the amount of aid that will be coming from the United States for this rearmament effort, whether in dollars and raw materials or in equipment and weapons; and the type of plan and organization within which the 12 Atlantic Pact governments will be expected to work. Are the habits and methods of three years' work on the European Recovery Plan to be continued, revised or scrapped? Will the United States wish to deal directly—that is to say bilaterally—with each ally, if only to see that the best possible use is made

[1] "Report to the President on Foreign Economic Policies," by Gordon Gray. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, November 10, 1950.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of whatever aid is given? Or will it deal with all at once, as one of a headquarters for strategic and economic planning—making over-all estimates of needs, allocating aid according to an over-all plan of mutual aid? In short, will American policy, within the Atlantic Pact, insist on an integrated approach in which the United States will be a fully involved partner—or won't it? The Gray Report says it should, but the Allies cannot be certain that it will.

That, put very briefly, is the chief question which worries planners and statesmen in London and Paris at the moment these lines are written. But any British observer who has tried from time to time to get outside the urgent preoccupations and special views of his own country—and of Western Europe—will suspect that many Americans are asking quite different questions. And he may suspect that they will want answers to them before they will decide on just what terms the joint rearmament effort is to be set going. What are these questions likely to be and what is the situation that provokes them?

To many Americans the integration of Europe has from the first been the real objective of their policy: a political integration which would stop intra-European feuds, such as that between France and Germany, and an economic integration which would enable industrial Europe, manufacturing for one great internal market, to stand on its own feet and buy and sell freely the world over. Washington's emphasis has been on the latter aim, probably because American policy was better able to exert overt influence on economic than on political policies; whereas in Europe itself the emphasis has been far more on the former, perhaps because the politician finds it easier and more popular to busy himself in talking and thinking about political than about economic integration. From economic integration the Americans expected something like the following result: that by 1952, when Marshall aid was due to cease, Western Europe and Britain would have become capable of earning through multilateral world trade all—or most of—the dollars which they needed. In fact, it was the Americans' expectation that they would be in a position to balance their earnings and their expenditure abroad. Economic integration was to be the road to solvency. If political integration was necessary to achieve the economic result—as British critics persistently suggested—then so much the better for Europe.

It is clear, in spite of the remarkable recovery made by the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Western countries (notably Britain), and in spite of the tremendous extra outflow of dollars from the United States stimulated by the Korean war and the new rearmament policy, that the job is not yet done. The countries of Western Europe, even Britain, are not yet ready to stand on their own feet; and it is unlikely that they would have been even if the European Recovery Program had gone smoothly on towards its appointed end in 1952, unflurried by rearmament or inflation or the the fear of imminent war. Now they have to shoulder the burden of increased expenditure on defense, at an average rate of 10 percent of their national incomes. And this necessity comes at a time when most of them are relying far more on cuts in their dollar purchases than on increased exports to cut down their trading deficits. They have to face the necessity of buying more things that cost dollars, and of making demands on their own resources that will certainly raise the price of everything that goes into the production of their principal exportable goods—the prices of raw materials, labor, transport, power. In short, they are being forced to face two years earlier than they expected, and, what is more, in an inflationary situation, the sort of challenge that the European Recovery Plan was supposed to have prepared them to deal with.

It is in this situation that the American asks certain questions. Will the Western partners concert their efforts to meet this challenge, or will there be a helter-skelter dash for safety to the cover of tariff walls, quotas and currency controls—a *sauve-qui-peut*? Will the tender shoots of liberalized trade, coördinated planning, exchange of information, limited convertibility of currencies, which have been coaxed into growth with such patient and hard work, shrivel up and die? In short, is European economic integration in danger of a deadly setback? And, if so, what should the United States do to protect the beginnings that have already been made?

In order to judge what governments are likely to do in the future we must first examine what they have done so far in the past, under known pressures of party politics and internal situations. British policy towards European integration, for instance, can be understood only in the light of the British Government's passionate attachment to its full employment policy, and its deep distrust of alternative policies pursued by many European governments—for instance, France, Belgium and Germany. Like-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wise the unashamed protectionism of French policy—so strikingly in contrast with the sincere desire of Frenchmen for European federation—cannot be understood without taking into account the precarious balance among the bourgeois parties in the governments that have been ruling France. Mr. Hoffman, when he gave his famous warning against economic nationalism and his exhortation to Europe to build a "dynamic, expanding economy," was perhaps not fully aware of such limiting factors. What was probably foremost in his mind was the knowledge that one of the long-term aims of Congress in passing the Economic Cooperation Act was—quite legitimately—to ensure an expanding overseas market for American goods and capital, and that "integration" in Europe would be an essential step in a return to multilateral and expanding world-wide exchanges.

With the passage of time this fundamental conception has been lost sight of—even by American officials—in the setting up and working of European economic institutions such as the O.E.E.C. These bodies have tended to become ends in themselves, and the will to use and develop their authority has tended to become—certainly in the continental mind—the test of sincere attachment to the cause of European integration. In other words, many continental ministers and some British and American officials saw in the working of the European Recovery Program the opportunity to build up the authority of the institutions which they believed to be essential to the unification of Europe—which is not what Mr. Hoffman meant by integration. On the other hand, the British Government (and here is the source of much misunderstanding and recrimination) remained conscious of the world-wide problem and the American objective, and they resisted—for this and other more parochial reasons—all concentration on exclusively intra-European bodies and authorities. If one remembers, too, that the main continental countries have never felt directly responsible for paying their way in trade with the world outside Europe—before the war this object was achieved for them by the sterling area's investments and raw materials—the confusion of aims in their counsels becomes understandable.

As a result, the 12 months that have passed since Mr. Hoffman made his appeal for integration have produced, by American standards, a poor record of achievements. There have been, it is true, some important measures of integration: the gradual re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

moval of quantitative restrictions on intra-European private trade; the starting of a limited system of multilateral payments and settlements through the European Payments Union; some chequered progress with the Benelux Union; and the progress in negotiating the Schuman Plan. But the European economies have remained both in principle and practice highly protectionist and separatist. (The conference on tariffs at Torquay in Britain has revealed this.) Whereas in Britain the resistance to integration takes the form chiefly of comprehensive quantitative restrictions and government bulk buying, in continental countries tariff walls are as high or higher than before and there is a strong reluctance to take the further measures of liberalization discussed in O.E.E.C last month. Moreover, the first quarterly settlements of the new European Payments Union show how great is the gulf between setting up a limited system of multilateral settlements and its successful operation. Indeed, on present evidence it is difficult to see how the gulf can be bridged.

This, then, is the record to date of an effort towards economic integration that has been painfully achieved, under very favorable conditions and with American help. It can and is said that greater risks should have been taken, that the long-term result of restoring a single market—which Europe actually had in the days of the gold standard—would be increased prosperity all round. But it must not be forgotten that some of the risks involved precisely those effects which Marshall aid was designed to avert: unemployment resulting in political and social discontent, hardship to employers and employed unable to adapt themselves to competition, and direct attacks on such vested interests as high-cost agriculture and protected industries of strategic importance. Two outstanding examples leap to mind. The first is the massive opposition of French peasants and wine-growers to the project of customs union with Italy, an opposition which many Frenchmen found quite compatible with a fervent belief in European federation. The second is the resistance of the British Government—supported by the trade unions—to the Schuman Plan for integrating the coal and steel industries of the West. In each case a threat was seen to a crucial political, social and economic interest which was deemed by most people far more important than any long-term benefits that liberalization or integration might bring. It is perhaps fair to say that in each case the arguments used and the emotions aroused were not un-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

like those used by the American manufacturer in favor of high tariffs.

Two things, then, seem clear. First, the past record of progress towards economic integration in Europe raises only feeble hopes for the future. Second, American opinion has either misjudged —or been misled about—the possibilities of moving more rapidly in that direction. The mistake is pardonable; indeed, it was probably inevitable. For in most people's minds there has been from the first a confusion between economic integration as clearly defined by Mr. Hoffman at the end of 1949 (which meant little more than a relation to free competition and efficiency); economic integration as more boldly and vaguely envisaged in 1947; and political integration as discussed in the Council of Europe in 1950. The blame for that confusion must be shared between America and Europe. In Europe, statesmen, politicians and leaders of public opinion have persisted in advocating political integration —or federation—without considering what its economic effects would be on the individual voter, let alone troubling to explain to him that they might be disagreeable. (It would be interesting to see, for example, how the Belgian coal miner would take the shutting down of high cost mines under the Schuman Plan.) And it has been tempting for Americans to conclude that men who are so zealous at Strasbourg for political unity must—to be consistent—show the same zeal for economic integration at Torquay in the tariff negotiations. It may, perhaps, be pointed out in passing that the British have persistently criticized the existence and implications of this confusion, and have been more than once accused, not always with justice, of "dragging their feet" in the march towards integration.

Two other causes of past confusion should be mentioned in any attempt to assess the future prospects of the integration movement. The first is the fact that for the industrial countries of Europe it has been until recently only too easy to sell their goods. With so many of the world's needs unsatisfied, with German and Japanese competition still not formidable, businessmen as well as governments have found it unnecessary to keep in mind either the salutary effects of competition or the future need for bigger markets and cheaper exports. These delusive conditions were disappearing until last spring but have now reappeared under the stress of the rearmament prospects.

Second is the fact that America's own efforts towards liberaliza-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of trade, as distinct from the Administration's policy of subsidizing dollar purchases by America's allies, have not given that promise of a return to free, multilateral trading conditions under Washington's leadership for which European governments had hoped. That is to say, the benefits to be expected in the long run from greater freedom and increased competition have appeared distant and unreal, despite the generosity of American aid. This fact, too, may change if the conclusions of the Gray Report recommend themselves to American opinion. Indeed, there is a growing tendency on the Continent—and even more in Britain—to say that Europe will go into integration just as fast as the Americans will themselves. The statement is vague and elusive, not to be taken too seriously; but there is a kernel of meaning in it which should not be disregarded.

On present evidence, therefore, it is likely that the strain of rearmament and the approach of the end of the European Recovery Plan will set back the general cause of economic integration in the sense that Mr. Hoffman urged it. On the other hand, the Schuman Plan, if it can be operated efficiently and swiftly, will certainly revive faith in the possibility of limited moves in similar directions. It should provide specific evidence of just what effects on enterprises and individuals such experiments can have, evidence that may work both for and against integration in other industries. But it would be unduly pessimistic—even rash—to assume that the cause of integration is lost or safe until more is known of what is intended in the planning now going on in the various committees of NATO—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is clear, for instance, that ministers and their advisers are keeping steadily before them the need to see that rearmament does not undo the economic progress of the last three years. It is clear, too, that the relationship between the United States and the industrial countries of Europe (barring of course neutral Switzerland and Sweden) which is likely to result from the work of NATO will be closer than anything that has existed between E.C.A and O.E.E.C. The daily discussion of defense problems, touching as they do every aspect of each country's economic and political life and leading to full exchange of information, is bound to develop new habits of coöperation. Perhaps it is not too much to believe that it may even develop new institutions.

It may be useful first to discuss these possibilities briefly and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on the broadest basis, indeed to speculate boldly. No one knows yet whether the United States sees in NATO a defense association of a new and special kind, or the making of a new international institution. For the British in particular there is a world of difference between these two ways of looking at it. If it is to be the former, then no far-seeing British statesman can dismiss the possibility that it will last only as long as the Soviet menace that brought it into being lasts. He can accept it as an *ad hoc* instrument of foreign and military policy, but not as the permanent basis of political and economic coöperation with the United States and other countries which he would like. If it is to be the latter—the permanent international institution or Atlantic community, of which Mr. Acheson has spoken more than once—then it is capable of fulfilling the aims of the British foreign and economic policy. For it might provide the basis on which Britain could plan her policies not as a European but as a World Power, and pursue common policies with Western Europe without weakening the special forms of integration which exist within the British Commonwealth of Nations.

One can, perhaps, go so far as to say that the whole future of British foreign policy—perhaps of Europe—depends on the answer to be given to this question by the United States. If there is eventually to be an integrated Atlantic community in the sense that Mr. Hoffman visualized an integrated Europe, then Britain and the Commonwealth can concentrate on that prospect, and in the long run take Western Europe with them. If there is no hope whatever of such a consummation, then there is the possibility that Britain—so far as Commonwealth ties and interests allow—will turn with more interest towards Europe. At the moment the choice is not, and cannot be, made. It is obvious to everyone, however, in which direction the British bias lies. If the choice had to be made in favor of Europe, then Americans would have to face the possibility that European integration under British leadership would mean the organization of its economic defenses, and those of some Dominions, against American competition.

These, it is repeated, are long-term, airy speculations. Nevertheless, they are not entirely absent from the thoughts of British and European ministers and officials when they find time to look more than a year or two ahead. What is perhaps more important for the present argument is to examine what could or should be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

done within NATO to prevent a return to economic nationalism in Europe.

There seems to be one point, and one point only, at which there is a hope of breaking the vicious circle referred to in the Gray Report, when it insists that the Western nations, if they are to find the resources and industrial capacity needed for successful and continuing rearmament, will have to increase their efficiency, expose themselves to competition and all the risks of adjustment and reorganization it would impose. The first is that the NATO governments, in assessing and distributing mutual aid for defense, should work out a new basis for giving and receiving aid, in which the emphasis will be more on the internal relations within the European and American economies and less, as at present, on their external balance of payments positions. To understand how important this is it is necessary to grasp the British official attitude to European integration.

Setting aside for a moment the merely insular attitude of many Englishmen, the limitations of Labor Party economic doctrine and the rigidity of its present planned economy, there are more permanent and substantial reasons why the British, under any government, would prefer to coöperate in an Atlantic than in a purely European partnership. First there is the fear that a European connection would force them towards a political federation, the obligations of which would cut across their ties with the Commonwealth and their psychological affinity with the Americans. More and more the Continent is beginning to understand this attitude. There is, second, their conviction that the only basis for a secure and prosperous Western world is to get the Americans well and truly committed in Europe, with men and money, and that concentration on European integration might well confuse the issue. In support of this view they can point to the persistent tendencies on the Continent to think of an integrated Europe as a "third force" standing between the United States and Russia—a conception that strikes the British statesman as unreal and dangerous. If Americans were to return, as Mr. Gray recommends, to the concept of partnership in Europe, and if the coöperative effort could be channelled through the Atlantic Pact, the British would certainly put more effort into cooperation. As it is, Mr. Bevin is obliged to ride dangerously and uncomfortably on two horses at once.

The *ad hoc* methods by which short-term defense aid is now

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

being distributed do not augur well for such a development. In view of the urgency of getting something done, that perhaps is inevitable. But there are other and encouraging signs which the British would like to see growing. An attempt is clearly being made to decide the allocation of arms production on the principle of placing the job where it can be done most efficiently and where there exists productive capacity that is not being fully used. This might be an important step towards real integration not only of the European but of the Atlantic economies. If it succeeds —and much depends on the attitude of the American staff officer —the old idea of America providing money for Europeans to buy American goods will give way to the idea of producing goods where they can be got most cheaply and quickly, and where they can be most easily paid for by all NATO members. The fact that the Gray Report has taken up and recommended just such ideas as the proper basis for future aid is extremely encouraging. Thus it says:

> To facilitate the required expansion of Western European defenses in accordance with joint plans, the United States should be prepared to continue supplying aid, apart from military equipment, for another 3 or 4 years beyond the present time. The needed amount of aid depends upon the rearmament effect actually undertaken by individual countries, and its total impact on their economies, these factors being worked out primarily through the economic and production planning agencies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. . . . Such aid should be administered on a basis that will contribute to the fullest possible use of European resources, encourage intra-European trade, and help to integrate the European economic effort.

To sum up. The last twelve months, which have been exceptionally favorable for European recovery, have seen some limited progress towards, but considerable confusion about the objectives of, European economic integration. It was to have been the first step in the renaissance of a multilateral world with an expanding, dynamic economy. Largely because of the confusion, progress has not been as fast or as real as Americans had hoped or had been led to believe was feasible. On top of this, the renewed strain on European economies, in anticipation of which Mr. Hoffman first asked Europe to start integrating, has been abruptly advanced from 1952 to the present time by the shock of Korea. This has caught the Europeans short, without any real integration of their economies and with no natural resistance to the *sauve-qui-peut* protective instincts of economic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nationalism. Inflation, shortages of raw materials and new threats to foreign exchange resources are already making their appearance.

If this process continues, Europe will be in danger of committing undignified suicide. Whether it continues depends very largely on the evolution of American policy through the Atlantic Pact. If, in approaching the problems of rearmament, the Americans intend to develop a close Atlantic-European community through joint institutions and joint planning, they will provide the spine which the unconnected vertebrae of British policy at present lack so badly. It is in their power to resolve Mr. Bevin's dilemma. If they do, then the Americans and the British between them may at last be able to "go places" with the rest of Western Europe. In short, the key to integration lies in the methods by which the defense of the West is organized.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE BUDDHISM THAT WAS INDIA

By Vincent Sheean

ONE of the decisive struggles of all human history was that which took place long ago between Buddhism and Hinduism for control of India, and its results are still being seen in the evolution of the Asian peoples. This struggle was epic, prolonged, filled with incident and drama, and yet it has figured very little in written history. If we say that the great Emperor Asoka, in the third century B.C., represents the triumph of Buddhism, and the Gupta dynasty around 400 A.D. the reviving triumph of Hinduism (or Brahmanism) we get about 700 years of a Buddhist India enlightening the whole of the East. What is more likely is that Buddhism continued to flourish in India, although not as the religion of the state, until about 1,000 A.D., at which period it had become extinct in the land of its birth and lived on, henceforth, only in the countries farther east.

There is nothing quite like this in the long story of man's development. The Lord Buddha arose in northern India around 500 B.C. as an ethical reformer, a rationalist and what some writers (H. G. Wells among them) have called an atheist. He swept away caste, ritual, superstitions and privileges of all sorts. To him there was little that was good in traditional Hinduism. He was, of course, Hindu, of the princely or warrior caste (*i.e.* not a Brahmin) and his followers during his own lifetime were all Hindus. And yet his great permanent following, the Buddhist world of today, is found in China and Japan, Tibet, Siam, Indo-China and Burma. Of the 340,000,000 or so people in India today only a handful are Buddhists, and these are to be found only in the mountain regions, toward Tibet, or on the borders of Burma. The mass of the Hindu people reverted, after their thousand years of Buddhism, to the many gods and rites of their forefathers.

It might be the first impression of the foreigner in India that Buddhism had, in fact, left no trace of its passing. The Hindu temples and Hindu sculpture, in all their extravagance of form, seem to have no relation to the austerity of the Buddha. And yet if sufficient effort is made, there are to be seen in India Buddhist monuments of the greatest beauty, which all the wars and disasters of a thousand years have scarcely impaired. These are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the visible evidences of the Buddhist centuries, the footprints of vanished time. They remind the beholder of how different the whole history of Asia might have been if this great Buddhist culture had not been swept away—if India had remained Buddhist, that is, holding Asia together with bonds more powerful than any mere political doctrine could be. And such are the ironies of time that today, when Asian countries feel themselves threatened with Communist conquest, something like a revived emphasis on Buddhist culture is taking place throughout the area. It is strongest in Burma and other countries of Southeast Asia, but even in India, which is no longer Buddhist at all, the signs of this emphasis are apparent. The relics of the Buddha's two disciples Mogallana and Sariputta were returned to India last year from London, and received with royal honors. They are now in Burma, being revered by the populace (they stayed in Ceylon a year, too), but sometime this year they will probably be restored to the temple platform at Sanchi, in the State of Bhopal, whence the British took them a hundred years ago. These bits of dust are probably the oldest relics in existence, for the stupa in which they were found at Sanchi in 1851 bore inscriptions of the time of Asoka. No Buddhist doubts that they are the actual dust of the Buddha's favorite disciples, which indeed they very well might be.

Those who saw photographs or newsreels of the inauguration of the first President of the Republic of India (January 26, 1950) must have noticed that the throne in which the President sat—the throne inherited from the British—was dominated by a figure of the Lord Buddha standing just behind it. This Buddha, which comes from Muttra in north India, was already in that room (the Throne Room or Durbar Hall) as a part of the National Museum which is now coming into existence in the former palace of the viceroys. By some happy inspiration it was decided to leave the Muttra Buddha where it was on Republic Day, although the rest of the sculptures and paintings were removed for the ceremonies. Thus the Republic came into being under the protective aura of a great piece of ancient sculpture which, to much of Asia, connotes the blessing of the Lord Buddha.

The Buddhist masterpieces are those at Sanchi, in the State of Bhopal, and at Ellora and Ajanta in Hyderabad. At Sanchi there are 32 stupas of all sizes in the immediate area. The Great Stupa with its platform and surrounding buildings is a work

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from which it is fair to say that all other stupas, dagobas and pagodas in Asia seem to derive. It took about 600 years to construct in its present shape. The Emperor Asoka, the Mauryan monarch who became a Buddhist and took nearly all India with him into that faith, built the first structure in the third century B.C. It was, according to reliable indications, about half the size of the present dome. A stupa—which can be of any size—is a sort of funeral tumulus or mound built to protect relics of the Buddha himself or his saints or disciples. It is in fact a heap of rubble, sometimes enclosed in brick or stone, with the precious relics deposited somewhere near the center or top. Very early in Buddhism the structure of a stupa became conventionalized: it had to have an umbrella (the sign of royalty) at the summit, and it had to have at least two railings around the bottom and top to permit of circumambulation. In addition, it had four gateways, north, south, east and west, in which the skill of the artist's hand was given full liberty on all the subjects associated with Buddhist legend.

This simple structure is seen in its original purity at Sanchi. The great dome is almost a hemisphere; its railings are massive and simple; its four gateways are among the most remarkable ancient monuments to be seen anywhere. When one has seen Sanchi one begins to understand how the stupa (or "tope" as the British called it in the nineteenth century) developed into all the various dagoba and pagoda forms which are seen throughout the Buddhist world. Even in Japan, which is so far away and received Buddhism so much later, the gateways of Sanchi can be detected, as they can also be in Ceylon, Siam, China and Indo-China. This is, therefore, a sort of normative or prototypical monument foreshadowing many centuries of Buddhist development.

But even if it were not so—even, that is, if Sanchi had had no offspring—it still would be a singularly beautiful and impressive work of art. To begin with, the imagination is staggered when we observe that these stones are simply balanced one upon the other, with no kind of cement or other aid except that of simple proportion to keep them standing. Furthermore, the numerous unknown artists who worked on the four gateways treated their sandstone material as if it were wood, giving it those curves and carpentry forms which have ever since characterized the pagoda. The amount of work involved is difficult to contemplate, but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

what is even more difficult to understand is how such a structure, which in common sense ought to fall down in a short time, should have survived practically intact for more than 2000 years.

The grandeur of the Great Stupa is hard to convey in words because it does not have that heaven-storming quality which evokes eloquence (as, for example, in the case of Gothic cathedrals or the temples at Karnak in Egypt). It is, in fact, classic in its simplicity and restraint. I have seen Buddhist stupas which look like rubbish-heaps and nothing else. This one also, perhaps, is a heap of rubble in essence, but it has form in the very grandest sense—form as the Parthenon has form. It seems balanced, poised, in a way which one feels to be true of only a very few works which man has produced on this earth.

Some of this self-contained, self-sufficient, classical formality, this completeness without reference to anything else, may be due to the tranquil beauty of the platform on which the Great Stupa stands against the immemorial blue of the Indian sky. There is no village here, there are no guides or beggars or priests and there are no interruptions. The Archaeological Department of the State of Bhopal has kept the great platform clear and clean. The flat-topped hill on which it stands is only about 300 feet high but it is very suitable for a place of sanctuary. The Great Stupa, which of course was built to contain some relic of Buddha himself, has other buildings around it, including two or three of remarkable interest, but it is the indisputable center and sovereign of the whole area. This centrality may have arisen only by accident during the passage of the centuries, as some neighboring buildings decayed or crumbled to dust and the miraculous stupa remained, but however it happened it is today a fact.

And then, of course when one begins to examine in detail the carving of the gateways, upon which innumerable artists lavished their best work for centuries, the quality of the monument becomes even more remarkable. These stone carvings have none of the exaggeration or grotesquerie of later Hindu work. They tell stories of the Buddha's life, his renunciation of the world, his temptations, his enlightenment and triumph, with a realism and earthiness which emerge in startling truth from the ancient stone. The quality of the work is unsurpassed in its own kind. A subject which has been treated by one artist may be treated on another gateway by another artist, and it is fascinating to see how they differ—and how a sort of competition seems to have arisen among

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

them. There is a flying figure (female) on one gateway, that to the south, which seems to be a sort of ancestor of all the twisted, large-hipped female figures of later Hindu art—but what a difference! This lady really seems to fly in the air, and her sinuous curve is by no means grotesque.

And in the immediate neighborhood of the Great Stupa are at least three buildings which in any other place would excite the greatest interest. One is the ruin of a *chaitya,* a Buddhist chapel or church with noble columns; another is a small temple which looks astonishingly Greek; a third is the smaller stupa in which the relics of the disciples Mogallana and Sariputta were found by Cunningham in 1851. The *chaitya* is a ruin—a "skeleton" as Sir John Marshall called it—but the outlines can still be seen, and as it occupies the highest place on the platform its effect, in that light and climate, is great. (It may be worthy of remark, since many Westerners do not know it, that the Buddhist *chaitya* in the centuries before Christ exhibited all the main characteristics of a Christian church with nave, altar and aisles; this seems to be mere coincidence and nothing more, since there is no way in which one can imagine the Christians having seen Buddhist churches.)

The little temple which reminds us of Athens is nothing much: a porch, some pillars. But here, too, as in some of the decoration of the Great Stupa, there is the suggestion of a foreign influence. It is possible that Persians and Greeks, or Indian arists who had studied with Persians and Greeks, worked in this place. It is also possible that similar conditions produced similar results, without any direct influence, as Sir John Marshall, the original discoverer and restorer of Sanchi, was prepared to believe. He said that Sanchi was produced in a great renaissance period of the Indian empire (under the Guptas) in which the psychological situation of most artists was much the same as that of the artist in Greece or, a thousand years later, in Italy.

Sanchi leaves upon the mind an impression of the might of Buddhism in those far-off, almost forgotten centuries. Indian history suffers from a terrible imprecision of chronology, as well as from partisan and legend-ridden records. But it is possible for us to see in these carven stones the plain evidence that Buddhism once was supreme here, that mighty churches, monasteries and reliquaries could dominate the whole plain of central India, and that the teaching of the Lord Buddha, the precept of the ab-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

solute equality of all creatures, once reached the Indian heart.

And even the austerity of early Buddhism is apparent here, in spite of the richness of the carvings. For example, the Lord Buddha himself is nowhere represented. There is not one effigy of him in the whole of Sanchi. Instead, whenever it is necessary to show that he was present—in the carvings which tell Buddhist stories, that is—he is indicated by a tree (the Tree of Enlightenment) or by an umbrella or even, sometimes, by his own footsteps carved in the stone. The devout are supposed to imagine for themselves what was the form of the Enlightened One as he sat underneath that tree, beneath that umbrella, or after he had made those footprints.

The caves of Ellora and Ajanta, in the State of Hyderabad, share with Sanchi the supreme interest among early Buddhist works of art. They come from the same dawn-time, the centuries in which India was the center of the Buddhist world. Caves hewn out of the solid rock of the hillsides were fairly common through western, west central and south central India during those Buddhist centuries and just afterward. There are caves near Bombay; there are others near Nasik; their uses, either as monasteries (*viharas*) or churches (*chaityas*) are similar everywhere. They seem to range, also, from about the third century B.C. to the seventh or eighth A.D. The testimony they bear to the patience and industry of innumerable Buddhist artists, workmen and sheer muscle-workers is impressive in the highest degree. Sometimes the rocky hill was excavated from above (as at Ellora) and sometimes from the side (as at Ajanta), but however it was done it was a labor not only of love, but of unexampled vision and humility. For the fact is that hardly anybody who began such a work could have hoped to live until it was anywhere near finished; one generation dotted the i's and crossed the t's for another; it was a sort of entailed and interwoven enterprise, from generation to generation, over about 800 years.

Ellora is all sculpture and rock-hewn architecture; Ajanta, which was similarly hewn out in just about the same centuries, has the added glory of some frescoes which are probably the oldest, as they are among the most beautiful, in the whole world.

The caves at Ajanta and Ellora are in a crescent against the hillside, but the hill at Ellora was a slope and that at Ajanta was a cliff; consequently there is a difference in the work which was spent upon them. Ellora was dug out from above, and, since it

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was a slope, has courtyards and anterooms to practically every cave; Ajanta was attacked boldly from the side of the cliff and does not have so many such approaches. The caves of Ellora give peculiarly valuable evidence of the rise and fall of Buddhism in India. There are 12 primitive Buddhist caves, starting with the severest kind of cave-dwelling for monks, and progessing steadily, visibly, obviously, toward a Hinduistic elaboration and polytheism. It is clear that the first Buddhist monks who dug their caves here would have been horrified at any representation of the Lord Buddha, or at any carved or sculptured reference to the many gods of Hinduism. Buddha's teaching in this respect was quite explicit; he did not regard God (or gods) as a proper subject for the speculation and imaginative efforts of mere men. In his system of thought all inquiry was welcome; no authority was imposed; every person who wished to know or at least to think was encouraged to do so; but on all those ultimate or final questions of divinity which have always been the delight of Hindu philosophy he was mute. Consequently his first followers, and those who followed on for two or three hundred years, lived barely, simply, ascetically, devoted to meditation and (when possible) good works, without visible objects for their worship and without marked temples, churches, altars or images upon which to concentrate.

The power of this singularly pure and elevated religion comes out at us starkly in the early caves at Ellora. Here we can imagine, without much difficulty, what must have been the life of the anchorite in that time before the Christian era. But as we go on from cave to cave the shape of all things changes, at first gradually, then with more emphasis, and finally with a rush. The old gods come back. It seems to be a fundamental truth of human nature, these ancient stones assure us, that mankind cannot get along without some form, shape or effigy to worship, some stories to stir the imagination, something incredible to believe. At first we see (in the Buddhist caves themselves after the earliest period) that the Lord Buddha, who was so much against such practices, has become an object of worship: his figure in numerous forms, young and old, becomes the chief ornament of every shrine. And then, after the fifth or sixth cave, we see the Hindu gods also creeping back—at first Sarasvati, the goddess of learning, and then this one or that; the river Ganges as a goddess, or Shiva of the four arms, or some attribute or symbol of these Hindu deities.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Shiva, for example, has a number of symbols (the trident, the conch-shell) as have Vishnu and others. We see with a sort of reluctant astonishment that these symbols of the older religion creep into Buddhism and are imperishably recorded here in the unchanging rock. Even the phallic symbol, the Shiva-linga, returns at last and marks (at about 650 A.D.) the end of Buddhism in India.

But then, as if to reward us for having perceived the high points of the long drama, Hinduism returns with such a rush as to leave us quite breathless. I know of nothing in the whole tremendous sweep of Hindu art which can equal the Kailash temple at Ellora. This is a temple to Shiva, carved straight out of the solid rock, with all the rush and extravagance, exuberant vitality and reckless imagination which characterize the Hindu religious genius. We had already seen Shiva coming back—three preceding caves were definitely Hindu, not Buddhist—but nothing really prepares you for the overwhelming tumult of the Kailash Temple. It is a tumult, yes, but a tumult under control, for these men who worked on the Kailash carvings a thousand years ago were artists of the first quality. Here are elephants, tigers, monkeys; here are Himalayan heights and jungle depths; here are gods, goddesses, heroes and demons, performing impossible feats, equipped with impossible powers. We are far indeed from the cold reason, the austerity and calm, of Buddhist days. Shiva is destroying devils all over the place; legends of every sort start out from the conquered rock; hardly a god or a goddess seems able to get along with less than four arms, and some have more, as some have several heads. The lush and jungly pantheism of the Hindu dawn have returned again, and we feel at Kailash—as nowhere else I have seen—how Buddhism was vanquished at last and came to its end in India, because it was too pure, too high and too cold for a people swarming in myth and akin to the steaming earth.

At the caves of Ajanta, which are also in a semicircle and built during just about the same centuries, the same process is seen: Buddhism in its youth and in its prime, vanishing at last under the return of the old gods and old practices. But at Ajanta the return of Hinduism is not signalized by any such great masterpiece as the Kailash Temple of Ellora. On the contrary: the Buddhist works are supreme here, and when Buddhism in a sense dies out, fades away, the Hindu return is in the nature of an anti-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

climax. This also is historically true: Ajanta and Ellora thus complement each other as historical evidence, just as they do aesthetically.

The treasure of Ajanta, which makes it unique in the world, is the wall-paintings in some of the caves. These have been world-famous for a long time now, and learned publications have dealt with them extensively. It was not until after 1920, however, that the Nizam of Hyderabad had them systematically inspected, cleaned and restored, employing for that purpose two Italian experts, Professor Lorenzo Cecconi and Count Orsini. The results—in Cave No. 1 at any rate—are startling. We have here a series of frescoes of the most vivid quality in a medium which normally does not withstand the assault of time very well. These pictures, from various hands, date from about 500 A.D. and it must be confessed that they are fresher than a great many famous western frescoes of a thousand years later. Anybody who has seen the work of Michelangelo at the altar of the Sistine Chapel in Rome (the Last Judgment) during recent years knows that it is doomed, that nothing can save it from disappearance. The Last Supper of Leonardo da Vinci, in the church of Santa Maria delle Grazie in Florence, has been practically invisible for a great many years (never in my lifetime has it been possible to see it properly). But here we see scenes from the life of Buddha with a freshness and clarity which defy time, and cause us to wonder. Perhaps the climate, perhaps the formation of the caves themselves, have made it possible for such very old bits of wall-painting to survive. In any case, here they are, and to the best of my knowledge and belief no such works of arts of this kind are to be found elsewhere on the planet.

The scenes are many—stories from the Jataka, which is to say Buddha's previous incarnations; stories from the historical Buddha's own life; stories from the lives of Bodhisattvas, or the almost-Buddhas who abound in later Buddhism. Perhaps the most famous of the figures, seen in many reproductions, is of the Bodhisattva known as Padmapani (lotus-water). There is a celebrated scene of the Lord Buddha, after his prolonged suffering, austerities and enlightenment, returning to his native palace and looking upon his wife and his son Rahula. The old familiar stories of his mother's dream (a sort of Annunciation) and his own youth, with palace scenes, dancers and the like, are repeated, along with the tale of his departure by night from his native city,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kapilavastu, for the jungle where he spent his prolonged penance.

Although several of the other caves contain treasurable items, the hand of time has not fallen so lightly—all is fragmentary, flawed or dimly visible. The caves are electrically illuminated nowadays, but during the days I spent there the generator had failed and we saw the interiors by means of sun-reflectors. This was, in all likelihood, the way the artists originally worked inside the caves. That is, an attendant outside the door holds a big reflector (now a looking-glass, but it must have been burnished metal of some kind in the fifth century) so that the sun hits it and shines a bright light upon the part of the wall under examination. This kind of light, which is sunlight but with an especially brilliant and unexpected quality, seems to me in all probability the best way to see the frescoes, since they were painted in that way.

The contest between Buddhism and Brahmanism, as we have remarked before, ended with the complete triumph of the Brahmins. But there was a complicating factor which operated to the advantage of the Brahmins and against the Buddhists. That was the rage of the earliest Moslem conquerors against Buddhists and Buddhism. Apparently large numbers of Buddhist priests or monks (*bhikkus*) fled before the Mohammedan conquerors and retreated to the mountains, toward Tibet, leaving the Buddhist remnants in India with no priesthood to direct them. This made it relatively easy for the Brahmins remaining in India to pick up the pieces and reform a Hindu world in which caste returned to its supremacy with the Brahmins at the top. Considerable destruction of Buddhist works of art must also have taken place during these wars of conquest, as well as by the usual process (familar in all countries) by which old stones are utilized for new buildings, old holy places pillaged to supply the material for new ones.

I have spoken so far only of the fixed sites, the Sanchi Stupa and the caves of Ellora and Ajanta. But the Indian Buddhist drama is also vividly displayed at the site and the museum at Sarnath, near Benares, and in the Amarávati carvings in the Government Museum at Madras. Sarnath was the site of the Deer Park where the Lord Buddha delivered his first sermon—that fundamental document of Buddhism, known as the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Path. He had been a wandering ascetic for years in the forest (having renounced the world and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

its pleasures, as well as the throne of his fathers) and had come through all sorts of austerities to his Enlightenment under the tree at Gaya. Thereafter he was sure, and it was apparent to him that austerities as such were useless. He made his way to Sarnath, where, at a mound which is shown as the original site and may well be, he made the first sermon and founded the Buddhist order of monks.

There probably was some kind of Buddhist monastery here from the very earliest date. The immense monastery of which all the ground-plan has now been cleared dates from about 200 years after Buddha's death, in the time of the Emperor Asoka, but it no doubt represents the imperial beneficence improving on what was already there. Asoka's pillar still stands, in three sections, at the center of this *vihara* or monastery—the pillar which has been taken as the symbol of the Indian Republic for stamps, coins and seals. Its famous capital, made of three lions rampant, has been moved to the Sarnath Museum nearby, where the beholder to this day marvels at not only the carving itself but at the extremely high, marble-like polish which the Mauryan artists were able to give to their hard sandstone.

And down at Madras, the metropolis of the south, are to be seen some further evidences of the heights reached by Indian Buddhism. These are the stone carvings brought from the ancient seacoast city of Amarávati, now obliterated by time. The stupa there must have been as great a monument as Sanchi, or even greater, when it was intact. A small model of it is shown in the museum to give the visitor some idea of how these carvings fitted in. These are from the same centuries—the oldest ones being contemporary with Asoka—and the carvings tell many of the same stories. But among them, and perhaps the most beautiful of all, are some medallions which tell no story at all—which simply repeat, with a delicacy and variety unsurpassed in this medium, aspects of the lotus blossom and the Wheel of the Law. Again the material is sandstone and again it looks like marble—so much like marble that it really does not matter much which it is.

Amarávati was a completely Buddhist city founded under Asoka and must have been a port of consequence in its day. According to some of the stories, it was from there that Asoka's son departed on the mission to Ceylon which made of that island a Buddhist stronghold, as it is today. But though we know little enough of Amarávati, the carvings we see are quite enough to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

convince us that in this ancient and almost forgotten city there flourished a culture which must have been equal to the highest. For centuries India was the center of the Buddhist world, which is to say the center of all the cultivated part of Asia. Some hints or suggestions of a similar position for modern India have been apparent in the past three years. These are based, not upon any system of belief uniting Asia (for no such exists) but upon the fact that a reviving Asian nationalism, or that part of it which is not dominated by the Communists, looks to India as the reasonable and independent leader. Even in this, however, a part has been played by Buddhism, the dominant belief of Southeast Asia, and to India's historic part in its origins.

Why did Buddhism go out of India altogether? I have given what I think is the main answer—that it was too cold and pure and high for this steaming earth. It occurs to many during these present years that Mahatma Gandhi was, of all modern men, the one who most resembles the Lord Buddha in his mode of thought and action. Gandhi was himself extremely aware of Buddha's teaching and was one of the foremost among modern Hindus in reminding his people of it. The small temple to Buddha in Delhi, built as an adjunct to the modern Birla Temple, was put up at Gandhi's wish and was dedicated by him. Is it possible, we wonder, that Gandhi's teaching will have the same fate as Buddha's—will go somewhere out of the land of its birth and be, perhaps, almost forgotten there?

Something is taking place which is not at all unlike the process undergone by Buddhism. That is, a species of deification of Gandhi goes on, and is in fact well advanced, accompanied by a disregard for much of what he wished to teach his people. This is just what happened to Buddha, except that in those ancient days it took centuries instead of years. Buddha, who had no use for images, became himself the reigning image of innumerable temples; there is a famous one in China which has 2000 Buddhas in it. His dislike for ritual has been long forgotten, even in the Buddhist countries, and in modern India it is fair to say that not one element in his teaching has remained. Some of the phenomena we see in India suggest that Mahatma Gandhi's laborious life may produce a not dissimilar result— that he will be revered almost to the brink of adoration, and, so far as practice is concerned, ignored. In the single matter of communalism, the division and subdivision of the Indian people, things seem to have reverted

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

again to where they were 25 or 30 years ago, as if Gandhi's patient and indefatigable efforts had never been made.

It is too soon, much too soon, to give rein to any such speculation. But the coming and going of Buddhism in this immense country, its rise and fall as we see them in the visible remains, inevitably put our minds on to the scale of history's larger movements, across continents and across centuries. There is abundant material for reflection, when we consider the quality of the Buddhist influence in Asia: it is an "imponderable," of course, but there can be hardly any doubt that it counts more than political elements which seem important in Western eyes. India is Holy Land to the devout Buddhists of Tibet, Siam, Burma and Indo-China, as well as of China and Japan. The places I have described are places of pilgrimage and have been so for twenty-odd centuries. Even the Chinese Communists have been forced—or think themselves forced—to recognize the power of the Buddhist faith in Asia. They have providentially in their hands the new Panchen Lama (or Tashi Lama), a boy of 13, whom the stars, signs and portents selected this past year to incarnate his august destiny. It would not be proper to suggest that Mao Tse-tung's government had any effect upon the operation of the stars, signs and portents, but in any case it is convenient for Mao Tse-tung that the Panchen Lama was chosen by the supernal powers at a spot well within the corner of Tibet which has long been occupied by Chinese troops. That child, as it happens, is regarded by many Tibetans as being of higher spiritual filiation than the other child at Lhasa, the Dalai Lama. The Chinese Communists, with their eyes on the huge high plateau of Tibet, a natural airfield half the year round, have not scorned to adulterate their dialectical materialism with a good sound dose of respect for the Buddhist cosmogony.

Amongst all the "ifs of history," as we consider these facts, one of the most impressive is that which arises naturally in the mind: what might have been Asia's history if India had remained Buddhist? We look and wonder.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GERMAN REPARATIONS IN THE SOVIET EMPIRE

By Peter Nettl

TO get "reparations" is to get something for nothing, and, unless an economy is threatened with immediate underemployment, they are as welcome to a state as to an individual. British and French experience has, however, shown that to be profitable they must be carefully chosen and absorbed. The utmost profit from reparations can be obtained only if the government responsible for their collection can chop and change its plans as circumstances change, can afford to be internationally selfish in addition to being domestically ruthless, and is also engaged in a drastic scheme for industrialization. The United States can do and be none of these things, the U.S.S.R. is and does them all.

Only the Germans and the Russians have so far managed to absorb large-scale reparations successfully. Both have been influenced exclusively by considerations of gain with little concern for the welfare of the vanquished. Since the end of the Second World War the Russians have hardly been confined by the Three-Power Agreements of Yalta and Potsdam. Whatever the intentions, the words of the Agreements were often ambiguous; and in matters on which the protocols were silent, such as the acquisition of capital within Germany, the Russians took silence as approval, while the Western Powers took it as prohibition. In fact the Russians were concerned with acquisition of German goods and services, while the Americans and British were primarily interested in depriving Germany of them in order to weaken her strategically. On July 9, 1946, Molotov declared in Paris that the reason "Allied and Soviet troops are at present in Germany [is] . . . to ensure reparation deliveries." No American diplomat would have put it like that.

Like a child long deprived of chocolate, the first Soviet "dismantlers" flung themselves on all the available tidbits. They were part of the Red Army itself, and had performed similar tasks in "liberated" Poland, Czechoslovakia and Manchuria. Since, according to international law, the taking of war booty is legitimate, these early pickings were labelled "military trophies," and the captors were called trophy teams. This was a convenient means of keeping such items out of the reparation account.

What the Russians consider choice morsels Americans regard as commonplaces. These early removals ranged from telephone exchanges to railroad signalling equipment, from public conveniences to private necessities. Relatively few industrial installations were at first affected. The trophy teams indicated their desires, and Russian soldiers proceeded to carry them into effect, often very unskilfully. Inadequate packing and transport caused the destruction and subsequent abandonment of much of this material; it was sometimes left on the spot, sometimes abandoned in sidings, often just heaped together at a collection point. The resultant wastage was hair-raising to the Germans and the Western personnel. As late as 1947 the traces of these early

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

depredations scarred the countryside, particularly around railroad tracks and sidings. In addition, there were, of course, the private trophy expeditions which Russian soldiers, like their Western allies, conducted for their own benefit, and these were more efficient.

By June 1945 the organized collection of reparations was getting under way. The chief targets at first were coal mine installations, railway repair shops and highly developed technical plants like Zeiss at Jena, Ohrenstein and Koppel (locomotives) at Potsdam and the great electrical works of AEG and Siemens-Halske. Power stations were another favorite target. This was the richest period of the harvest. The Soviet Reparations Agency would choose a factory or installation, and either Russian soldiers or, later, German workmen would dismantle it, after a security cordon had been thrown round it and the previous owners and managers had been chased off the premises. The owner's first reaction was to complain to the Soviet Military Government, which had publicly set itself the task of reviving the German economy. Usually nothing could be done; the dismantling teams were independent organizations under the direct control of Moscow, whose commands had absolute priority. Occasionally, the occupation authorities put up a fight over some vital power station. There was long distance telephoning, voluminous argument, a series of contrary decisions. At Magdeburg a power station was partially dismantled, partially restored, further dismantled, further restored, finally disembowelled and left to rust on the spot. Usually, however, only a few weeks passed between the arrival of the ominous surveyors in Russian uniform and the departure of the last wagonload of machines for Frankfurt-on-Oder and Brest-Litovsk en route to the U.S.S.R.

Gradually the process of dismantling became more selective. After spring of 1946 Soviet reparations had to be confined to the Soviet zone of occupation. General Clay had ordered a cease-delivery in the U. S. zone, as had the British shortly thereafter. Dismantling had to be fitted into an overall scheme of reparations, including delivery from current production, expropriation of works in Germany and export of German output on Soviet account. In autumn 1946 the rate of dismantling decreased and a number of works originally scheduled for dismantling were taken off the list. Thereafter dismantling served only to supplement other forms of reparation. Thus railway lines continued to be taken up and removed, according to directives from Moscow during 1946, and again in August 1947 and July 1948. Similarly, railway repair shops and agricultural machinery plants continued to be raided; often after the original dismantling had partially been made good out of stock, the same unit was dismantled again. Another industry which suffered heavily was wood processing; almost 85 percent of the industry was removed in some provinces.

The total value of dismantled plants has been estimated at about 1.6 billion dollars (prewar value); this includes the partial dismantling of Soviet corporations which took place during 1948–1949. Up to June 1948 some 1,225 plants were totally or partially dismantled, a few of them repeatedly. This is almost one-third of the total value of movable industrial capacity in the Soviet zone in 1939; in view of wartime damage and increased postwar investment costs, the dismantled value would be almost twice as high in terms

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of present prices, and the proportion of dismantled to total capacity would be 20 percent higher. The value of all this to the Russian economy was probably far less, but must still have been considerable.

II

Reparations from current output were threefold: removal of stocks, food and agricultural products, and industrial production. Stocks were taken only at the beginning, and consisted of reserves of coal, chemicals and such manufactured goods as tires, vehicles and clothing. Later such stocks as were taken were usually requisitioned for further processing on reparations account instead of being directly removed. Reparations from food were an additional burden to the parasitic occupation army, which was exclusively fed from German resources. Cattle were at first removed in large quantities. Refined sugar, which is a staple Eastern zone product, was both removed to Russia and exported to Switzerland and other hard-currency countries; the main sugar-producing province, Saxony-Anhalt, delivered about 185,000 tons of sugar for reparations up to the end of 1946. Another important item was raw spirits, of which some 1,650,000 gallons had been delivered by the same date. The most damaging item was distilled alcohol or *schnapps;* the Russians encouraged production in order to increase reparation deliveries, and the German authorities also encouraged production because the tax on alcohol was the main source of revenue for the provincial governments. Thus, at a time of great food shortage, both potatoes—the staple diet—and grains were diverted from the ration to the taverns and the Soviet export market. Visitors to the Leipzig fair noticed that the famous Auerbach Keller restaurant had been taken over by the Soviet national travel organization, Intourist, and offered delicacies from German produce at exorbitant prices in dollars, Swiss francs and Swedish kroner. It was said that even the caviar was German. Other currencies would be accepted only after the manager had obtained permission, and learned the rate of exchange, on the telephone from Berlin.

The carefully-nurtured forests were hacked down to provide timber for reparations and reëxport. Nearly $600,000,000 worth of raw timber alone was taken by the end of 1947. But the biggest item was reparations from industrial production. Orders were placed direct with individual factories, or with the reparations department of the provincial government. Prices were strictly based on 1936 levels and thus took no account of increased costs, or of the fact that, where raw material was not available and was not supplied by the Russians, it had to be obtained by the manufacturer at exorbitant prices in the black market. It was officially estimated in 1948 that nationalized undertakings working on reparation orders were regularly showing a deficit ranging from 25 to 40 percent and had to be subsidized accordingly. Nor was there any question of reparation orders not being carried out; failure to meet demands meant an indictment for economic sabotage. Raw materials were sometimes supplied by the Russians, as in the case of textiles and natural rubber, but usually had to be found by the Germans, either from stocks or from the meager imports obtained against export surpluses under the bilateral trade agreements of the zone with Sweden, Holland, Belgium and some Eastern European countries, such as Jugoslavia and Hungary.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These reparations first came into prominence in the early part of 1946. The Russians found that the output of the Soviet zone could be taken more cheaply, more quickly and more efficiently if the factories were left where they were. In addition, the substitution of reparations from current output for reparations by dismantling made good propaganda; on January 4, 1947, Marshal Sokolovsky stated that the decision to take reparations from the output of local industry was intended to give employment to German workers and resources. Such reparations continued to be taken on a very large scale during 1947 and 1948; after the publication of the Two Year Plan in July 1948, Soviet demands were reduced; and during 1949 the exigencies of the political campaign for German unity caused a further reduction. In January 1950 it was officially announced that only 7 percent of German output still went for reparations.

III

Two main classes of goods were taken, investment goods (machinery, vehicles, ships and heavy electrical motors) for the U.S.S.R., and consumer goods (particularly household and office equipment, chemicals, china and leather goods) for reëxport on Russian account. In a world chronically short of consumer goods, the Soviet trading caucus, established at Berlin to push the export of reparations, did brisk business. There was no question of dumping; on the contrary, prices were usually in dollars and on the high side. The Swiss, who bought brown coal, and the Belgians, who bought over a million tons of steel scrap, had difficulty in keeping the Russians to current world prices. Since the zonal authorities also attempted somewhat belatedly to boost exports, the Russians acting for the Soviet Union competed against the Russians acting on behalf of the zone; often there was competition a few doors away in the same goods from the same factory. In order to exploit sympathy for the Germans, the Soviet reparation authorities attempted to disguise the fact that the goods they sold were for Russian profit by employing some German salesmen and by conducting business through German puppet firms like Texta. Even some of the potash purchased by the British Board of Trade in 1948 and delivered during the Berlin blockade was sold on Russian, and not, as it seemed, on German account. Taking into consideration the current deficit of the firms supplying reparations, between 2 and 2.5 billion dollars worth of goods were taken at prewar dollar valuation up to 1949.

In connection with this form of reparations, it must be remembered that the transport of all these goods placed a heavy strain on the depleted German railroad system. Locomotives, known as "brigade" locomotives, were requisitioned for Russian use and freight cars were ordered for particular journeys at 48 hours' notice; they were usually, but not always, returned. (Very often the Poles took off a few cars for their own use on the return journey.) It is not surprising that the railroad system, dismantled, requisitioned, incapable of current repairs, had been on the verge of complete breakdown ever since the war. It takes up to nine hours to travel from Berlin to Dresden; it used to take three and a half before the war. Altogether some 6,000 kilometers of track have been dismantled out of a total of 19,000 kilometers; 1,200 locomotives—the biggest and best—requisitioned out of 5,500 capable of running. During 1946 and 1947 an average of 9,000 to 11,000 freight cars were daily

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

made available for the use of the Russians out of a total zonal pool of 60,000.

The so-called Soviet Corporations, or SAG, were 200 of the biggest works expropriated in the summer of 1946 from "monopoly capitalists and Nazis," and spirited into Russian hands on the grounds that the power over production which they represented was greater than any Germans—even "democratic" ones—ought to have. At the end of 1946, 73 were returned to German hands after partial dismantling, and in 1950, 24 more. The production of the SAG is mostly destined for the U.S.S.R. or for export on Russian account, the exports being handled by the same state-trading monopolies which export German-produced goods—Rasno, Technoexport, Promexport, Exportlion, etc., some of which have had offices in the United States and which act for the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade in foreign countries. Roughly a quarter of the production of the SAG goes to the German economy, chiefly in goods such as brown coal, potash, artificial rubber and some electrical supplies and power. Raw materials used by the SAG, on the other hand, are largely supplied by the German economy. The net total value of SAG production up to the end of 1948, excluding the amount returned to the German economy, was about $950,000,000.

Clearly the intention to expropriate German assets and exploit them on Russian account was taken before the end of the war, for some of the most modern and important plants were spared dismantling altogether. Thus the vast synthetic gasoline and oil refinery of Leuna in Saxony-Anhalt largely escaped in spite of the Four-Power ban on synthetic gasoline production in Germany. It has become a Russian concern. Similarly coal mines, metal smelting plants and potash mines were taken over. The big artificial rubber (Buna) factory at Schkopau became a unit of SAG, and at the opposite end of the scale, so did the famous Meissen porcelain works. The organization of the Russian works was based at first on the individual factory under the general control of the SAG holding company in Berlin-Weissensee, but later various factories were lumped together in both vertical and horizontal combines. These in turn were controlled by a trust for all combines in a particular industry, such as chemicals or textiles. The SAG today are a replica in miniature of the industrial trusts in the Soviet Union, and at present are being reorganized under their control. The Russians promised that these plants would eventually be handed over to the Germans, but they apparently will not be without at least partial dismantling.

In order to facilitate Soviet control over her economic empire in Germany and ensure complete independence from the German economy, a number of auxiliary organizations have been set up. There is the *Garantie und Kredit Bank,* a Soviet institution which finances reparations by making the necessary capital available to the SAG and to the trading monopolies. It operates with a small founding capital, but its assets are considerable. Further the Russians have formed their own transport company, the *Derutra* (German-Russian Transport Company), which handles all reparations and reparation export contracts, and in addition has a stranglehold over the North Sea harbor facilities of Wismar, Rostock and Stralsund. In addition the *Derutra* operates a lucrative transport business between East and West Europe on its own account by means of its control on road and rail facilities. Another example is the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Derunapht, originally a German-controlled gasoline import company. This Russian company owns much storage space and facilities, controls the distribution of gasoline in the Soviet zone, and blackmailed the provincial governments during 1947 into handing over the entire network of gasoline and oil retail pumps and service stations.

Much of Russia's reparations has been disguised. The profitable black market in cigarettes was cornered by the Russians; Rasno made its own cigarettes at Dresden and sold them at exorbitant prices, especially for the Western D Mark during the blockade. *Ossobtorg,* one of the Russian trading monopolies, has bought a large quantity of personal valuables, china, jewelry and works of art, in return for cash and cigarettes. Moreover, individual barter deals with the Western zones have been encouraged by the Russians acting through German middlemen; surgical equipment, specialized machinery and scarce raw materials have been purchased in the West by Soviet agents, who could dispose either of ready cash or promise compensation deliveries out of German production in the East. The Russians have also become real property owners on a large scale. Apart from the houses they have requisitioned for occupation, they have bought property in Eastern and Western Germany and in Berlin through German middlemen. In Berlin, they have acquired an astonishingly high proportion of property in the Western sectors, for political more than for economic purposes.

Reparations in the form of labor, specifically mentioned at Yalta and indirectly confirmed at Potsdam, fall into two categories: services compulsorily performed in Germany, and those performed in the Soviet Union. Since much of the labor employed in SAG and in factories working on reparations might normally have been unemployed under prevailing conditions, it cannot be counted as a total loss to the German economy. This, however, does not apply to the skilled workers, the scientists and technicians who worked for these firms, for the Red Army and for other special Russian agencies. The most significant factor with regard to reparations from labor were the snap Russian demands on the German labor exchanges for specific tasks; since these had to be fulfilled at any cost, German labor programs had, if necessary, to be postponed or scrapped. Russian demands reached unprecedented heights when the exploitation of the uranium mines in Saxony got into its stride. Shortage of machines and absence of rational mining processes were to be overcome by labor, more labor and still more labor. As many as 80,000 workmen were employed in the half-disused silver and radium mines at one time during the peak period in summer 1947. Conditions were frightful, and the natural reluctance of workmen to volunteer for the good cause of Soviet militarism resulted in compulsory registration and direction, first for anti-Communists, illegal border-crossers and sentenced criminals, then for mere non-Communists, finally for anybody who could be combed out of industry, save for those employed in such essential work as being a Communist Party official. Since remuneration was small, food insufficient and welfare projects nonexistent, this quasi-slave labor must be counted as reparation.

So must the removal of workers to the U.S.S.R. A feeble attempt at voluntary recruitment, chiefly among the miserable refugees from Poland and Rumania, was a complete failure and compulsion was resorted to. At first

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

workers attached to a dismantled factory were shipped off to Russia; some signed contracts under pressure coupled with financial inducements, others presumably signed contracts after being taken away. Later recruitment developed into a series of swoops, of which the biggest was Operation Ossawakim in autumn 1947, when about 10,000 workers, mostly skilled, were shipped to the East. Though their conditions in Russia are reported to be tough, they are comfortable compared to the political internees who were transferred from the reopened concentration camps in the Soviet zone to Russia to swell the millions of slave laborers. Some 8,000 to 12,000 internees have been thus removed to make themselves "socially useful;" they are mostly ex-Social-Democrats and economically anti-Russian survivals like independent shopkeepers and medium-sized farmers. Altogether 30,000 men with and without families have been deported, including 3,000 technicians, among them physicists and engineers of international reputation. Apart from internees, few of those transferred to Russia appear actually to have been kidnapped; the semblance of free contract has been preserved. All this is, of course, additional to the work of the 1,000,000-odd prisoners of war in Russian hands at the beginning of 1946.

The vast octopus of Soviet reparations has made necessary a distinctive system of finance in Eastern Germany. Soviet holdings of German currency spring from three sources: the capture of liquid assets belonging to the *Reichsbank* and the liquidated semi-private banks, the contributions out of the provincial budgets in the zone, and direct earnings. The most important item was the provincial contribution; direct earnings were at best only a side line, and the release of confiscated assets was to some extent limited by the need to preserve a semblance of control over inflation. During 1946 and 1947 the annual contribution of the provinces was just over 50 percent of their consolidated receipts; 5 billion RM in 1946, 5.2 billion in 1947 and 4.2 billion in 1948, out of gross receipts of 7.9, 8.5 and 8.7 billion RM respectively. This enormous sum was raised mostly from indirect taxation on cigarettes, *schnapps* and other consumption goods, and was spent partly in financing the occupation itself. Above all it provided the means for the reverse payments for reparations: wages, SAG deficits, production orders and dismantling costs. Much of the available assets has not yet been spent. At the end of 1947 some 5 to 7 billion RM were estimated still to be held in reserve, and since the falling-off in Soviet demands after 1948 the reserve is now estimated at about 2 to 4 billion. The value of Soviet assets was greatly increased at the time of the Eastern "currency reform" in June 1948, when they were converted at par while private and some semi-official holdings were revalued at anything up to 10 to 1. This was part of the process of facilitating the flow of reparations by reducing local demand while extending Russian purchasing facilities. It was made easier by the fact that the East German credit mechanism has not been allowed to develop since the war beyond the level of the crudest possible banking system.

IV

A word must be said of the effect of all this on the German economy. Dismantling is a long-term loss on a vast scale; it will be many years, even

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

under conditions favorable for expansion, before the removed installations can be replaced. The loss through reparations from current production, particularly in terms of foreign exchange and therefore of the balance of payments, is also considerable, but it is counteracted by a stimulation of production which may ultimately benefit the Germany economy. If the SAG are ever handed back to the Germans they will be a valuable item in industrial output, but as we have seen, their return seems unlikely at present. The financial policy and the Soviet black market will have adverse long-term effects on the prosperity of the individuals of the Soviet zone and of the zonal economy as a whole. But, in spite of great privations, the economic position of the zone has reached a level of industrial production roughly equivalent to 78 percent of 1936, and this level is likely to remain even for a time. In the spring of 1950, it was announced that the Russians valued reparations up to the end of 1951 at just over 3 billion dollars, and that a sum just below that figure still remained to be paid during the next 15 years. This was described as a generous reduction of the Yalta figure of 10 billion dollars. Bearing in mind the obvious undervaluation of payments it also meant a bleak future for this region. Psychologically, the decrease of Soviet demands means an increase in the zone's prosperity. In fact the economic crisis of the zone has come and gone, leaving it weak but breathing. In the West, on the other hand, the abandonment of reparations cannot be shown to affect prosperity to any important extent. Present prosperity there has its drawbacks, such as large-scale unemployment, and the economic test will come when American aid is exhausted. It is not impossible that the Eastern zone, in spite of Soviet reparations demands, may point derisive fingers at the pampered economy of Western Germany.

Two sets of conclusions can be drawn. From the narrow economic angle Soviet reparations have been a great success for the U.S.S.R. They have been an essential part of the Soviet plan for domestic reconstruction, and have been viewed by the Russians exclusively in this light. Since, in the last resort, the Soviet authority responsible for reparations policy is at the same time responsible for nearly everything else, the exaction of reparations has been characterized by maximum flexibility coupled with untrammelled ruthlessness. There is no magic which distinguishes Soviet success in extracting reparations from Germany from Western failure, unless there is magic in the commonplace that if you really want something very much, you put it ahead of other things.

The Russians have had to make political sacrifices for their reparations. They have sacrificed Allied good will, they have sacrificed the German Communist Party, and they have alienated German public opinion. For four years economic objectives have dominated politics in the Soviet zone, and only now that reparations have greatly diminished can the Russians cast their eyes on Western Germany and pursue a policy which has any chance of furthering Russian influence there.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

VARGAS RETURNS IN BRAZIL

By C. H. Haring

ON OCTOBER 3, 1950, Getulio Vargas, former dictator of Brazil, was returned to the Presidency by a landslide vote of over 3,667,000 as against about 2,226,000 for Major General Eduardo Gomes and less than 1,666,000 for Cristiano Machado, his two nearest competitors. The election was an acid test of the functioning of representative government in the country which is our most important ally among the Latin republics of America.

A more confusing situation has seldom confronted an electorate. The voters of Brazil not only had to choose the president and vice-president of the republic, but the entire federal Chamber of Deputies, one-third of the Senate, the state governors and legislators, and even municipal mayors and aldermen. And although there were only three important candidates for the national presidency, at least ten parties were of sufficient consequence to warrant serious attention by the daily newspaper press.

While many Brazilians conceded the possibility of Vargas' election, his large majority over his two principal opponents came as a surprise. It has been accounted for in various ways: by difficult living conditions due to inflation which made the voters ready for a change; by Vargas' personal popularity; by the fact that the Social Democratic Party, supposed to be the official government party, had more Vargas men in it than those dedicated to Cristiano Machado; and that evidently many of the politicians who supported Dutra in 1945, naturally loath to surrender their political advantages, were ready to shift to Vargas or to any other combination that promised victory. A contributing factor was the way in which the Governor of São Paulo, Ademar de Barros, placed funds and organization behind the former dictator.

But the fact remains that this was a free election, pledged by the government of President Dutra, administered by impartial judicial tribunals, and supervised at the polls by the armed forces. Apparently about three-fourths of the registered voters turned out, and in general the voting was quiet and orderly. What little violence occurred stemmed from bitter local feuds. The fact that the government candidate, Machado, came out a poor third is sufficient evidence that the voting was free. In the Federal District, Machado polled only about 5 percent of the votes cast. The electorate in the interior of the country, formerly conservative and largely influenced by the landowners, the clergy and other local dignitaries, used the secret ballot to display an unexpected independence. Exposed as never before to the impact of the radio, the voters showed that they knew they could vote against the powers that be. Considering the complexities of the electoral campaign, it may be said that representative government stood the initial test well.

II

Brazil has long suffered from the handicap of lacking genuine national parties. It is true that during the Braganza empire before 1899, under a pseudo-parliamentary régime, there was a two-party system. But the Brazil-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ian nation was then 80 percent illiterate and there was no firm basis of support for parliamentary institutions. This was abundantly illustrated after 1899, under the federal republic. The conservative monarchists withdrew from politics, and government remained in the hands of the republicans, who became really another oligarchy organized as a group of political machines in the principal states (the so-called Republican Party). These closely-knit state organizations, chiefly in São Paulo and Minas Gerais, dominated national politics until the revolution of 1930. Nomination of a "national" candidate for the presidency of the republic was generally a deal between São Paulo and Minas Gerais; the other states, unable to unite in any effective opposition, usually found it to their interest to acquiesce.

The 1930 revolution, and the beginning of the dictatorship of President Getulio Vargas, was in part a protest against this situation. But except for the short interval between July 1934 and November 1937, Brazil remained until near the close of 1945 a presidential dictatorship, without a congress and without parties. Although Vargas was accused of Fascist leanings, his régime was not based, as in Italy and Germany, upon the tyranny of a single, monolithic party. No political party was permitted, not even the Integralista or Brazilian Fascist Party. President Vargas ruled alone, by clever manipulation of checks and balances among the politicians and generals who collaborated with him. During these years, without national or state elections, a new generation was growing up, deprived of opportunity for gaining political experience. If Vargas destroyed the power of the oligarchy, he also permitted no room for the development of truly national parties to take its place. After the enforced retirement of President Vargas in October 1945, there were two principal candidates in the ensuing election, Brigadier General Eduardo Gomes and General Eurico Gaspar Dutra, Vargas' Minister of War, but their party organizations were improvised and had no roots in the past.

A somewhat similar situation existed in 1949–1950, before the national elections of last October. President Dutra during his five years' administration had done little to create a strong national political organization. Two principal parties, however, took shape, in part a survival of the presidential campaign of 1945: the Social Democratic Party (*Partido Social Demócrata,* or P.S.D.) and the National Democratic Union (*União Demócrata Nacional,* or U.D.N.). A convention of the U.D.N. in May formally nominated Eduardo Gomes again for the presidency; a month later the P.S.D. put forward the candidacy of Cristiano Machado. Side by side with them was a host of smaller parties representing state political organizations or the personal ascendancy of some dynamic local leader. Most of these minor parties, or their political chieftains, engaged in the most involved trading manœuvres with major parties, seeking a place on their electoral slates as the price of local support. These intrigues had to do especially with the candidates for vice-president, a matter in which the major parties reached no decision until well into the month of August. But the uncertainties extended all the way down the line to candidates for state governorships, the federal Congress, and even municipal prefects and councillors. In a sense, local issues were really paramount.

Given the immature development of the party system, and the conflict of state and personal rivalries and ambitions, the possible combinations and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

permutations were infinite. The confusion may in part have reflected the absence of experience with the democratic process. However, more than this was responsible for the bewilderment of the voters. Many of the older *políticos* survived from the days before 1930, and their intrigues and jockeying for position represented merely a survival of the bad old days, and a confirmation of the fact that in Brazil, as in most other Latin American countries, personalism in politics still prevails over principle.

The confusion during the months preceding October 3 was accentuated by the requirement under the Constitution of 1946 that all elections, national and local, take place on the same day. The provision was designed to dispose of all the agitations and distractions attending elections in as short a space of time as possible. But in practice it raised political heat to a dangerously high temperature. It also had the effect of bringing virtually all legislative activity to a standstill, both in the federal Congress and in such state legislatures as were in session. The electoral business was more important than parliamentary debates. This year, apart from senators and deputies seeking reëlection, and candidates for the presidency and vice-presidency (most of whom were members of Congress), an unusual number of congressmen—ten deputies and and six senators—were seeking election to the governorship of their respective states. Consequently, during a large part of the year the two houses of Congress were without a quorum.[1] Even the electoral code, governing the attributes and functions of the national and regional judicial tribunals that control the electoral process, was not finally sanctioned by Congress until the middle of July, less than three months before the election day. Experience since the collapse of the dictatorship had demonstrated the need of new legislation to correct errors or contradictions or fill lacunae in the code issued by President Vargas. But the bill after passing the Senate was frozen in the Chamber of Deputies for more than a year, and not until the ordinary session of 1950 did Congress awake from its procrastination and show signs of responsibility. Six months at least should have been allowed to insure normal and orderly execution of the laws governing the registry of voters and of candidates and the regulation of political parties and their propaganda.

III

In the presidential campaign the candidates made large promises to the nation. Yet all the parties offered much the same program: industrialization, mechanizing of agriculture, expanded transportation facilities, free enterprise, fair treatment for foreign capital, the preservation of democratic government.

Eduardo Gomes, commonly referred to as the *Brigadeiro*, the candidate of the U.D.N., first came into public notice as a young army officer in July 1922 at the time of the revolt of the Copacabana fort against what was said to be the fraudulent election of Arturo Bernardes to the presidency. The revolt failed of outside support, but Gomes and 17 others, refusing to surrender, fought a whole regiment on the Copacabana beach until all 18 were dead or

[1] When Congress met after the election, on October 10, 1950, after a "recess" of almost two months, it was reported to have voted in less than an hour 29 projects out of about 100 pending, including the national budget.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

badly wounded. The *Brigadeiro* is today the sole living survivor. As a top-ranking aviation officer during World War II, he was in close touch with Brazilian air defenses, and as inspector general of airways he came into close contact with United States Army officers. He visited Germany after the war as the guest of General Lucius D. Clay, and came to the United States as a guest of the United States Air Force. In 1945 he was the presidential candidate of the liberal opposition forces, but was defeated by General Eurico Dutra, Vargas' former Minister of War. He has a high reputation for honesty, patriotism and hard work.

Cristiano Machado was chosen candidate of the P.S.D., the party of President Dutra, after long uncertainty and much political manœuvring. His reputation for honesty and political rectitude is as high as that of the *Brigadeiro,* but he has never been a prominent figure in national politics. When he was nominated in June 1950, many Brazilians asked themselves, "Who is Machado?" He is a native of Minas Gerais, and most of his public career has been confined to his own state, as Secretary of Education in the years 1937–1942, and more recently as a federal deputy.

The most disturbing element in the political scene appeared to be the candidacy of the former dictator, Getulio Vargas. It aggravated the prevailing mood of insecurity, and seemed a threat to the stability of a constitutional régime. The return of Vargas to the presidency implied at least a vindication of his former policies, and of the schemes for legalizing the dictatorship that caused his downfall. In the face of this apparent danger, it seemed difficult to understand the inaction of the liberal forces of the country, and still less the willingness of some political groups to play ball with the ex-dictator in return for his support of their own local interests.

The possibility that Vargas would not become a candidate, that he would ultimately withdraw in favor of Gomes or of Machado, was entertained by many observers. As far back as April Vargas had declared that he did not want the presidency, and that he would retire from the race "to avoid political friction," if the two major parties would unite in support of a single "national" candidate. Several attempts apparently were made, Dr. Oswaldo Aranha's name being prominently mentioned in this connection. But the efforts to achieve a coalition for one reason or another failed; and after the other parties in May and June had nominated their candidates, Vargas himself entered the ring. Meantime it appeared that the former President and Governor Ademar de Barros of São Paulo were working together; and this was confirmed when the Governor announced that his party, the Social Progressive Party (*Partido Social Progresista,* or P.S.P.) would support the Vargas ticket. The P.S.P. was the strongest and best organized political machine in Brazil, controlling one of the major political centers of the country. It contributed a formidable voting force, and made the inability of the so-called liberal groups to achieve a coalition appear all the more culpable. On the other hand, Vargas failed to attend the convention of his own Brazilian Labor Party (*Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro,* or P.T.B.) which nominated him in June, and he delayed long-heralded public appearances in Porto Alegre, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro until the early part of August—all of which, added together, produced a second crop of rumors in certain political quarters that he would retire from the contest.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There could be little doubt of the ex-President's desire to stage a comeback, a personal vindication after his unceremonious expulsion from the presidency in 1945. But he also possessed a large following among the working classes, especially in the cities, because of the labor legislation decreed during the early years of the dictatorship, for which he claims full personal credit. Vargas had also introduced the secret ballot and extended the vote to women, by executive decree. However, the only opportunity vouchsafed to Brazilians while he was in power to enjoy these reforms was in the elections of 1933 and 1934; and it is a question whether the dictator really approved of them, or was driven to accept them by pressure from the young liberals (the *tenentes*, so-called) who were his early political collaborators, and by the revolt of the state of São Paulo in 1932.

A question mark in the minds of many concerned the Communists, who in 1945 had cast over 550,000 votes. As the Party had been outlawed in 1947, it could not present a presidential candidate of its own. It could expect no concessions in return for support from the party of Eduardo Gomes with its strong Catholic following; and even less from the party of the Administration which had outlawed it. But it could accept Vargas, who in his stratagems in 1945 had freed its leader, Luiz Carlos Prestes, and angled for its support, especially as his election would be interpreted in some quarters as a setback for democracy.

What really happened in the case of the Communist vote is obscure. A fortnight before the election the Communist press was actually attacking Vargas. And in Rio de Janeiro the Communists, under the name of the Republican Labor Party, managed legally to set up several candidates of their own. But in some of the other states they tried to secure election to one office or another by insinuating themselves into the good graces, and the electoral slates, of the legal parties—evidence of the general lack of party discipline and organization, and of the willingness of local leaders to make deals with the Communists to secure their support. In most cases, the parties involved appealed to the electoral tribunals to strike such camouflaged individuals from their lists.

IV

In the electoral campaign Vargas seized the occasion to criticize the shortcomings of the outgoing administration, an advantage not possessed by the other two parties, both of which had coöperated with the Dutra Government in devising a new constitution and keeping the third republic afloat. Some of the economic problems were an inheritance of the Vargas era. The charges of irregularities in the public services were not unfounded, however, although the irregularities were perhaps no greater than in the past; and Dutra bore down heavily upon them whenever they came to his attention.

President Dutra, 66 years of age and by profession a military man, is not a dramatic figure, and his administration has not been a spectacular one. Qualities of loyalty, honesty and patriotism had carried him steadily from the lowest officer ranks to the Ministry of War under Vargas. And the Army's confidence in him helped to persuade the generals to oust Vargas by a coup d'état when the latter gave every evidence of double-crossing Dutra, his announced candidate, and conspiring to continue the dictatorship by suspending

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or rigging the approaching election. There is no love lost, therefore, between President Dutra and President-elect Getulio Vargas.

Dutra's patriotism and loyalty to the Constitution have been reflected in his refusal to assent to the extension of his term to September 18, 1951, the anniversary of the promulgation of the Constitution of 1946. This was proposed on the ground that when he took office the constitution under which he has governed was not yet in existence, and that hence his term should be reckoned as beginning on the day it became effective. Dutra, however, divorced himself publicly from any such subterfuge, and has insisted that he will vacate office on January 31, 1951. His administration, in fact, has received less credit than it deserves for its accomplishments in the areas of social assistance, primary education and communications. It is conceivable that in years to come his presidency will be looked upon as the time when the third republic was firmly consolidated by his quiet but wise and steadfast direction of affairs.

V

The October elections, of course, marked the beginning not the end of a crucial period for representative institutions in Brazil. In former times Vargas always disparaged Congress as a drag on national progress. In the recent campaign he insisted that he is loyal to parliamentary processes, but it remains to be seen how genuine this recent conversion is. The attempt of the Perón régime in Argentina to associate itself with the Vargas interests has been a cause of some misgivings. In the middle of August the Peronista press in Buenos Aires suddenly launched a bitter attack upon the administration of President Dutra. At the same time in Brazil it was charged that Vargas was receiving funds from Argentine sources. Baptista Luzardo, Vargas' Ambassador to Argentina in 1945 and known to have represented Peronista interests in Brazil ever since, labored on Vargas' behalf. In fact, in the middle of October, on Luzardo's ranch in Rio Grande do Sul, the Vice President of Argentina paid a visit to Vargas, at the same time, it seems, that the President-elect received a visit from a general of the Brazilian Army. In Buenos Aires the government propaganda organs declared roundly that the victory of Vargas was a Peronista victory.

This association with Perón would seem to argue some maladroitness on the part of Vargas, who is generally credited with unusual political astuteness, and of stupidity on the part of Perón. Doubtless the latter acted under the impression that Vargas will revive the *Estado Novo* as another edition of Perón's social and economic policies, and probably as another center of resistance to the influence of the United States. It looked much like a transparent attempt at intervention in the domestic concerns of another American nation, such as that for which the Argentines have so vociferously denounced the United States in times past. It could only cause resentment in Brazil, and suspicion of the designs of the President-elect.

As someone has said, in discussions about the *homo politicus*, "all suppositions are possible and all conclusions probable;" and Vargas himself is well known to be an inveterate opportunist. Yet the best observers in Brazil do not seem to be greatly worried by the possibility of another dictatorship. Nor do they believe that the new Government will deviate from the policy of Brazilian-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American friendship and coöperation pursued by President Dutra. As has often been remarked, the Brazil of today is not the Brazil of 1930 or of 1945. The political climate is a different one, "after five years of free speech, thousands of candidates, and twenty-five million dollars spent on an election." Whatever the reasons for Vargas' comeback, they do not seem to spell a popular desire for a return to neo-Fascism. An attempt to dispense with Congress would entail the opposition of the vast majority of the nation. And even if the military leaders are today somewhat more divided in their political affiliations than in 1945—when in the coup d'état of that year they represented the nation at large, turning the government over immediately into civilian hands—it is doubtful if in 1951 or later they would act counter to the national will. Without army support an aspiring dictator would be helpless.

Vargas has claimed a victory for his partisans also in the congressional elections, but here the results are more doubtful. The new President will probably be forced to govern by coalition among the numerous parties, both in Congress and in the political administration. He announces that he will give his new régime a labor orientation, after the pattern of England and the Scandinavian countries. It is to be hoped that he will live up to his promise to make it a "government of evolution, not revolution."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

NOTE—FOREIGN AFFAIRS will supply its readers, *post free,* with any book published in the United States, at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, accompanied by check or money order, to Book Service, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 58 East 68 Street, New York 21, N. Y.

General: Political, Military and Legal

EUROPE IN DECAY. By L. B. NAMIER. New York: Macmillan, 1950, 329 p. $3.00.

A collection of book-review essays intended to keep readers abreast of material published since the author's "Diplomatic Prelude." Although many of the items are up to Professor Namier's usual level of excellence, the book as a whole does not really suffice as a guide to important sources appearing since 1948.

TWO MEMOIRS. By JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES. New York: Kelley, 1949, 106 p. $1.75.

Informal, brilliant and occasionally perverse talks by the late economist. The first deals with the Allied blockade of Germany in 1919.

TRUMAN, STALIN AND PEACE. By ALBERT Z. CARR. Garden City: Doubleday, 1950, 256 p. $2.75.

The most interesting aspect of these personal impressions of the cold war, written by a former member of the War Production Board and subsequent adviser on the White House staff, is the stress upon economic disputes and misunderstandings as leading factors in Soviet-American friction.

AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE INDIVIDUAL. By HAROLD W. METZ AND CHARLES A. H. THOMSON. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1950, 371 p. $3.50.

The authors make comparative studies of mediæval feudalism, absolute monarchy, Soviet Communism, Italian Fascism and German National Socialism to achieve their main objective: "to reveal how systems founded on the supremacy of society have controlled the life of the individual."

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE AGE OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP. By ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ AND STEFAN T. POSSONY. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950, 947 p. $6.00.

A textbook which puts emphasis upon the "principle of power accumulation."

EVEN NOW. By LORD VANSITTART. London: Hutchinson, 1949, 160 p. 4/6.

In warning his countrymen against Soviet Communism, Lord Vansittart insists on the essential identity of the Soviet and National Socialist régimes—"Communazism"—and on the parallel between the late 1930's and the present.

PAX FUTURA. By WILLY HELLPACH. Brunswick (British Zone): Westermann, 1949, 323 p.

The way to a peaceful world, according to this thoughtful essay by a well-known German social-psychologist, lies in the achievement of a "conservative democracy," the flavor of which is best indicated by the author's dedication of the book to Ludwig Uhland, Alexis de Tocqueville and Benjamin Disraeli.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRIEVE FROM WAR. By Lionel Gelber. New York: Macmillan, 1950, 196 p. $3.00.

How the West may achieve "peace by preponderance" without resorting to the remilitarizing and reindustrializing of Germany.

HOW CAN WE THE PEOPLE ACHIEVE A JUST PEACE? South Hadley (Mass.): Mount Holyoke College Institute on the United Nations, 1949, 251 p. $2.00.

Speeches by Benjamin Cohen, Carlos Romulo, Sir Alexander Cadogan and others at the second annual session of the Mt. Holyoke Institute on the United Nations.

SYSTÈME DE PAIX ET DE SÉCURITÉ MONDIALE. By Maurice Gandolphe. Paris: Éditions Internationales, 1949, 138 p. Fr. 210.

A project for publicizing and creating a new world order superseding the sovereignty of the nation state and comprising an "État de Sauvegarde Universelle" and a universal court of justice and arbitration.

HOW TO WAGE PEACE. By Hans W. Rosenhaupt. New York: Day, 1949, 248 p. $2.95.

For the citizen who wishes to "do something," a very handy book of practical information on foreign relief organizations, student exchange programs, peace groups, U. N. agencies, etc.

EUROPEAN MOVEMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE. London: Hutchinson (for the European Movement), 1949, 203 p. 10/6.

An enthusiastic account, published on behalf of the European Movement, of the aims and steps leading to the creation of the Council of Europe.

CONTRIBUTION À L'ÉTUDE DES ENTENTES RÉGIONALES. By B. Boutros-Ghali. Paris: Pedone, 1949, 247 p. Fr. 600.

A scholarly attempt to formulate a theory of international regionalism.

GEO-ECONOMIC REGIONALISM AND WORLD FEDERATION. By Maurice Parmelee. New York: Exposition Press, 1949, 137 p. $2.50.

Somewhat Utopian speculations.

THE STUDY OF COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT. Edited by Jasper B. Shannon. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949, 338 p. $4.00.

A miscellany of essays in honor of Frederic Austin Ogg, on national and local governments, political parties and public service.

LE ORGANIZZAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI. By Franco Florio. Milan: Giuffrè, 1949, 156 p. L. 550.

A theoretical discussion of the juridical nature of international organizations in the framework of international law.

LE PROCÈS DE NUREMBERG ET LE CHÂTIMENT DES CRIMINELS DE GUERRE. By Marcel Merle. Paris: Pedone, 1949, 185 p. Fr. 600.

An analysis of antecedents for the trial and of its legality in terms of international law; in general, the author believes the trial to have been a constructive step toward a more comprehensive legal order.

DIPLOMATICHESKII IMMUNITET. By D. B. Levin. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1949, 415 p.

A historical and analytical study of diplomatic immunity, which is called for, the author explains, by the new conceptions the Soviet system has introduced into international law and by the current struggle between the "democratic and imperialistic camps."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

VOPROSY MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRAVA I MEZHDUNARODNOI POLITIKI. By A. IA. Vyshinsky. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Iuridicheskoi Literatury, 1949, 502 p.

A collection of the Soviet Foreign Minister's speeches and remarks at the Paris Peace Conference of 1946, the first and second sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, at press conferences and meetings.

THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO ALIENS. By Andreas H. Roth. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1949, 194 p. Florins 7.50.

A largely theoretical study working from the premise that "the status of the alien is primarily and in its essence a question of international law."

THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK 1950. Edited by S. H. Steinberg. New York: Macmillan, 1950, 1594 p. $6.50.

THE MIDDLE EAST: 1950. London: Europa Publications, 1950, 375 p. 50/.

YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1950. New York: Hafner, 1950, 902 p. $7.00.

THE SOUTH AMERICAN HANDBOOK 1950. Edited by Howell Davies. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1950, 766 p. $1.50.

Current editions of useful reference works.

LES FLOTTES DE COMBAT 1950. By Henri and J. Le Masson. Paris: Société d'Éditions Géographiques, 1949, 372 p. Fr. 1500.

A new edition of the French equivalent of "Jane's Fighting Ships."

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

WAR AND THE MINDS OF MEN. By Frederick S. Dunn. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1950, 115 p. $2.00.

A discussion of the potential functions of UNESCO in the search for peace, in the practical context of Soviet-Western hostility and the Korean attack.

WAR AND CIVILIZATION. By Arnold J. Toynbee. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950, 165 p. $2.50.

Extracts from "A Study of History" relating to the problem of war.

THE IDEA OF CONFLICT. By Kurt Singer. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1949, 181 p. 8/6. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1950, $1.75.)

An inquiry, via history and mythology, into the cultural roots of human conflict.

ESSAI SUR LA FIN D'UNE CIVILISATION. By Marcel de Corte. Paris: Médicis, 1949, 248 p. Fr. 450.

A somber assessment of contemporary civilization in the line of traditional Catholic thought.

ZERO: THE STORY OF TERRORISM. By Robert Payne. New York: Day, 1950, 270 p. $3.50.

The nihilist Nechayev becomes an overworked symbol for outbursts of inhuman violence, both past and present, which the author attempts to reduce to a formula involving the collision of cultures.

THE DILEMMA OF THE IDEALIST. By David Bryn-Jones. New York: Macmillan, 1950, 278 p. $3.00.

Reflections on the eternal problem of reconciling personal ethics with a world in conflict, especially with respect to the issue of political compromise.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LE GRAND ESPOIR DU XXe SIÈCLE. By Jean Fourastié. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1949, 223 p. Fr. 320.

An interesting speculation on the future economy of the world. Examining the record of technological progress and the great rise in productivity, the author concludes that there will be great plenty of food, raw materials, and manufactured goods but a relative scarcity of "tertiary production" including services and, broadly speaking, "the finer things of life."

DIE WÜSTE DROHT. By A. Metternich. Bremen: Trüjen, 1949, 275 p.

Pessimistic observations on man-made deserts, along the lines of "Our Plundered Planet."

BROTPOLITIK. By Bruno Luxenberg. Oldenburg (British Zone): Oldenburger Verlagshaus, 1949, 427 p.

An extensive history of government policies regarding bread and grain from antiquity through the First World War.

LES JUIFS EN EUROPE (1939–1945). Paris: Éditions du Centre, 1949, 252 p.

A collection of reports on the fate of European Jews during the war, presented at an international conference held in Paris in 1947 to coördinate such studies.

MAKING CAPITALISM WORK. By Dexter Merriam Keezer and Associates. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950, 316 p. $3.50.

Starting from the premise "that Capitalism is the best way of economic life for the United States of America," the authors of this optimistic book set forth the steps—reforms as well as safeguards—which must be taken to preserve and advance capitalism.

TWENTIETH CENTURY ECONOMIC THOUGHT. Edited by Glenn Hoover. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950, 819, p. $12.00.

A symposium by 20 professional economists on a wide variety of topics both theoretical and practical.

THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE STATE. By William Aylott Orton. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950, 192 p. $3.00.

A stimulating inquiry into first principles, reinvoking such scholastic doctrines as distributive and commutative justice. The precise bearing of these doctrines upon current economic problems is not always apparent, however.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE RESTORATION OF WORLD TRADE. By William Adams Brown, Jr. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1950, 572 p. $5.00.

This detailed analysis of the Charter for an International Trade Organization and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade traces their history through long negotiations and discusses the policy questions involved in American adherence to the two instruments.

NEW CONCEPT IN THE QUEST FOR PEACE. By Paul Eric Koefod. Geneva: Librairie de l'Université, 1950, 235 p.

The origin and early history of the Marshall Plan are here conveniently described, from published materials, against the background of growing tension between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

PLAN MARSHALL: NAISSANCE ET DÉBUTS. By Jean Teissedre. Paris: Hermann, 1948, 158 p. Fr. 350.

A survey of the European situation leading to the Marshall Plan, the preparation of the plan, and its early days, with summaries of all the main reports.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

L'UNION DOUANIÈRE OU LE MARIAGE DES NATIONS. By Yves Mancel. Paris: Hermann, 1949, 170 p. Fr. 600.

A survey of recent discussions on customs unions—Benelux, the French-Italian negotiations, the study group for a European customs union, the provisions of the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization. This is volume II of the series on the Marshall Plan of which Teissedre (above) is the first.

L'EUROPE UNIE: PROBLÈMES ET PERSPECTIVES ÉCONOMIQUES. By R. Plessia. Paris: Pedone, 1949, 159 p. Fr. 400.

A discussion of the economics of European Union stressing the necessary inclusion of the Eastern European states in any politically or economically viable union.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONFERENCES IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD. By Dean E. Traynor. Washington: Catholic University, 1949, 196 p. $2.25.

A dissertation on the successes and failures of the conference method in solving international financial problems.

MONNAIE, PRIX ET CHANGE. VOLUME I: LA VALEUR DE LA MONNAIE DANS L'ÉCONOMIE CONTEMPORAINE. By Albert Aftalion. Paris: Sirey, 1950, 565 p. Fr. 700.

This third revised edition of a well-known French study is concerned only with developments prior to 1940. The subsequent period has been covered in the author's previously published work, "Monnaie et Économie Dirigée" (reviewed here January 1950).

MOVEMENTS FOR ECONOMIC REFORM. By Philip Taft. New York: Rinehart, 1950, 614 p. $5.00.

A handbook summarizing the various reform movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

WARTIME ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION. By R. Warren James. Toronto: Ryerson (for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs), 1949, 415 p. $5.00.

Canadian-American economic relations in World War II.

PROBLEMS IN THE COLLECTION AND COMPARABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL STATISTICS. New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1949, 165 p. 50 cents.

Papers presented at a round table on international statistics, November 1948.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF COLONIES. By René Maunier. London: Routledge, 1949, 2 v. 63/.

A translation of a work originally published in France ("Sociologie Coloniale," Paris, Domat-Montchrestien) over the period 1932–1949. About half the book is devoted to the theory of colonization and race contact; the other and more valuable half describes the impact of European law and practices upon native populations.

LA FIN DES EMPIRES COLONIAUX. By Hubert Deschamps. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1950, 127 p. Fr. 90.

HISTOIRE DE L'ALGÉRIE (1830–1950). By Gabriel Esquer. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1950, 126 p. Fr. 90.

Two compact studies of colonial affairs in the "Que sais-je?" series.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OIL IN THE MODERN WORLD. By Raj Narain Gupta. Allahabad: Kitab Mahal, 1950, 170 p. Rs. 8.

Of interest for its reflection of the resentment felt in India, as in other backward economic areas, toward "oil imperialism."

The Second World War

OUR JUNGLE ROAD TO TOKYO. By Robert L. Eichelberger. New York: Viking, 1950, 306 p. $4.50.

The wartime commander of the Eighth Army gives a straightforward and modest account of the campaigns of the Army ground forces from the Buna operation to the Philippines and victory.

THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II. VOLUME FOUR: THE PACIFIC: GUADALCANAL TO SAIPAN, AUGUST 1942 TO JULY 1944. Edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950, 824 p. $6.00.

Though numbered fourth in an official series of seven, this volume, dealing with the A. A. F.'s part in the struggle with Japan to July 1944, is actually the third to appear.

FESTUNG VORARLBERG. By Georg Schelling. Bregenz (Austria): Teutsch, 1947, 223 p. Schillings 12.

An account of the final days of the war in Hitler's western Alpine redoubt.

HEER IN FESSELN. By Siegfried Westphal. Bonn (British Zone): Athenaeum, 1950, 332 p.

The war as seen by a staff officer serving successively under Rommel in Africa, Kesselring in Italy and Rundstedt in West Europe.

AFRIKANISCHE SCHICKSALSJAHRE. By Hanns Gert von Esebeck. Wiesbaden (U. S. Zone): Limes, 1949, 278 p.

A professional account of the military campaigns of the *Afrikakorps* by one of Rommel's staff officers.

LA CAMPAGNE DE NORVÈGE. By Jacques Mordal. Paris: Éditions Self, 1949, 445 p. Fr. 660.

A detailed analysis of Hitler's 1940 campaign in Norway, by a well-known and somewhat Anglophobe naval historian.

ENVERS ET CONTRE TOUT: D'ALGER À PARIS (1942–1944). By Jacques Soustelle. Paris: Laffont, 1950, 452 p. Fr. 585.

This second volume of an important series of "Souvenirs et documents sur la France Libre" (the first volume reviewed here in April 1948) covers the period from the North African invasion to the Normandy landing.

LERO. By Virgilio Spigai. Leghorn: Società Editrice Tirrena, 1949, 315 p. L. 750.

A detailed account of the battle of Leros in November 1943.

CHE HA FATTO LA MARINA? (1940–1945). By Marc' Antonio Bragadin. Milan: Garzanti, 1949, 643 p. L. 1500.

The story of the Italian Navy during World War II.

ILL MET BY MOONLIGHT. By W. Stanley Moss. New York: Macmillan, 1950, 192 p. $2.50.

An exuberant account of the kidnapping of the German wartime commander in Crete, written by one of his captors, a Briton.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The United States

THE MAN OF INDEPENDENCE. By Jonathan Daniels. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1950, 384 p. $3.75.

This is the best book to appear thus far on President Truman, and while the author is a stout Democrat and admirer of his subject it is by no means an uncritical study. There are no startling revelations, but the book contains a number of interesting sidelights on Cabinet conflicts as well as a lengthy review of the President's early career.

BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY. By Charles S. Hyneman. New York: Harper, 1950, 586 p. $6.00.

In discussing the need for assuring that the federal bureaucracy "will actually provide the kind of government the American people want," the author recommends the creation of a Central Council composed of both administrators and legislative leaders.

MODERN REPUBLIC. By Spencer Pinkham. New York: Corwin Publishing Co. (distributed by Greenberg), 1950, 137 p. $2.50.

A proposal for certain constitutional modifications—an indefinite presidential term plus the right of Congress to call for a presidential election at any time—to modernize our governmental machinery.

FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY-MAKING. By G. L. Bach. New York: Knopf, 1950, 282 p. $3.00.

A competent analysis of policy formulation, both within the Federal Reserve, and with other branches of the government, plus the author's suggestions for improvements.

WARTIME ECONOMIC PLANNING IN AGRICULTURE. By Bela Gold. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949, 594 p. $6.75.

An exhaustive examination of the United States wartime agricultural mobilization, which the author finds to have been inadequate in its control both of output and of land use.

TRADE AND AGRICULTURE. By D. Gale Johnson. New York: Wiley, 1950, 198 p. $2.50.

Professor Johnson of the University of Chicago has made a careful analysis of conflicts between some American farm policies and the foreign trade policies pursued by our government. He proposes an alternative farm policy that will overcome these conflicts without damaging American agriculture.

PRODUCTION AND WELFARE OF AGRICULTURE. By Theodore W. Schultz. New York: Macmillan, 1949, 225 p. $3.50.

A study of American agricultural policy since World War I especially with regard to production and the welfare of farm population.

THE ROAD TO PEARL HARBOR. By Herbert Feis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950, 356 p. $5.00.

A scholarly examination of the diplomatic prelude to the Japanese attack, by the former Adviser on International Economic Affairs in the State Department. The author's exposition of the developing pattern of Japanese expansion and aggression, derived from extensive use of the records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Japanese sources, is particularly valuable.

AMERICA'S SECOND CRUSADE. By William Henry Chamberlin. Chicago: Regnery, 1950, 372 p. $3.75.

Another book which develops the notion that President Roosevelt forced the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States into a meaningless and disastrous world war. Mr. Chamberlin thinks that Roosevelt did this largely because of personal ambition and the desire to give the American economy a boost. Rauch's and Feis's studies (reviewed in the preceding and current issues) supply material in refutation.

FAITH, PURPOSE AND POWER. By James P. Warburg. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1950, 180 p. $2.00.

A plea for an American foreign policy directed toward more positive ends than "a struggle for naked military power."

ORDEAL BY SLANDER. By Owen Lattimore. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1950, 236 p. $2.75.

Professor Lattimore's vigorous account of his defense against Senator McCarthy's charges of Communism and espionage.

CHARACTER ASSASSINATION. By Jerome Davis. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950, 259 p. $3.00.

While the dangers of political character assassination are real, it is doubtful whether this book's style of presentation and its rather one-sided selection of examples—almost exclusively from the extreme right—are likely to reduce the tensions causing this sinister phenomenon.

A GENERATION ON TRIAL. By Alistair Cooke. New York: Knopf, 1950, 342 p. $3.50.

The American correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* reports on the Hiss case from the first accusation to the conviction. The author does not attempt to unravel the past or inner lives of the principals but delivers some very penetrating, and British, observations on the American political scene, the mores of our press, and our trial system.

THE PRE-ELECTION POLLS OF 1948. By Frederick Mosteller and Others. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1949, 396 p. $3.00.

A scholarly, non-political inquiry into the reasons for the failures of the public opinion polls in the last presidential election.

EUROPEAN BELIEFS REGARDING THE UNITED STATES, 1949. A Study under the Direction of Henry Lee Munson. New York: Common Council for American Unity, 1949, 134 p. $2.00.

An indirect public opinion poll based primarily on questionnaires addressed to "qualified observers of opinion."

STATEHOOD FOR HAWAII. By William C. Dill. Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1949, 134 p. $2.00.

A rather elocutionary treatment of the question.

S.SH.A. OT PERVOI DO VTOROI MIROVOI VOINY. By V. I. Lan. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1947, 483 p.

A substantial though orthodox Soviet review of American domestic and foreign policy from 1914 to 1939.

Western Europe

TRENTE ANS D'HISTOIRE 1918–1948: DE CLEMENCEAU À DE GAULLE. Paris: Nouvelle Librairie de France, 1949, 426 p. Fr. 3200.

A handsomely illustrated volume, with contributions by a number of authors and a perceptibly de Gaullist bias.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MENSONGES ET VÉRITÉ. By Admiral Auphan. Paris: Éditions Self, 1949, 191 p. Fr. 270.

LA VÉRITÉ SUR LES AMIRAUX. By Vice-Admiral Docteur. Paris: Éditions de la Couronne, 1949, 257 p. Fr. 400.

The French admirals in counterattack against the charges of collaboration and defeatism during the Vichy régime.

EN ÉCOUTANT WEYGAND. By François Legrix. Paris: Nouvelles Éditions Latines, 1949, 155 p. Fr. 200.

A spirited rebuttal of Churchill's criticism of Weygand's actions in 1940.

LE RÈGNE DE LA BÊTE. By Florian-Parmentier. Paris: Gastein, 1948, 308 p. Fr. 350.

The German occupation as viewed from a Burgundian village.

THE BELGIAN KEMPENLAND. By F. J. Monkhouse. Liverpool: University Press of Liverpool, 1949, 252 p. 17/6.

The justification for this detailed economic and geographic study of a small region in northeastern Belgium lies in the remarkable manner in which an apparently barren heath has been developed to support a rapidly expanding population.

CONTEMPORARY DANISH POLITICIANS. By Poul Hansen. Copenhagen: Danske Selskab, 1949, 179 p. (New York: Scandinavian Book Service, $1.60.)

Forty-five useful biographical sketches.

THE DEBATE ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF SWEDEN, 1918–1939. By Herbert Tingsten. New York: Oxford University Press, 1949, 324 p. $4.50.

This detailed case-history illuminates many of the difficult problems involved in formulating and pursuing a successful foreign policy in a democratic state.

DER SCHWEDISCHE MITTELWEG—SOZIALE SICHERHEIT. By Kurt Heinig. Hamburg (British Zone): Hammonia Norddeutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1949, 118 p.

A brief sketch of Sweden's moderate Socialism.

GERMANY AND THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM. By General Lucius D. Clay, Ret. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950, 83 p. $2.00.

The Godkin Lectures, delivered at Harvard in 1950.

STAATSFORM UND POLITISCHE WILLENSBILDUNG. By Otto Barbarino. Munich (U. S. Zone): Pflaum, 1949, 423 p.

A historical and theoretical examination with special emphasis upon the reasons for Germany's collapse into tyranny, the necessary limitations to the principle of majority rule, and the values of federalism.

VON DEUTSCHER POLITIK. By Theodor Steltzer. Frankfurt (U. S. Zone): Knecht, 1949, 169 p.

Thoughtful essays on contemporary political problems by one of the survivors of the anti-Hitler Kreisau Circle.

DAS WIDERSTANDSRECHT DES VOLKES GEGEN VERFASSUNGSWIDRIGE AUSÜBUNG DER STAATSGEWALT IM NEUEN DEUTSCHEN VERFASSUNGSRECHT. By Carl Heyland. Tübingen (French Zone): Mohr, 1950, 124 p.

A solid though rather pedestrian account of the doctrines concerning the right of resistance, culminating in an analysis of that strange article 147 of the Hesse Constitution postulating the right and duty of every man to resist the unconstitutional exercise of public power.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LEHRBUCH FÜR DEN DEMOKRATISCHEN STAATS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSAUFBAU. By Walter Ulbricht. Berlin: Dietz, 1949, 258 p.
A mélange of speeches by the S.E.D. leader, primarily concerned with the two-year plan in the Soviet Zone.

ES GEHT UM DEUTSCHLAND. By Max Seydewitz. Dresden (U.S.S.R. Zone): Sachsenverlag, 1949, 168 p.
A collection of radio addresses and essays on postwar developments in Germany, by a distinctly pro-Soviet former commentator on Radio Berlin.

STALIN UND DIE SCHICKSALSFRAGEN DER DEUTSCHEN NATION. By Alexander Abusch. Berlin: Aufbau, 1949, 159 p.
A Communist appeal for the Germans to realize that Stalin is the best defender of their national interests.

VÖLKERRECHT UND DEUTSCHER FRIEDE. By Rudolf Nadolny. Hamburg (British Zone): Hugo, 1949, 151 p.
An appeal for a return to principles of international law and justice for Germany: revisionism in advance of the treaty.

DER FRITSCHPROZESS 1938. By Graf Kielmansegg. Hamburg (British Zone): Hoffmann, 1949, 152 p.
A defense of the career and activities of General Fritsch, demoted by Hitler in 1938 and killed on the Polish front in 1939.

EIN GENERAL KÄMPFT GEGEN DEN KRIEG. By Wolfgang Foerster. Munich (U. S. Zone): Münchener Dom-Verlag, 1949, 139 p.
A documented account of General Beck's opposition to Hitler's war plans.

DOUZE ANS AUPRÈS D'HITLER. By Albert Zoller. Paris: Julliard, 1949, 248 p. Fr. 390.
Hitler at home, as seen by his secretary and related to an interrogation officer.

JOSEPH GOEBBELS: DÄMON EINER DIKTATUR. By Werner Stephan. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1949, 311 p.
An unimpressive portrait based largely on diary notes kept by a subordinate in the Ministry of Propaganda.

THE FALL OF THE GERMAN GODS. By H. E. Westermeyer. Mountain View (Cal.): Pacific Press, 1950, 328 p. $4.00.
A rather thin history of National Socialist religious policy swamped by fervent rhetoric.

IM ZEPPELIN ÜBER LÄNDER UND MEERE. By Hugo Eckener. Flensburg (British Zone): Wolff, 1949, 565 p.
Recollections of the dirigible commander, with occasional political sidelights.

ZWISCHEN DEMOKRATIE UND DIKTATUR. By Georg Schreiber. Münster (British Zone): Regensberg, 1949, 149 p.
Recollections by a Center Party historian, primarily concerned with German Catholic questions after 1919.

MÄNNER DES DEUTSCHEN SCHICKSALS. By Jakob Stöcker. Berlin: Arnold, 1949, 239 p.
Sharply sketched political portraits, largely of the period of the Weimar Republic.

FRIEDRICH EBERT. By Max Peters. Berlin: Arani, 1950, 113 p.
A brief and rather pedestrian biography of the first Weimar president.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

VOM ENDE ZUM ANFANG. By Gustav Stöckelle. Graz: Moser, 1949, 424 p. Schillings 33.50.

Recollections and reflections of an Austrian National Socialist concerning his two years' internment after the war.

L'AVVENTO DI DE GASPERI. By Leo Valiani. Turin: Silva, 1949, 167 p.

A Socialist's rather disillusioned account of Italian politics from 1945 to 1948.

IL CAPPIO DELLE ALLEANZE. By Pietro Nenni. Milan: *Milano-Sera,* 1949, 265 p. L. 350.

Speeches and articles by the leader of the Italian left-wing Socialists, largely against the régime, U. S. influence, and the Marshall Plan.

L'OMBRA DEL RE. By Carmelo Puglionisi. Rome: Edizioni l'Arnia, 1949, 223 p. L. 600.

Brief articles on recent Italian history, politics and foreign affairs.

LA MIA BATTAGLIA DA NEW YORK. By Luigi Sturzo. Milan: Garzanti, 1949, 436 p. L. 1400.

Essays and articles by the founder of the Partito Populare Italiano during his exile in New York from 1940 to 1946.

RICORDI, 1922–1946. By Raffaele Guariglia. Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1950, 782 p. L. 1400.

An important book by an astute Italian diplomat and devoted monarchist, ambassador during the Fascist régime to Spain, France and Turkey, and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Badoglio Government during the famous "forty-five days" when he played a notable rôle in staving off German suspicions and preparing the armistice with the Allies.

ROMA BERLINO SALÒ (1936–1945). By Filippo Anfuso. Milan: Garzanti, 1950, 587 p. L. 1200.

The theme of neo-Fascism pervades these brilliantly written and provocative reminiscences of an Italian Fascist diplomat, who remained loyal to Mussolini to the end. Much interesting material on the history of the Axis.

GUERRA DIPLOMATICA A SALÒ (OTTOBRE 1943– APRILE 1945). By Alberto Mellini Ponce de Leon. Bologna: Cappelli, 1950, 213 p. L. 650.

A Fascist diplomat presents first-hand evidence regarding the efforts of Mussolini and his entourage in the Italian Social Republic to sustain Italian interests vis-à-vis the encroaching Nazis.

CON MUSSOLINI NELLA TRAGEDIA. By Giovanni Dolfin. Milan: Garzanti, 1949, 305 p. L. 600.

Revealing testimony regarding Mussolini's last phase by his private secretary from October 1943 to March 1944.

SOCIALIZZAZIONE E SINDACALISMO NELLA R.S.I. By Francesco Galanti. Rome: Magi-Spinetti, 1949, 175 p. L. 450.

A defense of the social and economic program of the short-lived "Repubblica Sociale Italiana."

GIOLITTI E SALANDRA. By Vincenzo Galizzi. Bari: Laterza, 1949, 147 p. L. 400.

These posthumously published sketches of two pre-Fascist political adversaries contain some useful observations on the crisis of Italian liberalism.

PELLE D'AMMIRAGLIO. By Alberto da Zara. Milan: Mondadori, 1949, 449 p. L. 1500.

An admiral's memoirs of 40 years in the Italian navy and two world wars.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ESPAÑA TENÍA RAZÓN (1939–1945). By José M. Doussinague. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1950, 376 p. Ptas. 50.

Franco's former director general in the foreign office tells how the Caudillo preserved Spanish neutrality in the Second World War.

ESSÊNCIA DO CORPORATIVISMO EM PORTUGAL. By Henrique Marques. Lisbon: Bertrand, 1949, 342 p. Escudos 30.

In praise of Portugal's Christian corporativism as contrasted with laissez-faire liberalism, Socialism, Communism and Nazi neo-paganism.

Eastern Europe

SOVIET POLITICS—THE DILEMMA OF POWER. By Barrington Moore, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950, 503 p. $6.00.

An important contribution to Soviet studies. With admirable balance and insight Mr. Moore investigates the interaction between Communist ideology and Soviet political practices from the period of Lenin's theoretical formulations to the present Soviet bureaucratic state. His method of defining the principal questions concerning internal influences on Soviet foreign policy is particularly noteworthy.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION. By Samuel N. Harper and Ronald Thompson. New York: Van Nostrand, 1949, 369 p. $5.00.

Mr. Thompson, who has revised and to a considerable extent rewritten this well-known work, takes a much more critical and somber view of the Soviet Government than did the original edition which appeared in 1937.

THE PEOPLE OF GREAT RUSSIA. By Geoffrey Gorer and John Rickman. New York: Chanticleer, 1950, 235 p. $3.00.

Mr. Gorer's provocative thesis is that if you scratch a Russian you find an angry, frustrated infant whose early swaddling has left a permanent mark on his character and his society. Dr. Rickman's contribution is a series of exceptionally vivid sketches of Russian peasant life from the point of view of a village medical officer.

VERDICT OF THREE DECADES. Edited by Julien Steinberg. New York: Duell, 1950, 634 p. $5.00.

These selections from the writings of more than 30 anti-Bolshevik or anti-Stalinist witnesses—from Rosa Luxemberg and Karl Kautsky to Louis Budenz and Sidney Hook—amount to a rake's progress of the Soviet dictatorship. While the views represented are too exclusively those of former adherents to one of the fractions of the political left, many of the chapters are highly illuminating.

MOSCOW CORRESPONDENT. By Ralph Parker. New York: Soviet Russia Today, 1949, 304 p. $3.00.

Avoiding discussion of foreign affairs or what he calls the "black spots" in post-war Russian life, Mr. Parker stresses what he found good and promising (including, apparently, the triumph of Lysenko's genetics).

RYSSLAND OCH VÅR UTRIKESPOLITIK. By Arthur Montgomery. Stockholm: Skoglund, 1949, 211 p.

Reprints of newspaper articles by a scholarly Swedish expert on Russia. Illustrations from Pravda.

THE ELECTION TO THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF 1917. By Oliver Henry Radkey. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950, 89 p. $2.50.

An excellent and enlightening monograph which finds this unique election to have been essentially both valid and meaningful.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IL MATERIALISMO DIALETTICO SOVIETICO. By Gustavo A. Wetter. Turin: Einaudi, 1948, 431 p. L. 1200.

An exceptionally thorough, scholarly and dispassionate examination—both historical and analytical—of the development of Soviet dialectical materialism by a Jesuit professor of Russian philosophy at the Pontifical Oriental Institute at Rome.

AN INTRODUCTION TO RUSSIAN HISTORY AND CULTURE. By Ivar Spector. New York: Van Nostrand, 1949, 454 p. $6.00.

A useful textbook of Russian history from 862 A.D. to the present.

THE DEADLY PARALLEL: STALIN AND IVAN THE TERRIBLE. By George Backer. New York: Random House, 1950, 240 p. $3.50.

The author's frequently penetrating observations about the nature of the Stalin régime are not really improved by his play with his historical relativism or his questionable use of historical parallels.

STALIN AND THE POLES. By Bronislaw Kusnierz. London: Hollis, 1949, 317 p. 16/.

Employing the Nuremberg trial categories of crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, this book by the minister of justice in the Bor-Komorowski Government takes the form of indictment against the Soviet leaders for their actions in Poland since 1939. A formidable mass of evidence is presented, though often with no indication of the source.

I COMUNISTI STANNO ALLE SPALLE. By Vassilij Ivanovic. Milan: Garzanti, 1949, 285 p. L. 650.

Pseudonymous memoirs of a young Cominform "courier" who, between 1945 and 1948, was involved in Communist activities in Italy, Czechoslovakia, Spain, Greece, Jugoslavia and Germany.

SOVIET TRADE UNIONS. By Isaac Deutscher. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950, 156 p. $1.75.

The author of a biography of Stalin believes that the "revived serfdom" apparent in Soviet labor policy is not an indictment of planning as such but reflects the economic conditions in which the régime undertook its forced industrial revolution.

DIE GEWERKSCHAFTEN IN DER SOWJETUNION. By Fritz Apelt. Berlin: Freie Gewerkschaft Verlag, 1949, 119 p.

A Communist presentation of the functions of trade unions in the U.S.S.R.

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT IN THE USSR. By A. Arakelian. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1950, 168 p. $3.00.

This monograph, originally issued in 1947 by the Economic Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., expounds and praises the superiority of the "universal organized management of economy" of the Soviet Union.

SUOMEN HISTORIAN KÄSIKIRJA. Edited by Arvi Korhonen. Helsinki: Söderström, 1949, 2 v.

A detailed, authoritative handbook of Finnish history. Volume II covers the period since 1890 with more than 100 pages devoted to the Second World War. The stress is upon military and political rather than social or economic history.

SUOMALAISEN YHTEISKUNNAN SOSIAALIPOLITIIKKA. By Helge Virtanen. Jyväskylä: Gummerus, 1950, 200 p. M. 400.

An introduction to Finland's contemporary social problems and their political setting, by the director of the Workers College.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

KYMMENEN VUOTTA KANSANHUOLTAJANA. By Onni Toivonen. Helsinki: Söderström, 1950, 241 p. M. 450.

Revealing memoirs of the recent minister of public welfare, listing both the achievements and mistakes of this key department over the war decade.

THE CARDINAL'S STORY. By Stephen K. Swift. New York: Macmillan, 1949, 328 p. $3.75.

DER PROZESS JÓZSEF MINDSZENTY. Berlin: Historisches Kabinett, 1949, 179 p.

Two opposing accounts of the Mindszenty trial; the first includes a biography of the Cardinal and attempts to reconstruct the means by which the "confessions" were secured; the second, published under Communist auspices, is largely a transcript of the court record.

HISTOIRE DES PEUPLES BALKANIQUES. By René Ristelhueber. Paris: Fayard, 1950, 503 p. Fr. 500.

A compact and readable if not exceptional review of the history of the Balkan peoples from their obscure origins to their obscure present.

TITO. By George Bilainkin. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950, 287 p. $3.75.

An erratic and altogether uncritical survey of Tito's career, adding little new information.

MACEDONIA: A SWITZERLAND OF THE BALKANS. By Ivan Mihailoff. St. Louis: Pearlstone, 1950, 139 p. $3.00.

Arguments by a leader of IMRO for Macedonian independence.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

BRITISH POLITICS SINCE 1900. By D. C. Somervell. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950, 265 p. $3.75.

A delightfully readable survey, with a gallery of well-drawn political portraits. Of particular interest is the author's defense, at points debatable, of the Baldwin and Chamberlain Cabinets, which have suffered both Churchillian and Laborite castigation.

DAYS FOR DECISION. By The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden. Boston: Houghton, 1950, 239 p. $3.00.

Twenty-seven speeches on domestic and foreign affairs delivered between June 1946 and August 1949.

POLITICAL OPINION. By the Association for Planning and Regional Reconstruction with Henry W. Durant. New York: Macmillan, 1950, 55 p. $2.00. (London: Allen and Unwin, 10/6.)

An analysis of British general election results from 1929 to 1945.

BRITISH RAILWAYS AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY. By Kenneth H. Johnston. London: Clerke, 1949, 352 p. 18/.

The case for electrification as the key to a cheap and efficient railway system.

ENGLISH SOCIAL SERVICES. By Emmeline W. Cohen. New York: Macmillan, 1949, 169 p. $1.75. (London: Allen and Unwin.)

A brief survey of the development of social services—for children, the aged, and the sick—from the eighteenth century to the Second World War.

CANADA IN WORLD AFFAIRS. By F. H. Soward. New York: Oxford Uni-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

versity Press (for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs), 1950, 359 p. $3.00.

This fourth volume of a series surveying "the varied forces which determine the international position and policies of Canada" covers the years 1944–46.

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN CANADA. By Robert MacGregor Dawson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949, 188 p. $2.75.

A brief descriptive account of Canada's national, provincial and municipal government by the author of a more extensive study reviewed here in October 1948.

WE WENT TO AUSTRALIA. By David Walker. London: Chapman, 1949, 253 p. 12/6.

An amusing and quite informative travel journal by a British correspondent who spent 18 months touring the Continent.

AUSTRALIEN. By Kurt von Stutterheim. Berlin: Herbig, 1949, 156 p.

A brief sketch of Australian history, society, politics and economics.

FREEDOM AND PLANNING IN AUSTRALIA. By A. Campbell Garnett. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1949, 331 p. $4.00.

A lucid introduction to Australian economic planning, designed for Americans.

INDIA. By C. H. Philips. New York: Longmans, 1950, 176 p. $2.00.

NEW ZEALAND. By Harold Miller. New York: Longmans, 1950, 155 p. $2.00.

BURMA. By D. G. E. Hall. New York: Longmans, 1950, 184 p. $2.00.

SOUTH AFRICA: A SHORT HISTORY. By Arthur Keppel-Jones. New York: Longmans, 1950, 212 p. $2.00. (London: Hutchinson, 7/6 each.)

Four recent contributions to the British Empire History edited by Sir Reginald Coupland. Prepared by competent specialists, each provides a brief introduction to the history of these members of the Commonwealth.

The Middle East

THE MIDDLE EAST: A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SURVEY. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950, 496 p. $6.50.

A number of specialists contributed to this useful compendium of political, social and economic information on Arabia, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Palestine and Israel, the Sudan, Syria and Lebanon, Transjordan and Turkey.

THE JEWS. Edited by Louis Finkelstein. New York: Harper, 1949, 2 v. $12.00.

This imposing collection of studies, designed to be "the first comprehensive description of Judaism and the Jews" and drawing on the scholarship of nearly 40 contributors, covers the whole range of Jewish history, culture, religion and sociology. The regrettable absence of a chapter on the Palestinian Jewish community and the new state of Israel is, the editor hopes, to be remedied in future editions.

THE REPUBLIC OF ISRAEL: ITS HISTORY AND ITS PROMISE. By Joseph Dunner. New York: Whittlesey House, 1950, 269 p. $4.75.

A serious study but one which disappoints by falling off, in style and and in objectivity, as the author approaches the postwar period and the problems of the future.

ON THE ROAD TO ZION. By Daniel Frisch. New York: Zionist Organization, 1950, 240 p. $2.50.

FIFTY YEARS OF ZIONISM. By Oskar K. Rabinowicz. London: Anscombe, 1950, 130 p. 7/6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BUILDING ISRAEL. By Arthur Ruppin. New York: Schocken, 1949, 342 p. $4.00.

Three books on the Zionist background. Frisch, whose selected writings are now published, was a leader of the Zionist Organization of America. Dr. Rabinowicz's book is a rather severe critique of Chaim Weizmann's "Trial and Error." Arthur Ruppin's essays span the years from 1907 to 1935.

NEW STAR IN THE NEAR EAST. By Kenneth W. Bilby. Garden City: Doubleday, 1950, 279 p. $3.50.

NEGUEV. By Teddy Eytan. Paris: Presse Française et Étrangère, 1950, 242 p. Fr. 675.

I SAW THE BATTLE OF JERUSALEM. By Harry Levin. New York: Schocken, 1950, 288 p. $3.00.

THE ARMY OF ISRAEL. By Moshe Pearlman. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950, 256 p. $5.00.

Four reports primarily devoted to the various military actions involved in the creation of the Republic of Israel. Bilby's excellent reporting covers the period after the withdrawal of British troops; Eytan participated in the Negev campaign; Levin was an eyewitness to the siege of Jerusalem; Colonel Pearlman directed the Israeli press information services.

ISRAEL: EIN STAAT IM WERDEN. By Eric Mettler. Zürich: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 1949, 143 p.

Reports on a trip through Palestine in 1948, originally appearing in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*.

GOING TO JERUSALEM. By Willie Snow Ethridge. New York: Vanguard, 1950, 313 p. $3.50.

ISRAEL REVISITED. By Ralph McGill. Atlanta: Tupper, 1950, 116 p. $2.00.

REPORT ON ISRAEL. By Irwin Shaw and Robert Capa. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1950, 144 p. $3.00.

Three pieces of competent if not exhaustive reportage on present-day Israel, the last of which is very handsomely illustrated by Capa's camera work.

PALESTINE IS OUR BUSINESS. By Millar Burrows. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1949, 155 p. $2.50.

An earnest expression of the view that a great wrong has been done to the Palestinian Arabs.

ISRAEL IN CRISIS. By A. B. Magil. New York: International Publishers, 1950, 224 p. $2.50.

A relatively extensive exposition of the Communist view of Israel, its internal and foreign policies.

THE LAND AND PEOPLE OF ISRAEL. By Gail Hoffman. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1950, 119 p. $2.50.

A simple introduction to contemporary Palestine.

L'AVENIR ÉCONOMIQUE D'ISRAËL. By l'Aliah des Jeunes. Paris: Éditions "Je Sers," 1949, 95 p.

A prospectus published under the auspices of the Chambre de Commerce France-Israël.

EDUCATION IN ARAB COUNTRIES OF THE NEAR EAST. By Roderic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

D. MATTHEWS AND MATTA AKRAWI. Washington: American Council on Education, 1949, 584 p. $6.00.

A scholarly descriptive report of the variegated pattern of education in Egypt, Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon, based upon extensive field work.

FOUNDATIONS OF TURKISH NATIONALISM. BY URIEL HEYD. London: Luzac and Harvill, 1950, 174 p. 12/6.

The life and writings of Ziya Gökalp, influential proponent of modern Turkish nationalism.

A SEARCHLIGHT ON THE ARMENIAN QUESTION (1878–1950). BY J. MISSAKIAN. Boston: Hairenik Publishing Co. (for the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia), 1950, 154 p. $2.50.

This sketch by a British-Armenian journalist is largely concerned with the years 1914–1923.

THE IRANIAN SEVEN-YEAR PLAN AND ITS MONETARY EFFECTS. BY ALI MOAREFI. Washington: The Author, 1950, 270 p.

A lengthy and rather unwieldy dissertation, principally concerned with the problem of financing the plan.

South and Southeast Asia

INDEPENDENCE AND AFTER. BY JAWAHARLAL NEHRU. New York: Day, 1950, 403 p. $3.00.

In this collection of speeches, delivered in the main in the year and a half after August 1947, the Prime Minister of India discusses—extemporaneously and rather volubly—numerous problems: communalism, Kashmir and Hyderabad, education and industry, foreign policy and Commonwealth affairs.

INTERVIEW WITH INDIA. BY JOHN FREDERICK MUEHL. New York: Day, 1950, 310 p. $3.50.

An agonizing account of human misery and privation as seen on a 2,300-mile journey through western and southern India.

INDIAN INDUSTRIAL LABOUR. BY T. N. RASTOGI. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1949, 236 p. Rs. 8/8.

A discussion of trade unionism, wage structure, employer-employee relations, and social insurance by the labor officer of the Calico Mills at Ahmedabad.

BENGAL IN MAPS. BY S. P. CHATTERJEE. Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1949, 105 p. Rs. 18.

Some 80 maps, with accompanying text, depicting the geography, climate, population and economy of Bengal.

ERLEBNIS INDIEN. BY WALTER MANGELSDORF. Brunswick (British Zone): Vieweg, 1950, 194 p.

The report of a journey to the holy places of Buddhism and Hinduism.

PARADIES IN LICHT UND SCHATTEN. BY KARL HELBIG. Brunswick (British Zone): Vieweg, 1949, 308 p.

An Indonesion travelogue.

L'INDOCHINE DANS LE CADRE DE L'ASIE ET SES PROBLÈMES ACTUELS. BY COLONEL MARCHAND. Paris: Peyronnet, 1949, 215 p. Fr. 270.

A brief summary by an experienced colonial officer.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

IM LANDE ARIMASEN. BY KARL HEINZ ABSHAGEN. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone):

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1948, 373 p.

Observations and recollections of a German journalist stationed in the Far East from 1941 to 1946.

DATELINE: CHINA. By Hollington K. Tong. New York: Rockport Press, 1950, 269 p. $3.50.

Chiang Kai-shek's public relations officer and foreign press censor between 1937 and 1945 presents his side of the disputed story of wartime reporting in China.

CONFLICT IN THE FAR EAST: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN CHINA FROM 1928–1933. By James William Christopher. Leyden: Brill, 1950, 335 p. Guilders 14.50.

Covering American diplomacy in China from 1929 to 1933 this book serves as a sequel to Dorothy Borg's work. Its value to the specialist is limited by the narrow range of sources consulted.

THE BEGINNINGS OF POLITICAL DEMOCRACY IN JAPAN. By Nobutaka Ike. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1950, 246 p. $3.50.

This study of the democratic movement in Japan between 1875 and 1890 is an important supplement to E. Herbert Norman's earlier work, and of particular value in its portrayal of such figures as Ueki and Itagaki.

JOURNEY TO THE MISSOURI. By Toshikazu Kase. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950, 282 p. $4.00.

An American-educated former member of the Japanese Foreign Service writes a valuable and exceptionally interesting account of the war and the defeat as seen from Tokyo.

WHY WAR CAME IN KOREA. By Robert T. Oliver. New York: McMullen (for Fordham University Press), 1950, 260 p. $2.95.

A critique of America's Korea policy, by a close personal friend and adviser of Syngman Rhee.

THE EPIC OF KOREA. By A. Wigfall Green. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1950, 136 p. $2.50.

A quick survey, primarily of the first three postwar years, by a former officer in the American military occupation.

ÜBER DEN HIMALAJA INS LAND DER GÖTTER. By Ernst Schäfer. Brunswick (British Zone): Vieweg, 1950, 200 p.

FEST DER WEISSEN SCHLEIER. By Ernst Schäfer. Brunswick (British Zone): Vieweg, 1950, 199 p.

Two books on a Tibetan expedition in 1938–39; the first concerns the journey from India across the Himalayas to the Brahmaputra, the second Tibet itself.

THE SAGA OF JOSÉ P. LAUREL (HIS BROTHERS' KEEPER). By Teofilo and Jose del Castillo. Tucson: The Authors, 1949, 358 p. $3.50.

Two Filipinos write of the tribulations of the President of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation.

JAUNES, NOIRS ET BLANCS. By Patrick O'Reilly and Jean-Marie Sédès. Paris: Éditions du Monde Nouveau, 1949, 294 p. Fr. 390.

An account of the war years in the Solomon Islands.

KON-TIKI. By Thor Heyerdahl. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1950, 304 p. $4.00.

The absorbing chronicle of a voyage from Peru to Polynesia, on a balsa raft of pre-Columbian design and propelled only by the Humboldt and South Equatorial currents.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Africa

AFRIKA: EIN KONTINENT SPRICHT. By Wilhelm O. Hess. Meisenheim am Glan (French Zone): Westkulturverlag, 1949, 340 p.

A thoughtful historical and anthropological survey but with little discussion of current questions.

AUTOUR DE L'AFRIQUE. By Jacques Hébert. Montreal: Fides, 1950, 2 v. $3.30.

The diaries of an overland journey from Tangier to South Africa and north to Egypt in 1948–49.

LA TUNISIE. By Pierre Hubac and Others. Paris: Cahiers Charles de Foucauld, 1950, 268 p.

Articles on various aspects of Tunisian history, society and culture.

SEVEN ACROSS THE SAHARA. By Harold Ingrams. London: Murray, 1949, 231 p. 18/.

A British official's overland journey to his post as Chief Commissioner to the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast. The book pays tribute to French administration in the Sahara.

THE GROUNDNUT AFFAIR. By Alan Wood. London: Lane, 1950, 264 p. 12/6.

A lively report on the difficulties encountered in the widely publicized peanut development scheme in Tanganyika.

AFRICAN SWITZERLAND. By Eric Rosenthal. London: Hutchinson, 1949, 255 p. 15/.

An illustrated account of Basutoland and its people.

EAST AFRICAN AGRICULTURE. Edited by J. K. Matheson and E. W. Bovill. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950, 332 p. $4.50.

A survey of European and African farming in Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

THE GRIQUAS OF GRIQUALAND. By Samuel James Halford. Cape Town: Juta, 1949, 209 p. 12/6.

The unhappy story of the decline of the Griqua people, who once led a pastoral life near Kimberley.

TWILIGHT IN SOUTH AFRICA. By Henry Gibbs. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950, 288 p. $4.50.

An exceptionally competent report on contemporary South Africa. The author is critical of the Malan government's political philosophy and the policy of *apartheid.*

AFRICA: BRITAIN'S THIRD EMPIRE. By George Padmore. New York: British Book Centre, 1949, 266 p. $3.00. (London: Dobson, 12/6.)

An indignant attack—from the Left—on the Labor Government's African policy, of more significance in showing the violent feelings aroused by this subject than for its analysis of current problems.

THE GOLDEN LAND. By Julian Mockford. London: Black, 1949, 270 p. 12/6.

SERETSE KHAMA. By Julian Mockford. New York: Staples, 1950, 231 p. $2.50.

Two books by the late Public Relations Officer at South Africa House in London. The first amounts to a useful if somewhat glossed-over handbook for visitors to South Africa. The second is an unfinished account of the dynastic affairs of the Bamangwato from the great chief Khama up to Seretse's controversial marriage.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE ZULU PEOPLE. By A. T. Bryant. Pietermaritzburg: Shuter, 1949, 769 p. 35/.

The author of this substantial reference work on the manners and customs of the Nguni Bantu spent more than 50 years as a missionary in Zululand.

EL SÁHARA ESPAÑOL. By Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco and Others. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Africanos, 1949, 808 p. Ptas. 100.

An extensive geographical and geological survey of the Canary Islands, Ifni, and Rio de Oro.

Latin America and the West Indies

EL FUTURO DE AMÉRICA. By Juan Yepes del Pozo. Quito: Jodoco Ricke, 1949, 319 p.

An impressionistic and lightly documented survey of Pan Americanism, past and present, and of Latin and Anglo-Saxon character differences.

SOCIAL SCIENCE TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICA. By Harold E. Davis. Washington: American University Press, 1950, 136 p. $2.50.

A review of contemporary developments in sociology, political science, economics, history, geography and anthropology.

TROPISCHES SÜDAMERIKA. By Werner Hopp. Berlin: Safari-Verlag, 1949, 261 p.

A description of the South American tropics by a German engineer and naturalist who finds the area unfit for European settlement.

LATIN AMERICAN LEADERS. By Harold E. Davis. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1949, 170 p. $2.50.

Sixteen biographical sketches of political and intellectual leaders, some of them twentieth century.

LA OBRA IMPRESA DE LOS INTELECTUALES ESPAÑOLES EN AMÉRICA, 1936–1945. Compiled by Julián Amo and Charmion Shelby. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1950, 145 p. $4.00.

A bibliography, with biographical notes, of the works of Spanish writers who have emigrated to America since 1936.

MEXICO: A LAND OF VOLCANOES. By Joseph H. L. Schlarman. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1950, 640 p. $5.00.

An emphatically Roman Catholic interpretation of Mexican history from Cortes to Alemán, involving rather intemperate judgments of such figures as Iturbide, Juárez and Cárdenas.

ATLAS DE CUBA. By Gerardo Canet and Erwin Raisz. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949, 63 p. $3.50.

A comprehensive physical, historical and economic geography in Spanish and English.

RURAL CUBA. By Lowry Nelson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1950, 285 p. $3.50.

The findings of methodical investigations in 1945–46, by a rural sociologist.

HONDURAS: AN AREA STUDY IN GOVERNMENT. By William S. Stokes. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1950, 351 p. $6.00.

A detailed study, based on extensive field work, of governmental institutions and political practice.

DEMOCRACIA Y TIRANIAS EN EL CARIBE. By William Krehm. Mexico:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Unión Democrática Centroamericana, 1949, 316 p. Pesos 10.
A good journalistic account, by a former *Time* correspondent, pointing up the differences in the régimes of the Caribbean states.

AFTER ENGLAND—WE. By A. H. Maloney. Boston: Meador, 1949, 183 p. $2.50.
An appeal for Caribbean independence, preferably in the form of a nation comprising all the West Indies and the Guianas.

THE BOLIVAR COUNTRIES: COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, VENEZUELA. By William Russell. New York: Coward-McCann, 1949, 308 p. $4.00.
An amiable guide for tourists.

GEOPOLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA. By General Julio Londoño. Bogotá: Ministerio de Guerra, 1949, 237 p.
The second edition of a strongly nationalistic and haphazard attempt to interpret Colombia in the light of geopolitical concepts.

HISTORIA ECONÓMICA DEL PERÚ. By Emilio Romero. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1949, 471 p.
The greater part of this general history is concerned with developments prior to the twentieth century.

THREE WORLDS OF PERU. By Frances Toor. New York: Crown Publishers, 1949, 239 p. $3.50.
A well-written travel book covering the coastal region, mountains and jungle of Peru.

THE ROAD TO CUZCO. By Ena Dargan. London: Andrew Melrose, 1950, 215 p. 20/.
An account of a journey from Buenos Aires, across Bolivia to Cuzco in upper Peru, told with skill.

THE EPIC OF THE CHACO: MARSHAL ESTIGARRIBIA'S MEMOIRS OF THE CHACO WAR, 1932–1935. Edited and Annotated by Pablo Max Ynsfran. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1950, 221 p.
Useful source material on the Chaco war by a former President of Paraguay.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations, International Court of Justice, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2966 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1825 Jefferson Place, Washington 6, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, and Lake Success imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Agriculture

Agricultural advisory services in European countries; report of a working party of experts. Paris, O.E.E.C., 1950. 232 p.

Farm advisory methods for grassland improvement. Paris, O.E.E.C., 1950. 135 p.

Hybrid maize (corn) in European countries; report by United States specialists. Paris, O.E.E.C., 1950. 68 p.

Foreign agricultural relations. Hearings before Subcommittee no. 2 of the Committee on Agriculture, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. Feb. 9–22, 1950. Washington, 1950. 135 p.

Commercial Policy and Trade

A European payments union, and the rules of commercial policy to be followed by member countries. Paris, O.E.E.C., 1950. 24 p.

Agreement providing for the provisional application of the draft international customs conventions on touring, on commercial road vehicles and on the international transport of goods by road . . . 16 June 1949. Geneva. Inland Transport Committee, Economic Commission for Europe, 1950. 125 p. (1950. VIII. 1.) $1.25.

Germany

Erster bericht der Deutschen Bundesregierung über die Durchführung des Marshallplanes 1 Oktober 1949 bis 31 Dezember 1949. Bonn, Bundesminister für den Marshallplan, 1950. 50 p.

Entwicklung und ursachen der arbeitslosigkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1946–1950). Bonn, Bundesministerium für Arbeit, 1950. 20 p.

Lebensfähigkeit und vollbeschäftigung; ein Beitrag zur Frage des wirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbaus in Westdeutschland. Bonn, n. pub., 1950. 55 p.

Report of Price, Waterhouse & Co. on the accounts of the Joint Export-Import Agency for the period 1st January, 1947 to 31st December, 1948. London, 1950. 21 p. (Cmd. 7978. Germany 2, 1950.) 6d.

Vier jahre betreuung der vertriebenen in Bayern 1945–1949, by Wolfgang Jaenicke. München, Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern, 1950. 38 p.

Great Britain

Labour and the new society; a statement of the policy and principles of British democratic Socialism, 1950. London, Labour Party, 1950. 39 p. 6d.

British exports and exchange restrictions abroad. London, Swiss Bank Corporation, 1950. 118 p.

Dollar sales—capital goods; a practical guide to selling British capital goods to industrial and other users in the U. S. A. and Canada. London, Dollar Exports Board, 1950. 52 p. 2s.

Japan

GHQ, SCAP, Natural Resources Section. Reports. Tokyo, Author, 1950.

127. Japanese land reform program, by Laurence I. Hewes Jr. 118 p. *128.* Gold and silver in Japan, by Robert Y. Grant. 112 p. *130.* Fire clay resources of Japan, by Donald E. Lee. 61 p. *131.* Glossary of Japanese forestry terms, by T. Sasaki and K. Watanabe. 132 p. *133.* Coal fields of Hokkaido, Japan (Other than Ishikari), by John B. Lewis. 55 p.

Korea

Korea and the United Nations. Lake Success, 1950. 96 p. (1950. I. 8.) 25¢.

Action in Korea . . .; first report to the Security Council by the United States government, July 25, 1950. Washington, 1950. 7 p. (Dept. of State. International Organization and Conference Series III.) (First of several in same series.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SITUATION in Korea. Message from the President of the United States . . . July 19, 1950. Washington, 1950. 11 p. (H. Doc. 646.)

LABOR

INTERNATIONAL Labour Conference, 33rd Session, Geneva, 1950. Reports, v. 3, pts. 1–4. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1950.

INTERNATIONAL Labour Organization. Petroleum Committee. 3rd Session, Geneva, 1950. Reports, v. 1–2. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1950.

NATIONAL employment services—Canada. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1950. 105 p. 75¢.

CONDITIONS in ships flying the Panama flag. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1950. 87 p. (Studies and reports. New Series 22.) 50¢.

FREEDOM of association and conditions of work in Venezuela; report of the Mission . . . (22 July–1 September 1949). Geneva, International Labour Office, 1950. 185 p. (Studies and reports. New Series 21.) $1.00.

IMPLEMENTATION of full employment policies. Report No. 1. Measures taken in the second half of 1949 . . . Lake Success, 1950. 52 p. (1950. II. A. 1.) 40¢.

FOR bread, peace and freedom; decisions of the First World Congress of the I.C.F.T.U., London, November–December 1949. New York, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 1950. 32 p. (I.C.F.T.U. Pamphlets 1.) 25¢.

LATIN AMERICA

CONFERENCES and organizations series of the Organization of American States. Washington, Pan American Union, 1950. 10¢ each.

1. Standards for the study of Inter-American organizations. 6 p. *3.* Agreement between the Council of the OAS and the Pan American Institute of Geography and History . . . January 12, 1949. unp. *4.* Agreement between the Council of the OAS and the American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood . . . April 22, 1949. unp. *5.* Agreement between the Council of the OAS and the Inter-American Statistical Institute . . . April 11, 1950. unp.

OVERSEAS Economic Surveys. London, 1950.

Colombia. 42 p. 1s. 3d. Ecuador. 47 p. 1s. 6d.

BILATERAL treaty developments in Latin America. 1938–1948. Washington, Pan American Union, 1950. 154 p. (Law and Treaty Series 32.)

CARIBBEAN land tenure symposium. Washington, Caribbean Commission, 1946. 377 p.

A STATEMENT of the laws of Venezuela in matters affecting business . . . [by Luis Loreto and R. L. Parparcen under the auspices of the Inter-American Development Commission.] Washington, Pan American Union, 1949. 170 p.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

MUTUAL defense assistance program, 1950. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. June 2–15, 1950. Washington, 1950. 113 p.

——. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services on S. 3809. June 21, 1950. Washington, 1950. 42 p. (S. Rept. 1853.)

——. Act. Approved July 26, 1950. Washington, 1950. 5 p. (Public Law 621, 81st Cong.—S. 3809.)

LONDON conferences. Tripartite talks between the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom and France, with annex, 11th–13th May 1950. Fourth session of the North Atlantic Council 15th–18th May 1950. London, 1950. 13 p. (Cmd. 7977. Miscellaneous 10, 1950.) 4d.

RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

INTERNAL financial stability in member countries. Paris, O.E.E.C., 1950. 122 p.

FOREIGN aid appropriations for 1951. Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. March 10–June 20, 1950. Washington, 1950. 647 p.

FOREIGN economic assistance act of 1950. Committee of Conference, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., on H. R. 7797. May 18, 1950. Washington, 1950. 14 p. (S. Doc. 168.)

REPORT on the effectiveness of the reconstruction programme, 1947–1948–1949. Paris, UNESCO, 1950. 75 p. $1.00.

RUSSIA

BACKGROUND information on the Soviet Union in international relations. Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 81st Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, 1950. 54 p.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United Nations and Agencies

Revision of the United Nations charter. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. Sept. 1, 1950. Washington, 1950. 64 p. (S. Rept. 2501.)

Proceedings of the United Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources 17 August–6 September 1949, Lake Success, New York. Volume 1, Plenary Meetings. Lake Success, 1950. 431 p. (1950. II. B. 2.) $3.00.

Report to the United Nations, 1949–1950. Paris, UNESCO, 1950. 198 p.

The Programme of UNESCO proposed by the Executive Board. Paris, UNESCO, 1950. 88 p. (5C/5 (1) Rev.)

How to find out about the United Nations; materials available and where to get them. Lake Success, 1950. 51 p. (1950. I. 4.) 15¢.

These rights and freedoms. Lake Success, 1950. 214 p. (1950. I. 6.)

United Nations social welfare seminar for Arab States in the Middle East, Beirut, 15 August to 8 September 1949. Lake Success, 1950. 68 p. (1950. IV. 8.) (Technical Assistance for Social Progress 3.)

United States

Our foreign policy. Washington, 1950. 99 p. (Dept. of State. General Foreign Policy Series 26.) 30¢.

Personnel and composition of the Army and Air Force. Report from the Committee of Conference, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany H. R. 1437. June 26, 1950. Washington, 1950. 7 p. (H. Rept. 2322.)

——. Act. Approved July 10, 1950. Washington, 1950. 5 p. (Public Law 604, 81st Cong.—H. R. 1437.)

Army organization act of 1950. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., on S. 2334 and H. R. 8198. May 25–26, 1950. Washington, 1950. 66 p.

——. Report from the Committee of Conference, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany H. R. 8198. June 20, 1950. Washington, 1950. 17 p. (H. Rept. 2289.)

——. Report from the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany S. 3691. June 2, 1950. Washington, 1950. 49 p. (S. Rept. 1776.)

Suspending restrictions on the authorized personnel strength of the armed forces. Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., on H. R. 9178. July 21, 1950. Washington, 1950. p. 6801–6811.

——. Report from the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany S. 3939. July 21, 1950. Washington, 1950. 5 p. (S. Rept. 2116.)

——. Report from the Committee on Armed Services, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany H. R. 9178. July 24, 1950. Washington, 1950. 6 p. (H. Rept. 2719.)

——. Act. Approved August 3, 1950. Washington, 1950. 1 p. (Public Law 655, 81st Cong.—H. R. 9178.)

Department of Defense appropriations for 1951. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. March 13, 1950–May 15, 1950. Washington, 1950. 915 p.

Defense production act of 1950. Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., on H. R. 9176. July 24–25, 1950. Washington, 1950. 130 p.

——. Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., on S. 3936, July 24–26, 1950. Washington, 1950. 329 p.

——. Report from the Committee on Banking and Currency, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany H. R. 9176. July 28, 1950. Washington, 1950. 26 p. (H. Rept. 2759.)

——. Report from the Committee on Banking and Currency, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany S. 3936. August 7, 1950. Washington, 1950. 54 p. (S. Rept. 2250.)

——. Act. Approved September 8, 1950. Washington, 1950. 27 p. (Public Law 774, 81st Cong.—H. R. 9176.)

Control of radiation hazards in the atomic energy program. Washington, 1950. 230 p. 55¢.

Unification and strategy. Report of investigation by the Committee on Armed Services, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. March 1, 1950. Washington, 1950. 59 p. (H. Doc. 600.)

United States civil defense. Washington, National Security Resources Board, 1950. 162 p. 25¢.

Protection of the United States against un-American and subversive activities. Report from the Committee on Un-American Activities, House 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany H. R. 9490. August 22, 1950. Washington, 1950. 13 p. (H. Rept. 2980.)

——. Act. Approved Sept. 23, 1950. Washington, 1950. 50 p. (Public Law 831, 81st Cong.—H. R. 9490.)

Legislation to outlaw certain un-American and subversive activities. Hearings before the Committee on Un-American Activities, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., on H. R. 3903 and H. R. 7595. March 21–28, 1950. Washington, 1950. p. 2111–2364.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EXCLUSION and expulsion of subversive aliens from the United States. Report from the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany S. 1832. August 2, 1950. Washington, 1950. 32 p. (S. Rept. 2230.)

HEARINGS before the Committee on Un-American Activities, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. Washington, 1950.

Communism in the United States government, April 20–August 7, 1948; June 8, 1950. p. 1697–1938. Communist activities in the Territory of Hawaii, April 10–19, 1950. 3 pts.

REPORT on atomic espionage. Committee on Un-American Activities, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. April 26, 1950. Washington, 1950. 15 p. (H. Rept. 1952.)

STATE Department employee loyalty investigation. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., pursuant to S. Res, 231. March 8–June 28, 1950. Washington, 1950. 2 pts.

——. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., pursuant to S. Res. 231. July 20, 1950. Washington, 1950. 2 pts. (S. Rept. 2108.)

GENERAL appropriation bill, 1951. Report from the Committee on Appropriations, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany H. R. 7786. July 6, 1950. Washington, 1950. 303 p. (S. Rept. 1941.)

——. Act. Approved September 6, 1950. Washington, 1950. 192 p. (Public Law 759, 81st Cong.—H. R. 7786.)

DEPARTMENTS of State, Justice, Commerce and the Judiciary appropriations for 1951. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. Jan. 31–May 24, 1950. Washington, 1950. 2 pts.

EXPANDED international information and education program. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., on S. Res. 243. July 5–7, 1950. Washington, 1950. 165 p.

THE IMMIGRATION and naturalization systems of the United States. Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., pursuant to S. Res. 137. April 20, 1950. Washington, 1950. 925 p. (S. Rept. 1515.)

LIMITATIONS upon authorizations for United States participation in five international organizations. Report from the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany H. J. Res 334. August 28, 1950. Washington, 1950. 16 p. (S. Rept. 2450.)

——. Act. Approved Sept. 21, 1950. Washington, 1950. 2 p. (Public Law 806, 81st Cong.—H. J. Res. 334.)

SMALL business and procurement—Economic Cooperation Administration. Hearing before the Select Committee on Small Business, Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. June 21, 1950. Washington, 1950. 47 p.

PROVIDING for the dissemination of technological, scientific, and business information to American business and industry. Report from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., to accompany S. 868. June 28, 1950. Washington, 1950. 5 p. (H. Rept. 2356).

GREAT LAKES—St. Lawrence basin. Hearings before the Committee on Public Works, House, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., on H. J. Res. 271. April 24–May 10, 1950. Washington, 1950. 567 p.

YUGOSLAVIA

REAL reasons behind the slanders against Yugoslavia, by Marshal Josip Broz-Tito. Belgrade, Jugoslovenska Knjiga, 1949. 55 p.

II. PAMPHLETS

AGRICULTURE IN MEXICO, by Gonzale Blanco. Washington, Pan American Union, 1950. 52 p. 25¢.

ATOMIC ENERGY AND SOCIETY, by J. S. Allen. New York, International Publishers, 1949. 95 p. $1.25.

DIE AUSWÄRTIGE STELLUNG DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND NACH DEM BONNER GRUNDGESETZ, by Herbert Kraus. Göttingen, Musterschmidt, 1950. 24 p.

DIE BEZIEHUNGEN ZWISCHEN PRESSE UND BEHÖRDEN. Frankfurt, Institut zur Förderung Öffentlicher Angelegenheiten, 1950. 88 p.

LES CARACTÈRES POLITIQUES ET LE RÉGIME LÉGISLATIF DE L'ALGÉRIE, by Paul-Emile Viard. Algiers, Maison des Livres, 1949. 80 p.

COMMUNISTS CRUSH CHURCHES IN EASTERN EUROPE, edited by R. H. Markham. Boston, Meador, 1950. 143 p.

CONSTITUTIONS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES, by Sydney D. Bailey. London, Hansard Society, 1950. 52 p. 2s. 6d.

CULTURE AND POLICY; the United States and the Hispanic world, by René de V. Williamson. Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1949. 66 p. $2.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EAST-WEST TRADE, by M. B. Brown. London, National Peace Council, 1950. 24 p. (Peace Aims Pamphlet 48.) 1s.

ECONOMIC POLICY FOR REARMAMENT. New York, Committee for Economic Development, 1950. 29 p.

EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS. Washington, Editorial Research Reports, 1950. $1.00 each.
1950. v. II, no. 1. Stand-by laws for war, by William H. Chartener. p. 431–446. *no. 4.* Postwar cartels, by William H. Chartener. p. 487–503.

EXODUS FROM IRAQ, by J. B. Schechtman. New York, United Palestine Appeal, 1950. 32 p.

A FRAMEWORK FOR LONG-RANGE AGRICULTURAL POLICY, by Oscar Heline and Donald R. Kaldor. Washington, National Planning Association, 1950. 68 p. (Planning Pamphlets 72.) 50¢.

GEGEN DIE KRIEGSHETZE FÜR EINHEIT UND FRIEDEN, by Wilhelm Pieck. Berlin, Dietz, 1949. 61 p. DM. 0.30.

GERMANY AND WORLD PEACE, by J. P. Warburg. New York, Current Affairs, 1950. 20 p. 25¢.

HEADLINE SERIES. New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1950. 35¢ each.
82. Germany: promise and perils, by Sigmund Neumann. 62 p.

INDONESIEN GESTERN UND MORGEN. The Hague, Linck, 1949. 102 p. DM. 3.90.

LA INDUSTRIALIZACIÓN DE ESPAÑA EN 1949, by Juan Antonio Suanzes. Madrid, Diana, 1949. 117 p. 5 ptas.

JAPANESE ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND PAKISTAN, by Hassan Habib. Karachi, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1950. 42 p. Re.1/-

KIELER STUDIEN. Kiel, Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel, 1950.
3. Die Entwicklung des finanzausgleichs im Deutschen Reich und in Preussen von 1919 bis 1944, by Hans-Erich Hornscher. 198 p. DM. 12. *11.* Die Belastung durch die persönliche Einkommensteuer in Deutschland, England und den Vereinigten Staaten, by Rudolf Binder. 196 p. DM. 15.

THE KOREAN CRISIS, by Sydney D. Bailey. London, National Peace Council, 1950. 43 p. (Peace Aims Pamphlet 49.) 1s. 6d.

MATERIAL ZUR AUFTEILUNG DER I. G. FARBENINDUSTRIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, by Hermann Gross. Kiel, Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel, 1950. 60 p.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS. New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1950. $1.00 each.
34. Behavior of wage rates during business cycles, by Daniel Creamer. 66 p. *35.* Shares of upper income groups in income and savings, by Simon Kuznets. 68 p.

DIE ORGANISATIONSARBEIT DER SED; reden von Walter Ulbricht und Paul Verner auf der Organisationskonferenz der SED. Berlin, Dietz, 1949. 128 p. DM. 0.60.

DIE POLITIK DER PARTEI UND DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER SED ZU EINER PARTEI NEUEN TYPUS, by Otto Grotewohl. Berlin, Dietz, 1949. 89 p. DM. 0.30.

DAS PROBLEM DER NEUGLIEDERUNG DER DEUTSCHEN BUNDESREPUBLIK DARGESTELLT AM BEISPIEL SÜDWESTSTAATES, by Theodor Eschenburg. Frankfurt am Main, Institut zur Förderung Offentlicher Angelegenheiten, 1950. 80 p. DM. 2.

REGIONALE STRUKTUR VON WIRTSCHAFT, BESIEDLUNG UND VERKEHR IN EUROPA, by Otto Schlier. Berlin, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, 1950. 78 p.

STADVERWALTUNG UND POLIZEI IN DEN SÜDDEUTSCHEN LÄNDERN. Frankfurt am Main, Institut zur Förderung Offentlicher Angelegenheiten, 1950. 55 p.

SUGAR IN HAWAII. Honolulu, Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, 1949. 96 p.

THE UNITED NATIONS; ITS RECORD AND ITS PROSPECTS. New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950. 60 p. 20¢.

UNSERE WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, 1949, by Walter Ulbricht. Berlin, Dietz, 1949. 99 p. DM. 0.30.

LA VIVIENDA EN EL TERRITORIO ESPAÑOL DE IFNI, by Jeronimo Saenz Martinez. Madrid, Instituto de Estudios Africanos, 1949. 69 p. 6 ptas.

EIN VOLK KÄMPFT UM SEIN LEBEN, by Alfred Migsch. Vienna, Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, n.d. 80 p.

THE WELFARE STATE AND THE STATE OF HUMAN WELFARE; a study by the Committee on Economic Policy. Washington, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1950. 60 p. 50¢.

DIE WELTWIRTSCHAFT MITTE 1950. Kiel, Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel, 1950, 91 p.

WEST GERMANY—PROTECTORATE OR ALLY? by Arnold Wolfers. New Haven, Yale Institute of International Studies, 1950. 49 p. (Memorandum 35.)

WESTEUROPÄISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSUNION ODER WIRTSCHAFTLICHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT? by Hans Bachman. Zurich, Polygraphischer, 1950. 48 p.

EIN WORT FÜR ÖSTERREICH, by Wilhelm Böhm. Vienna, Österreichischer Verlag, 1949. 103 p.

ZUR GESCHICHTE DER KOMMUNISTISCHEN PARTEI DEUTSCHLANDS, by Wilhelm Pieck. Berlin, Dietz, 1949. 70 p. DM. 0.60.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"By far the best general survey of American policy as it develops from year to year."—*N. Y. Herald Tribune*

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1949

By RICHARD P. STEBBINS

With an Introduction by GEORGE F. KENNAN

THIS fourth volume in the well-known Council on Foreign Relations new postwar series provides a comprehensive survey of world conditions on the eve of the Korean hostilities. It tells how the United States and the other free nations, confronted with a challenge whose revolutionary nature was clear, endeavored to readjust their policies and develop a coordinated defense without sacrificing economic benefits or democracy at home. It recounts the vicissitudes of the East-West political struggle in Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Greece, describes the clash of great-power interests in the turbulent Middle East, and appraises the course of the revolutionary movement in China and Southeast Asia.

The most neglected area in diplomatic history, George F. Kennan points out in the Introduction, is the immediate past—"the mirror of our own personal mistakes and achievements and the direct determinant of our current problems." Thoughtful citizens will welcome this clear, objective and expert interpretation of the antecedents of the present world crisis.

"It is the kind of book which in an ideal democracy every active citizen should read."—*The Review of Politics*

"The value of this continuing series is greater from year to year, because this country has been plunged deeper into world affairs."—*Cincinnati Enquirer*

558 pages of text (illustrated with maps), extensive selected bibliography, chronology of world events and index. *$5.00*

PUBLISHED BY HARPER & BROTHERS FOR THE
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
58 EAST 68 STREET • NEW YORK 21

London: ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AMERICA'S
"SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE"
IS ALWAYS READY

More than half the commercial airplanes used in the Korean airlift were operated by Pan American.

● When an aggressor struck in Korea, our government asked the civilian airlines to help set up a military airlift across the Pacific. In only *four days* after the invasion, the airlift was in operation. Ten of our scheduled airlines provided 45 four-engine airplanes, complete with crews, for the emergency lift from the United States to Tokyo.

Pan American is proud that it was selected by the government as operator of 24 of these airplanes . . . more than half. Ten of these came from Pan American's own world-wide Clipper* fleet.

Equally important, Pan American crews could—and did—contribute the priceless *experience* gained in over 15 years of Pacific flying.

Let no one forget it: America's civilian airlines are part of America's air power. For that reason alone, their growth should be encouraged in every way possible.

*Trade Mark, Reg. U. S. Pat. Off.

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS

WORLD'S MOST EXPERIENCED AIRLINE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED